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Abstract
This thesis comprises three essays on mutual fund performance which
provide new insights into different aspects of the mutual fund industry.
The first essay examines the relationship between the mutual fund man-
ager’s past experience and mutual fund performance. The skills and
knowledge acquired from the prior working experience may be trans-
ferred to the current working context, thereby influencing the current
job performance (Schmidt et al., 1986). Using data on U.S. mutual fund
managers’ work experience ranging from 1993 to 2012, we introduce a
new method to evaluate mutual fund performance from the perspective
of the manager’s lifetime working experience. Specifically, the method
involves using the Principal Component Analysis to construct a Manage-
rial Experience Index (MEI) based on 3 professional experience factors
from the past career history of each manager: (i) investment objectives
of the funds that s/he has managed (Zambrana and Zapatero, 2017), (ii)
fund companies that s/he has worked for and (iii) industries of stocks
in which s/he has invested (Kacperczyk et al., 2005). The MEI would
increase along with the experience accumulation for each mutual fund
manager. We group the sample based on the MEI into 5 quintiles from
the lowest MEI score (most concentrated experience) to the highest MEI
score (most diversified experience). The findings suggest that managers
with more specialised experience outperform managers with more diver-
sified experience. In addition, the “Specialist” managers tend to exhibit
stock-picking ability while the “Generalist” managers tend to exhibit
market-timing ability.
The second essay analyzes the performance patterns of new funds during
the early stage after their creation, and provides potential explanations
for their short-lived outperformance. Using a sample of incubation-free
mutual fund data from 1996 to 2015, we address the questions of (i)
ii
whether new mutual funds outperform the market and (ii) if they do
what may explain their superior performance. We find evidence of out-
performance for the new funds during their emerging period defined here
as the first 6 months of their existence, both before and after fund ex-
penses are taken into account. This outperformance, however, only lasts
for a short term and disappears soon after the emerging period. This
short-lived outperformance can be explained by the small size effect and
IPO stock allocation, but is only weakly associated with managerial char-
acteristics such as team managers and prior experience in equity fund
management. Our analysis also provides evidence on a flow-performance
relationship. The results suggest that IPO allocation is an effective strat-
egy that enhances investment flows during the emerging period of a new
fund. In addition, we find that funds created by team managers attract
more flows than funds created by individual managers.
The third essay examines if fund managers would take into account
turnover risk from a tournament when adjusting the risk of portfolios
under their management, where the tournament is defined as the com-
petition in a group with the purpose of being rewarded on their relative
performance Conyon et al. (2001). In addition to exploring a statistical
correlation between a manager’s discharge from a fund and the realized
volatility of the fund that she had been managing, we use an instrumen-
tal variable (IV) approach to study whether one may infer causality from
such a correlation. Using the instrumental variable (IV) measured as the
peer flow pressure in the tournament following the “Rank-of-Ranks” ap-
proach in Kempf and Ruenzi (2008), we find that peer flow pressure is a
highly statistically significant determinant of manager replacement. Fur-
ther, the risk of replacement is significantly linked to the fund’s realized
idiosyncratic volatility. The finding is robust to the use of an alternative
instrumental variable (Segment Flow Rank), an alternative measure of
realized risk (Carhart-adjusted Idiosyncratic Risk), and finite distributed
lag specifications that incorporate one-period lags of explanatory factors.
iii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Research Background
Globalization and the development of capital markets continue to fuel the growth of
mutual fund management industry. A mutual fund is a type of investment instru-
ment that pools money from investors, and invests their money in stocks, bonds,
money-market instruments, other securities, or even cash. Different mutual funds
may also be subject to different risks, fees and expenses.
By the end of year 2016, the total net asset (TNA) of U.S. mutual funds has
reached $16.3 trillion, which constitutes an increment of $9.3 trillion from $7 trillion
in year 2000. Figure 1.1 demonstrates the annual TNA of U.S. mutual funds from
1998 to 2016. The size of U.S. mutual fund industry has increased continually in
the past two decades, apart from a small drop of $2.4 trillion in year 2008 which
could be potentially caused by the global financial crisis.
Among the universe of U.S. mutual funds, 56% are equity funds as at the end
of 2016, which mainly invest in equities. Within the equity funds, domestic funds
which invest mainly in stock shares of U.S. corporations hold 42% of total assets1.
The domestic equity funds remain as hot as ever. According to Thomson Reuters
Lipper data, the average diversified U.S. equity fund registered a total return of
18.3% in 2017. In return, the positive performance of mutual funds helps to attract
great flow into the industry, and therefore fuze the overall mutual fund marekt size.
The increasing importance of mutual funds, especially equity funds has stim-
ulated a great number of researches among academics and practitioners. A large
1The relevant statistics are obtained from the 2017 Investment Fact Book published by the
Investment Company Institute (ICI).
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strand of literature focuses on the mutual fund performance measurement and de-
terminants of better performance. Specifically, building on Jensen (1968), a large
number of studies have investigated (i) whether mutual funds perform better, on
average, than a benchmark which is usually a passive market portfolio’s performance
(Daniel et al., 1997; Grinblatt and Titman, 1989; Huang et al., 2011; Jensen, 1968;
Wermers, 2000), and (ii) potential determinants of the cross-sectional variance of
performance across different mutual funds (Atkinson et al., 2003; Berk et al., 2004;
Berk and Van Binsbergen, 2012; Simutin, 2014). The empirical evidence on whether
the mutual fund manager could generate abnormal returns is mixed. On one hand,
Carhart (1997) and Jensen (1968) find that the average equity mutual fund does
not outperform the market. However, there are a few actively-managed funds per-
form better than a passive portfolio. On the other hand, the majority of individual
investors tend to believe that some active portfolio managers have skills and could
therefore “beat the market” (Wermers, 2004).
As a few funds are found to provide abnormal performance, there is a strand
of the literature that focuses on certain fund or portfolio manager characteristics
which are associated with superior performance. Several fund characteristics have
been analyzed as potential determinants of future fund performance. For example,
Chen et al. (2004) and Grinblatt and Titman (1989) empirically conclude that a
large fund size would erode performance. Simutin (2014) reveals the positive rela-
tionship between the cash holding amount of a mutual fund and its performance.
Most mutual funds are under the management of an individual or a group of portfolio
managers who make investment decisions. Perhaps not surprisingly, an increasing
number of studies have studied managerial traits and fund governance (Ba¨r et al.,
2011; Chevalier and Ellison, 1999b; Choi et al., 2016; Khorana, 1996; Qiu, 2003).
For instance, Gottesman and Morey (2006) conclude a significant positive relation-
ship between the education score of portfolio manager and the fund performance.
Patel and Sarkissian (2017) analyze the fund management team structure, and find
that team-managed funds outperform individual-managed funds across various per-
formance metrics.
Building on the existing literature, the thesis tries to investigate the mutual fund
performance, and seeks for potential explanations of mutual fund outperformance
from various perspectives including managerial employment experience, managerial
career concern and new fund initiation.
3
1.2 Research Objectives and Key Findings
There are three topics in mutual fund industry investigated in three independent
empirical studies in the thesis. The three research topics include the fund manager’s
past working experience, new fund initiation and manager’s career concern raised
from peers. We discuss specific research objectives of three empirical studies in this
section.
The first empirical study is presented in Chapter 3, following an overview of the
literature in Chapter 2. This study examines the relationship between the mutual
fund manager’s past experience and the mutual fund’s performance. The skills and
knowledge acquired from prior working experience may be transferred to the current
working context, thereby influencing the current job performance (Schmidt et al.,
1986). Researchers have explored this topic from the perspectives of both applied
psychology and empirical finance, where the latter particularly pertains to the CEO
behavior analysis (Custo´dio et al., 2013). Building on this literature, we investigate
the relationship between the mutual fund manager’s past experience and mutual
fund performance. Using data on U.S. mutual fund managers’ work experience
ranging from 1993 to 2012, this chapter introduces a new method to evaluate mutual
fund performance from the perspective of the manager’s lifetime working experience,
by using the Principal Component Analysis to construct a Managerial Experience
Index (MEI) based on 3 professional experience factors from the past career history
of that manager: (i) investment objectives of the funds that s/he has managed
(Zambrana and Zapatero, 2017), (ii) fund companies that s/he has worked for and
(iii) industries of stocks in which s/he has invested (Kacperczyk et al., 2005). This
chapter aims at addressing the following research questions:
• Is the fund’s current performance affected by the manager’s past working ex-
perience, including the number of investment objectives managed, the number
of fund companies employed and the number of industries invested?
• How does the manager’s past working experience influence the manager’s in-
vestment ability, particularly the stock-picking and market-timing abilities?
The key findings of this chapter suggest that fund managers with more con-
centrated past working experience outperform those with more diversified experi-
ence. In addition, managers with more concentrated experience tend to exhibit
4
stock-picking ability while those with more generalized experience tend to exhibit
market-timing ability. The findings of this study are expected to be particularly
useful for individual investors, since an observable managerial characteristic such as
managerial past experience would allow them to more appropriately choose where
to allocate their money for investment purposes.
Chapter 4 reports an analysis of the performance patterns of new mutual funds,
and investigates the explanation for the short-lived outperformance. The increasing
number of new funds has stimulated a debate among academics and practitioners
about fund performance. Using U.S. mutual fund data from 1996 to 2015, we
provide the first empirical evidence that new mutual funds can temporarily add
value during its early stage, although this outperformance vanishes after a while.
We restrict our sample to incubation-free funds like Evans (2010), by selecting funds
with inception dates in the database close to the ticker creation date recorded in
National Association Of Securities Dealers (NASD). This chapter aims at addressing
the following research questions:
• Can the outperformance of newly-created fund be explained by the fund or
managerial characteristics?
• Considering that fund creation is highly correlated with IPO volume, would
the fund’s access to IPO stocks become a valuable trading opportunity in
creating new funds?
The first finding of this chapter is that new funds during their emerging period
exhibit abnormal performance both before and after adjusting for fund expenses.
The short-term outperformance during the emerging period is negatively related
with the fund size, but not related to manager characteristics. We also find that
IPO access is a significant explanation for the short-term outperformance and is
associated with significant fund flow.
Chapter 5 investigates the idea that fund managers would take into account
turnover risk that they face when adjusting the volatility of portfolios under their
management. In addition to exploring a statistical correlation between a manager’s
discharge from a fund and the realized volatility of the fund that s/he had been
managing, we use an instrumental variable (IV) approach to study whether one
may infer causality from such a correlation. Our structural equation describes a
fund’s volatility as a function of whether its manager has been recently replaced,
5
and we address the potential endogeneity of manager replacement using an IV that is
motivated by the notion of a family tournament. The instrumental variable measures
the peer flow pressure that a fund is facing in the tournament, and is based on the
“Rank-of-Ranks” approach in Kempf and Ruenzi (2008). This chapter aims at
addressing the following research questions:
• Is the peer flow pressure from the fund tournament a significant determinant
of whether a mutual fund manager is replaced?
• Do fund managers adjust the risk of their funds based on the career risk that
they are facing from the tournament?
We find an innovative explanation for the linkage of fund risk taking and the
fund tournament. To be specific, fund managers are facing greater career concern if
they perform badly in the tournament. Under the peer pressure, managers are more
likely to hold more volatile portfolios so that to improve and secure their positions
in the tournament.
1.3 Thesis Overview
This thesis comprises a total of six chapters. The current chapter is Chapter 1,
and has presented a general introduction of the thesis, including the research back-
ground, motivations and research objectives. Chapter 2 provides an overview of
the relevant literature, and also summarizes the theoretical framework, fund perfor-
mance measurement and performance determinants that are applied in this thesis.
Chapters 3 to 5 present three original empirical studies. Specifically, the first
empirical analysis (Chapter 3) examines the relation between the fund manager’s
past working experience and the performance of funds that s/he currently manages.
Chapter 4 analyzes the performance patterns of new funds during their early stage.
The third and final empirical study in Chapter 5 investigates the association between
the fund’s risk taking and the manager’s replacement risk arising from within-family
tournament to generate greater fund flow.
After presenting three empirical studies, the final chapter, Chapter 6, summarizes
the conclusions of all three empirical analysis.
6
Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter provides a review of the literature on mutual funds, which relates
to the research topics covered in the thesis. Specifically, this chapter includes the
discussion in the research frameworks, estimation models used to evaluate fund
performance and determinants widely applied in the literature in explaining fund
out-performance.
2.1 Research Framework
According to the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) (Fama, 1965, 1970), financial
markets are “informationally efficient”. If markets are efficient, then information
gathering by mutual fund managers cannot produce abnormal returns consistently.
However, testing this assertion is quite challenging because performance measures
are imperfect.
Most of fund performance studies follow the methodology comparing a manager’s
performance with a benchmark index portfolio such as S&P 500 (Blume and Friend,
1973; Jensen, 1968; Jensen et al., 1972; Wermers, 2000). The major drawback of
this method is the assumption of a consistent risk level of the portfolio without at-
tention to the manager’s stock selectivity skill (Lee and Rahman, 1990). Ferson and
Qian (2004) suggests the Conditional Performance Evaluation (CPE) as a method
to improve performance measurement by considering time-varying risk, and apply
the new model to test U.S. equity mutual funds with conditional alphas. Malkiel
(1995) and Carhart (1997) examine the performance using net returns data while
Grinblatt and Titman (1983, 1992) and Wermers (2000) use the calculated return
using portfolio stock holding information. Though they analyze fund performance
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using different data information, outcomes are similar which indicating that mutual
funds have a slightly negative level of premium returns.
The empirical evidence on whether the mutual fund manager could generate ab-
normal returns is mixed. The average equity mutual fund does not outperform the
market, but a few actively-managed funds perform better than a passive portfolio
(Carhart, 1997; Jensen, 1968). Ferreira et al. (2013) find consistent empirical evi-
dence that mutual funds underperform the market overall not only in U.S., but also
in other 26 countries. It is commonly argued that actively managed mutual funds
would not generate great returns because of management expenses that the fund
managers charge. With small samples of mutual funds, Ferson and Schadt (1996)
empirically show that the expense-adjusted performance is indeed negative under
the traditional measurement model. However, the performance turns out to be neu-
tral when one applies conditional measurement models (Ferson and Schadt, 1996).
Ferson and Qian (2004) find that overall, the US equity mutual funds generate neu-
tral risk-adjusted return, indicating those managers have the portfolio management
ability only to cover the expenses. Moreover, several studies conclude that mutual
fund performance is largely unpredictable, and suggest that the outperformance
of some mutual funds is driven by luck instead of skills (Bollen and Busse, 2005;
Carhart, 1997; Fama, 1970).
While some studies suggest that that overall, mutual funds underperform the
market benchmark, others disagree. Moreover, the majority of individual investors
tend to believe that some active portfolio managers could “beat the market” persis-
tently for a long period (Wermers, 2004). Grinblatt and Titman (1989) show positive
gross abnormal returns for both small funds and growth funds. Chevalier and El-
lison (1999a) find that some managers would be expected to beat the market even
after considering management fees. Wermers (2000) finds that the stocks mutual
funds outperform broad market indices. The value of active fund management turns
out to be significant: stocks held by fund managers outperform the characteristic-
based benchmark by 1.3%, which suggests the existence of the stock-picking skill
in active portfolio managers (Wermers, 2000). More recently, Kacperczyk et al.
(2008) compare the actual performance of funds to the performance of the funds’
beginning of quarter holdings and find that for the average fund, performance is
indistinguishable, suggesting superior performance gross of fees and thus implying
that the average manager adds value during the quarter after the beginning. Cre-
8
mers and Petajisto (2009) show that the amount of portfolio holding of a fund that
deviates from its benchmark is associated with better performance, and that this
superior performance is persistent.
The empirical evidence on whether fund managers possess ability to generate
abnormal performance is decidedly mixed. Some studies reveal that active portfolio
managers fail to outperform the passive benchmark portfolios even before consid-
ering the expenses (Carhart, 1997; Gruber, 1996; Jensen, 1968; Malkiel, 1995). On
the other hand, there are some studies find that active portfolio managers do exhibit
securities picking ability by beating the benchmark (Daniel et al., 1997; Grinblatt
and Titman, 1989).
2.2 Measurement of Mutual Fund Performance
As mentioned in Fan et al. (2017), turning the curse of dimensionality into blessing,
the latent factors can be accurately extracted from the vast set of predictive vari-
ables and hence they can be reliably used to build models for response variables.
For the same reason, factor-based models have been widely employed in portfolio
management to examine the performance patterns of mutual funds.
There are a large number of studies that use factor-based models to estimate the
mutual fund performance, such as Chen and Pennacchi (2009) and Kacperczyk et al.
(2005). These models provide benchmarks against which the superior or inferior fund
performance is assessed. As the main research objective of the thesis is to investigate
mutual fund performance and reveal potential determinants for outperformance, we
adopt factor-based asset-pricing models as the performance measurements following
the existing literature.
The present section discusses these asset-pricing models including Fama-French
3 factor (Fama and French, 1993), Carhart 4 factor (Carhart, 1997), Ferson-Schadt
conditional (Ferson and Schadt, 1996) and Fama-French 5 factor (Fama and French,
2015) models. Specifically, intercepts (Jensen’s α) estimated from these models are
often used as performance indicators.
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2.2.1 Fama-French 3 Factor Model
The market beta from the single factor Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of
Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) is argued to be insufficient to explain the cross-
asset variation (Harvey and Siddique, 2000). Therefore, Fama and French (1993)
document the importance of two fundamental factors “Small Minus Big” (SMB)
and “High Minus Low” (HML).
Ri,t −Rf,t = αi + βi,m(Rm,t −Rf,t) + βi,smbSMBt + βi,hmlHMLt + εjt (2.2.1)
where we use i to donate the equity mutual fund, and t to donate the time unit.
The dependent variable Ri,t − Rf,t is the monthly return on portfolio in month
minus the risk-free rate, and the independent variables are given by the returns of
the four zero-investment factor portfolios. The expression Rm,t −Rf,t measures the
excess return of the market portfolio over the risk-free rate, which is also known as
the “market premium” that equals the difference between the net return and the
value-weighted aggregate proxy portfolio (Chen and Pennacchi, 2009); SMBt is the
return difference between small and large capitalization stocks; HMLt is the return
difference between high and low book-to-market stocks. The last expression εjt
refers to the error item. One drawback of this model is that no theoretical argument
exists justifying why these factors measure systematic risk in the economy. Fama
and French (2010) recognize this limitation but argue that one can interpret the
factors as simply alternative (passive) investment opportunities.
2.2.2 Carhart 4 Factor Model
One of the fund performance measures in this thesis is based on the Carhart (1997)
four-factor model, which controls for risk and style factors. In the related literature,
it is typically assumed that the riskiness of the manager’s portfolio can be measured
using factors identified by Fama and French (1995) and Carhart (1997). This model
especially considers the momentum effect in stock returns (Jegadeesh and Titman,
1993). The regression that would be estimated is defined as:
Ri,t −Rf,t = αi + βi,m(Rm,t −Rf,t) + βi,smbSMBt + βi,hmlHMLt
+βi,momMOMt + ε
j
t (2.2.2)
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The dependent variable Rm,t−Rf,t and explanatory variables Rm,t−Rf,t, SMBt
and HMLt are as previously defined in Section 2.2.1. The additional factor MOMt
is the return difference between stocks with high and low past returns. The Carhart
four-factor measure is broadly used in measuring mutual fund performance (Chen
and Pennacchi, 2009; Kacperczyk et al., 2005).
2.2.3 Ferson-Schadt Conditional Model
Traditional unconditional fund performance measures might be unreliable because
of the common variation will be confounded with average performance (Ferson and
Schadt, 1996; Kacperczyk et al., 2005). Therefore, Ferson and Schadt (1996) ad-
vocate the use predetermined instruments to capture time-varying loadings. In
this thesis, the measurement model follows Wermers (2004) by introducing various
macro-economic variables in addition to the Carhart (1997) 4 factor model. As a re-
sult, the model allows the interaction terms between various macro-economic factors
and excess market return (Kacperczyk et al., 2005):
Ri,t −Rf,t = αi + βi,m(Rm,t −Rf,t) + βi,smbSMBt + βi,hmlHMLt
+ βi,momMOMt +
4∑
j=1
βi,j[zj,t−1(Rm,t −Rf,t)] + εjt (2.2.3)
Variables Rm,t − Rf,t, SMBt, HMLt and MOMt are as discussed in previous
sections. The zj,t−1 is the lagged value of macro-economic variable j. Four macro-
economic factors include the 1-month Treasury bill yield, the dividend yield of the
S&P 500 index, the Treasury bill spread (long- minus short-term bonds) and the
quality spread in the corporate bond market (low- minus high-grade bonds).
2.2.4 Fama-French 5 Factor Model
Fama and French (2015) add the profitability (RMW) and investment (CMA) factors
to the 3 factor model of Fama and French (1993). The Fama and French (2015) 5
factor model draws on evidence from Novy-Marx (2013) and Aharoni et al. (2013)
suggesting that profitability and investment bear risk premia in the cross section.
They use this evidence to support augmenting the Fama and French (1993) 3 factor
model with the investment and profitability factors.
By adding the investment and profitability factors to the Fama and French (1993)
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3 factor model, the model provides better power in explaining returns (Dittmar and
Lundblad, 2017). The model is presented as follows:
Ri,t −Rf,t = αi + βi,m(Rm,t −Rf,t) + βi,smbSMBt + βi,hmlHMLt
+βi,rmwRMWt + βi,cmaCMAt + ε
j
t (2.2.4)
As the model is based on the Fama and French (1993) 3 factor model, the
dependent variable and some of the explanatory factors are defined as in Section
2.2.1. In addition, the profitability factor RMWt is the return difference between
stocks with robust and weak profitability and the investment factor CMAt is the
return difference between stocks with low and high investment firms.
2.3 Determinants of Mutual Fund Performance
As the mutual fund industry plays a dramatically increased role in financial markets
in recent decades, investors are increasingly interested in mutual fund selection,
demanding detailed mutual fund information and investment advice. Under this
incentive, many authors have tried to explain the performance of mutual funds,
which is a critical aspect in investor fund selection. In this section, we provide the
literature review on the documented determinants of mutual fund performance from
three aspects: fund characteristics, manager characteristics and managerial abilities.
2.3.1 Fund Characteristics
Several fund characteristics have been analyzed as potential determinants of future
fund performance, including fund size, age, fees and expenses, loads, turnover, flows,
and returns (Berk and Green, 2004; Chen et al., 2004; Edelen, 1999; Jensen, 1968;
Jordan and Riley, 2015; Pollet and Wilson, 2008; Simutin, 2014; Wermers, 2004;
Yan, 2006).
The fund size is defined as “the month-end net assets of the mutual fund” by
MorningStar2, and normally recorded in millions of dollars. Based on an analysis
of a long term sample from 1962 to 1999, Chen et al. (2004) conclude that a large
fund size would erode performance, which is consistent with the finding of Grinblatt
2Morningstar Inc. is an investment research and investment management firm headquartered in
Chicago, U.S.. It also provides data and research insights on a wide range of investment offerings.
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and Titman (1989) that fund returns decline with fund size. It is believed in some
literature that large asset sizes would erode mutual fund performance due to higher
trading costs associated with liquidity impact (Perold and Salomon Jr, 1991). More-
over, the negative relation between fund size and performance can be explained by
the portfolio diversification. As mentioned in Pollet and Wilson (2008), a typical
large fund held fewer than twice the number of stocks held by a fund less than 1% of
its size. It is easier for a small mutual fund to put all assets into the best-performing
portfolio than a large size fund (Chen et al., 2004).
Similarly, fund age is normally applied as the control variable in fund perfor-
mance measurement. It is usually measured as the number of months since the fund
started its first share class as mentioned in Jordan and Riley (2015). Fund age is
normally highly correlated to fund size, as the TNA of a mutual fund typically grows
over time. However, Jordan and Riley (2015) find a positive effect of fund age on
the estimated alphas.
Sometimes it is argued that one may make abnormal returns by analyzing the
cash flow information in small funds (Zheng, 1999). Fund flows would be greatly
impacted by fund sizes and media attention since search costs could be affected by
these characteristics (Sirri and Tufano, 1998). The significant positive relationship
between fund flows and past performance does appear in the top 25% of past returns
(Goetzmann and Peles, 1997). Berk and Van Binsbergen (2012) argue that money
would flow to the most skilled manager until the manager could not deliver further
abnormal returns. This evidence is rooted in diseconomies of scale in performance.
In a similar vein, some literature tries to explain the observed convexity in the mutual
fund flow-performance relationship with reference to the managers risk-taking (Berk
et al., 2004; Lynch and Musto, 2003). Venkatesan (2014) finds the evidence that new
money flows would follow skilled managers after controlling for past performance.
Cash holdings, as the largest non-equity asset class in the mutual fund, could
generate dynamic differences in fund performance (Simutin, 2014). Yan (2006) ar-
gues that cash holdings are related to the fund size, fees and other characteris-
tics. Simutin (2014) examines the relationship between the cash holding amount
of a mutual fund and its performance. The result shows that funds managed with
large abnormal cash holdings which exceed a predicted level would outperform those
actively-managed funds with low cash holdings by more than 2% per annum due to
the flexibility that the excess cash provides.
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As expressed in the 2017 Investment Company Factbook, there are mainly two
types of expenses and fees for mutual fund investors: ongoing expenses and sales
loads. The ongoing expenses cover portfolio management, fund administration, dis-
tribution charges (known as 12b-1 fees) and other compliance costs (Malhotra and
McLeod, 1997). Such expenses are included in the fund expense ratio, which is
the annual charge expressed as a percentage of its total assets. The sales loads are
paid at the time of share purchase (front-end loads), or at the time when shares
are redeemed (back-end loads), or over time (level loads). The fund expense ratio
tends to fall if the total assets of a fixed sample of funds rise over time. This is
because some costs included in the expense ratio (such as accounting and auditing
fees, transfer agency fees and director’s fees) are mostly fixed in dollar terms. An-
other factor explaining a decline in the average expense ratio is the shift towards
no-load share classes, particularly institutional no-load share classes that tend to
have below-average expense ratios. Malhotra and McLeod (1997) argue that funds
with higher expense ratio tend to take riskier investment decisions to achieve bet-
ter returns so that these high expenses can be recouped. Further, Cashman et al.
(2012) find the envidence that fund outflows increase with expense ratios which can
be explained as the cost of staying in a fund for investors.
2.3.2 Manager Characteristics
In the 1990s, most studies on mutual fund performance ignored the essential role of
fund managers, and mainly focused on fund characteristics. Kon et al. (1983) stress
the importance of managerial characteristics on fund performance as it provides a
better view in manager evaluation. Some literature has focused on the managerial
level recently by studying the effects of manager characteristics and behavior in-
cluding manager age (Taylor, 1975), gender (Atkinson et al., 2003) and education
background (Chevalier and Ellison, 1999a; Gottesman and Morey, 2006) on fund
performance.
One factor of fund management that relates closely to our studies is the size of
the fund management team. Usually, researchers categorize funds into individual-
managed and team-managed funds based on the number of managers. In the past
decades, the number of mutual funds managed by a team has increased significantly
from only 30% in 1992 to above 70% in 2010 (Patel and Sarkissian, 2017).
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The current literature offers two competing hypotheses concerning individual-
managed and team-managed funds. The group shift hypothesis (Hogg et al., 1990;
Kerr, 1992) suggests that the opinion of team members shifts towards the opinion
of the dominant person in a team. As that person typically holds very pronounced
opinions, a team eventually gravitates towards extremes. Consequently, teams make
more extreme decisions than individuals do. In contrast, the diversification of opin-
ions hypothesis suggests that the team opinion is the average opinion of the team
members. Because individual team members might have different opinions, the team
decision will be a compromise (e.g., Sah and Stiglitz (1986, 1988)). Extreme opin-
ions of members in a team are averaged out and teams eventually make less extreme
decisions than individuals do.
The empirical evidence on the performance of individual and team management
is rather mixed. For instance, most studies use the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) or Morningstar Principia (MP) data and conclude there is no signif-
icant outperformance in teams over individually managed funds (Ba¨r et al., 2011;
Bliss et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2004; Massa et al., 2010). However, very recently, Patel
and Sarkissian (2017) find that team-managed funds outperform individual-managed
funds across various performance metrics using the relatively new Morningstar Di-
rect (MD) mutual fund database.
Turning to the effects of education, a manager who attended a more selective
SAT (Scholastic Aptitude Test) institution would have a better risk-adjusted return
(Chevalier and Ellison, 1999a). With some improvement from the former article,
Gottesman and Morey (2006) add more educational factors to pursue the study.
A significant positive relationship between GMAT (Graduate Management Admis-
sion Test) score in MBA (Master of Business Administration) program and fund
performance is proved.
Although the mutual fund industry is large in the U.S. financial market, the
fraction of female fund managers is quite low, which has been singled out as a
“trillion dollar question” by a recent New York Times article3. Niessen-Ruenzi
and Ruenzi (2017) find no difference in fund performance between female and male
managers. However, the fund flow attracted to funds managed by female managers
is significantly more than male managers.
3This can be found in the New York Times article on 13/01/2017: A Trillion-Dollar Question:
Why Don’t More Women Run Mutual Funds?
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Age is also one of characteristics that have received a lot of attention in the
academic literature on fund performance. The effects of age and experience on the
decision-making behavior are examined by Taylor (1975) by using data of 79 male
line managers from factories. It is found that age matters more to decision making
performance than experience (Taylor, 1975). In the literature investigating how the
gender difference affects fund characteristics, Atkinson et al. (2003) show that there
is no significant relationship between gender and fund performance. However, the
net asset flow is comparatively low in female-managed fixed-income mutual funds
than male-managed funds. Another interesting perspective is the geographic impact
on the portfolio performance. It is observed that portfolio managers earn abnormal
returns in assets invested in nearby areas because of the informational advantage
(Coval and Moskowitz, 2001).
2.3.3 Managerial Abilities
Lee and Rahman (1990) document that fund managers obtain better performance
due to obvious ability to “time” the financial market (market-timing) and/or the
skill to forecast individual asset returns (stock-picking). Fama (1972) categorizes the
portfolio manager’s skills into two parts: micro forecasting of the price movement
of individual asset (stock-picking), and macro forecasting of the price movement of
the whole stock market (market-timing).
Stock selection skill allows the manager to forecast firm-specific events and there-
fore the prices of individual securities, while market timing ability is mainly con-
cerned with predicting future realizations of the market portfolio (Kon et al., 1983).
Lee and Rahman (1990) mention that a portfolio managers can be characterize as a
stock-picker or/and market-timer based on the skill that revealed in the investment.
Further, Kacperczyk et al. (2014) investigate the interaction between two man-
agerial skills and the business cycle by pointing out that managers exhibit more
“stock-picking” skill in economic booms while greater “market-timing” ability in re-
cessions. A skilled fund manager is likely to attract more fund inflows and also tend
to set into the hedge fund industry in the future (Kacperczyk et al., 2014). And
portfolio managers are approved to have the ability to effectively separate the stock-
picking skill from the market-timing skill during the tenure (Treynor and Black,
1973).
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According to Venkatesan (2014), on average mutual fund managers have the
stock-picking skill and it is even more pronounced in smaller funds. Those skilled
fund managers who turnover the portfolio more often would also charge more ex-
penses, which might be used as a compensation for their skills (Venkatesan, 2014).
Venkatesan (2014) concludes that the average of U.S. mutual fund managers has
stock-picking skill and it is mainly driven by the ability to predict firms’ inflows.
This outperformance is persistent in the short term and cannot be explained by
the momentum effect. However, Fama and French (2010) conclude that though top
managers have the skill to beat the market, the average manager lacks the rele-
vant skill. Additionally, Ding and Wermers (2004) find that the most experienced
growth fund managers have substantially better stock selecting abilities than the
less-experienced colleagues. Moreover, Ding and Wermers (2004) conclude that the
managerial experience does matter for predicting future stock-picking successes of
growth-oriented managers, but not that of income-oriented managers. This outcome
supports the view that experience is positively related with the success in picking
growth stocks.
The literature on the market timing ability of mutual fund managers mainly fo-
cuses on examining the managerial skill to time market return or volatility. Treynor
and Mazuy (1966) develop a market timing measure but only find 1 out of 57 funds
in the sample with significant timing ability. Likewise, Henriksson (1984) adopts the
methodology in Henriksson and Merton (1981) to test the presence of market timing
ability and concludes that only 3 out of 116 funds exhibit timing ability. Chang and
Lewellen (1984) apply a joint test to examine the existence of stock picking and
market timing ability of mutual fund managers, and conclude that neither type of
skill exists. (Elton et al., 2009) find the evidence that the managerial timing ability
lead to incorrect investment decisions and poor management performance.
Although most studies find virtually no evidence that fund managers exhibit
timing ability, there is still some empirical evidence supporting the existence of
timing ability. Fama (1972) proposes a model to test market timing ability. Later,
Kon et al. (1983) follow the method by apply this method in an analysis of 37 mutual
funds. Kon et al. (1983) conclude that the significant market-timing ability exist
in individual portfolio managers. Bollen and Busse (2001) test the market timing
ability of mutual fund managers using both daily and monthly data, and conclude
that the use of daily returns makes it possible to detect timing ability. In line with
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this finding, Jiang et al. (2007) and Huang and Wang (2014) also show the existence
of market timing ability by applying a holding-based approach.
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Chapter 3
“Specialist” versus “Generalist”:
Mutual Fund Performance and
Manager Lifetime Work
Experience
3.1 Introduction
This study extends the literature on mutual fund by analyzing novel data on the
lifetime work experience of mutual fund managers to investigate whether a mutual
fund’s performance varies with its fund manager’s managerial experience that the
manager has accumulated over the course of her career.
This chapter is motivated by studies from applied psychology which suggest that
individual behavior is partly shaped by past experiences (Nisbett and Ross, 1980;
Taylor, 1975). Building on this literature, recent studies examine how past experi-
ences affect investment decisions of individuals. Vissing-Jorgensen (2004) concludes
that an individual’s current belief depends on her own prior investing experience,
and this belief affects her portfolio shareholdings. Similarly, Kaustia and Knu¨pfer
(2008) provide evidence on a positive linkage between past IPO investment returns
and future subscriptions by individuals. Past experience affects not only the behav-
ior of individual investors, but also that of mutual fund managers and CEOs. Using
the mutual fund manager’s age as a proxy for her investment experience, Greenwood
and Nagel (2009) find that younger, and hence less experienced according to their
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proxy, managers invested a larger amount of money into equities in the technol-
ogy industry particularly at the peak of a bubble. Custo´dio et al. (2013) argue that
CEOs with more general managerial skills, gained from the past working experience,
are rewarded with a greater compensation relative to specialist CEOs. Overall, the
existing empirical evidence agrees with the conclusion of Schmidt et al. (1986) that
an individual’s prior working experience is a valuable source of skills and knowledge
which may be also applied to her current working context.
We investigate the relationship between the mutual fund manager’s past expe-
rience and the mutual fund performance by exploiting data on the fund manager’s
career history, instead of using age as a proxy for the manager’s experience. The
main esearch questions examined in this chapter are listed as follows:
• Is the fund’s current performance affected by the manager’s past working ex-
perience, including the number of investment objectives managed, the number
of fund companies employed and the number of industries invested?
• How does the manager’s past working experience influence the manager’s in-
vestment ability, particularly the stock-picking and market-timing abilities?
The mutual fund manager’s past experience may encapsulate all the professional
knowledge and skills acquired from the past career history. In this study, the fund
manager’s experience is captured by information on the numbers of (i) different
fund types managed where different types are distinguished by different investment
objectives, (ii) fund companies worked for and (iii) industries invested during the
past career history. These three dimensions reflect the manager’s investment styles,
employment history and exposure to industry-specific information which may affect
her current fund’s performance via her skills and knowledge. For example, a more
specialist manager, who has managed fewer fund types and invested in fewer in-
dustries in the past, may be expected to improve her fund’s performance via better
stock-picking and market-timing skills.
The existing literature on the determinants of mutual fund performance focuses
either on the role of fund characteristics, such as fund flows (Berk and Green, 2004;
Hu et al., 2011), turnover ratio (Pa´stor et al., 2015) and fund size (Chen et al., 2004;
Pollet and Wilson, 2008), or that of managerial characteristics, such as the manager’s
education background (Chevalier and Ellison, 1999a; Gottesman and Morey, 2006),
gender (Atkinson et al., 2003) and age (Taylor, 1975). This study extends the
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literature by investigating the impact of managerial professional experience acquired
during the career of the manager. In addition, this study considers the channels
through which such an impact may operate.
More specifically, this study proposes an index based on three managerial expe-
rience factors, which can represent the fund manager’s past professional experience,
and empirically investigates how the index is associated with the mutual fund per-
formance. Based on the index rankings, the manager could be divided into “gen-
eralist” (with more diversified experience) or “specialist” (with more concentrated
experience) based on the lifetime experience. The insights from applied psychology
suggest that the past experience may affect the mutual fund manager’s investment
decisions via her lifetime accumulated experience and skills, thereby affecting fund
performance. This study anticipates a potential relationship between the managerial
experience and fund performance which would indicate that the past professional
experience shaped the fund manager’s decision making.
Moreover, this study provides evidence on the specific channels through which
managerial experience acquired over the course of the manager’s career may im-
pact on the fund performance. Managers with more specific skills during their em-
ployment history might be more familiar with some individual stocks which could
improve their stock-picking skill. Similarly, with more concentrated experience in
certain industries, specialist fund managers are expected to possess better security-
picking and market-timing ability due to more informational advantages obtained
in certain industries than generalist managers.
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows. We present the literature review
in Section 3.2. Next, we provide the data and methodology in the next section. The
main empirical results and robustness tests are included in Section 3.4. Finally, we
close the chapter with conclusion.
3.2 Prior Literature
This section presents the literature review on topics including individual’s experience
and job performance, mutual fund performance and managerial abilities.
The association between the individual’s past experience and current decision
making has long been examined in the literature. In the early 1970s, Slovic (1972)
concludes that investor’s prior investment decision making experience of a specific
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type had little effect on performance in subsequent decisions of the same type. Sim-
ilarly, Taylor (1975) argues that the manager’s age is a more influential determinant
of the job performance in the decision making exercise than their prior decision
making experience. Medoff and Abraham (1980) provide direct evidence on the
relationship between experience and earnings, using data on managers and profes-
sional employees who do similar work in two major U.S. corporations. They conclude
that there is a strong and positive linkage between manager experience and relative
earnings, but there is no significant association between experience and relative job
performance (Medoff and Abraham, 1980).
Another strand of the literature has found evidence that past experience has a
significant influence on the current job performance. For instance, McDaniel et al.
(1988) conduct a quantitative study in examining the relation between individual’s
job experience and job performance from a total sample of 16,058. Particularly,
they find that length of experience and job complexity are the two key determi-
nants for the job performance (McDaniel et al., 1988). This can be explained by
argument that an individual’s prior working experience is a valuable source of skills
and knowledge which may be also applied to her current working context (Schmidt
et al., 1986). Vissing-Jorgensen (2004) concludes that an individual’s current belief
depends on her own prior investing experience, and this belief affects her portfolio
shareholdings. More recently, Custo´dio et al. (2013) argue that CEOs’ managerial
skills obtained from the past working experience are associated with their compen-
sation. Specifically, CEOs with more general managerial skills are rewarded with a
greater compensation relative to specialist CEOs based on 5 managerial experience
factors (Custo´dio et al., 2013).
In the mutual fund industry, the fund abnormal return is normally considered as
the measurement of the manager performance. The empirical evidence on whether
the mutual fund manager could generate abnormal returns is mixed. On average,
the equity mutual fund does not outperform the market, but a few actively-managed
funds perform better than a passive portfolio (Carhart, 1997; Jensen, 1968). It is
commonly argued that actively managed mutual funds would not generate great re-
turns because of management expenses that the fund managers charge. While some
studies suggest that that overall mutual funds underperform the market benchmark,
others disagree. Moreover, the majority of individual investors tend to believe that
some active portfolio managers could “beat the market” persistently for a long pe-
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riod (Wermers, 2004).
Prior literature suggests that stock selection and market timing abilities are
potential channels through which a manager may affect fund performance (Fama,
1972; Lee and Rahman, 1990). Ding and Wermers (2004) and Chevalier and Ellison
(1999a) find the evidence that the stock selecting ability exist in certain groups of
fund managers. To be specific, Ding and Wermers (2004) reveal that experienced
growth fund managers tend to show better skills in selecting stocks while Chevalier
and Ellison (1999a) conclude that the manager with higher education grades would
exhibit better stock-picking skill. More recently, Venkatesan (2014) shows a signifi-
cantly positive relationship between managerial skill in stock-picking and the future
performance, which suggests the fund manager could add value through their skills.
Managers with more specific skills during their employment history might be more
familiar with some individual stocks which could improve their stock-selecting skill
(Lee and Rahman, 1990).
The main method of stock selectivity skill is to identify individual equities that
are under- or overvalued with expected return significantly away from the security
market line (Lee and Rahman, 1990). For the first managerial experience factor,
with more concentrated investment objective styles, the manager has more expertise
in managing certain type of mutual funds such as the Small-Cap and Health Sector
funds. With the equipped superior experience in these fund styles, the specialist
managers tend to have better skills in picking undervalued stocks in certain sectors.
Secondly, the fund company normally has its own information advantages. Cohen
et al. (2008) find that the private information flow would transfer from the top firm
officer to portfolio managers through a network, and therefore affect the stock price
and portfolio holdings. This information advantage could also be obtained through
social or/and educational networking (Cohen et al., 2008). The manager with more
company-employment history is more likely to be familiar with the superior infor-
mation from inside the company of picking under-valued stocks. Finally, managers
with certain industry expertise or information advantage on certain industries, i.e.
specialist fund managers, are expected to exhibit better stock-picking ability. To be
specific, a specialist with more concentrated professional experience in fewer indus-
tries would have the informational expertise to invest in better-performing stocks.
On the contrary, a generalist manager who is equipped with more diversified man-
aging experience are more likely to chase the market portfolio, and diversify more to
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reduce unsystematic volatility. Moreover, Kacperczyk et al. (2005) find that more
industry-concentrated funds would outperform well-diversified portfolios. Mutual
fund managers would prefer concentrating the fund holding if they believe they
have superior information in selecting profitable stocks.
Market timing refers to dynamic capital allocation among a wide range of invest-
ments, commonly restricted to stocks and short-term government bonds (Bollen and
Busse, 2001). To be specific, a fund manager with better timing ability would in-
crease the portfolio weight on stocks prior to a rise in the market and/or decrease the
weight before the market starts to fall. According to Henriksson and Merton (1981),
the market timing ability is a macro-forecasting skill that aims at forecasting the
price movements of the general market. A fund manager with more concentrated ex-
perience would have better skill in timing the market than a manager with broader
experiences, since a specialist manager is more familiar with the price movement
with the more focused past professional experience.
To be specific, the manager with more focused investment objectives is more
experienced in certain types of stocks such as the Value stock or Natural Resource
Sector equities. Having concentrated more on certain types of equities makes them
familiar with the price movement along with the business cycle therefore they could
exhibit better timing ability compared to managers with more diversified experi-
ences. According to Jiang et al. (2007), mutual fund managers apply non-public
information to time the market and predict market returns, which the manager
could obtain from the fund company. Avramov and Wermers (2006) prove that
long-only strategy outperform the Fama-French and Momentum benchmark by 2%
- 4% per year by timing industries over the business cycle. Moreover, Kacperczyk
et al. (2005) measure the industry-adjusted fund performance with the industry
concentration index, and conclude that the more concentrated fund exhibits better
ability in timing industries. This conclusion also indicates that the market timing
funds tend to be industry concentrated (Jiang et al., 2007).
Normally, firms would hire workers based on the working experience since they
believe workers would have obtained relevant skills, and knowledge to improve their
current working performance (Rynes et al., 1997). The prior employment history
would affect the future working performance (Dokko et al., 2009; Rynes et al., 1997).
In fund companies, mutual fund managers often manage a smaller sector of funds as
their career starts, and will be promoted to higher positions that will enable them
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to manage greater income funds afterwards (Chevalier and Ellison, 1999a). They
also argue that mutual fund managers in different career stages behave differently
and fund performance is determined by comprehensive managerial characteristics of
mutual fund managers. Chevalier and Ellison (1999a) test whether some managerial
characteristics including ability, knowledge or effort could affect fund performance
using a sample of mutual funds over a short time period. Later, Ding and Wermers
(2004) also raise the hypothesis of considering the performance at the manager level
rather than the fund level. They find that the manager’s experience matters, but
only for growth-oriented fund managers.
According to Becker (1962), general human capital improves working productiv-
ity across all firms while firm-specific capital only works in the current firm. Apart
from these managerial traits, the past working experience of a fund manager could
also be considered as one of the essential components of his/her background. How-
ever, there is little empirical evidence on its impact on fund performance. Only a
small number of studies analyzed fund performance by applying the past working
experience information of mutual fund managers.
Our study mainly focuses on the professional fund managing experience of the
fund manager, which could be acquired from the investment decision experience
in the mutual fund industry. There are three managerial experience factors that
may capture the past professional mutual fund management experience, specifically
investment objectives (Brown and Goetzmann, 1997), employment history (Dokko
et al., 2009) and industry concentration (Kacperczyk et al., 2005) information. These
are experiences and skills which have been previously found to affect fund perfor-
mance. Specifically, Dokko et al. (2009) argue that individuals are able to transfer
the knowledge and skill acquired from prior related work experience and improve the
current job performance. Kacperczyk et al. (2005) find the empirical evidence that
funds with more concentrated stock holdings tend to outperform more diversified
portfolio. This can be explained by the management team’s expertise in concen-
trated industries and therefore they are more likely to pick profitable stocks.
3.3 Data and Methodology
This section explains the data sources and describes the main characteristics of
mutual funds included in the study sample. The main methodology in constructing
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the Managerial Experience Index and in measuring managerial abilities are included
in this section.
3.3.1 Sample Selection
The primary data source for most of mutual fund characteristics used in this study is
the CRSP U.S. Survivorship-Bias-Free Mutual Fund Database. The CRSP database
covers the U.S. open-end mutual fund and provide fund characteristics information
like TNA (total net asset), fund returns, fund management structures, investment
objectives, holdings, turnover rates and fund manager’ identity (Niessen-Ruenzi and
Ruenzi, 2017). Next, we merge the CRSP mutual fund database with the Thomson
Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings Databases (formerly known as the Thomson Fi-
nancial CDA/Spectrum Holdings Database) using the MFLINKS file (see Simutin
(2014); Wermers (2004)) obtained from the Wharton Research Data based on (Wer-
mers, 2000). The Thomson Financial database provides long positions in domestic
common stock holdings of mutual funds and the data are collected both from sub-
mitted reports of mutual funds to SEC (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission)
and from volunteer reports generated by some mutual funds (Huang et al., 2011)4.
Since our study captures the managerial experience from the manager level, we
restrict our dataset to funds managed by individual managers, as opposed to teams
(Zambrana and Zapatero, 2017). We manually correct manager names with different
spellings and assign each manager a unique identifier5.
Like previous studies (Glode, 2011; Kacperczyk et al., 2008, 2014; Simutin, 2014),
we mainly focus on actively managed diversified domestic equity mutual funds in
U.S., and exclude international, balanced, sector, bond, money market, and index
funds6. This allows us to work with holdings data which are mostly complete and
4The Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires mandatory disclosure frequency from
quarterly to every 6 months. In 2004, SEC increased the disclosure frequency back to quarterly.
5In some cases the same manager is reported with or without the middle name, or using abbre-
viated first name.
6First, we select funds with the following Lipper objectives: CA, CG, CS, EI, FS, G, GI, H, ID,
LCCE, LCGE, LCVE, MC, MCCE, MCGE, MCVE, MLCE, MLGE, MLVE, MR, NR, S, SCCE,
SCGE, SCVE, SG, SP, TK, TL, UT. If a fund does not have any of the above objectives, we
select funds with the following Strategic Insights objectives: AGG, ENV, FIN, GMC, GRI, GRO,
HLT, ING, NTR, SCG, SEC, TEC, UTI, GLD, and RLE. If a fund has neither the Lipper nor
the SI objective, then we use the Wiesenberger Fund Type Code to select funds with the following
objectives: G, G-I, G-S, GCI, IEQ, ENR, FIN, GRI, HLT, LTG, MCG, SCG, TCH, UTL, and
GPM. Since the reported objectives are not always accurate in characterizing a fund, funds without
a CS policy (holding less than 80% asset allocation in equity market) would also be excluded. Index
funds are identified based on their names.
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reliable. As Busse et al. (2015) find, smaller funds tend to outperform larger funds
primarily when small-cap stocks outperform large-cap stocks; we therefore exclude
funds that managed less than $5 million assets in the previous month, and exclude
funds that did not disclose their holdings in the previous 36 months (Huang et al.,
2011). Additionally, we exclude funds for which the observation date precedes the
inception date, to avoid incubation bias (Evans, 2010; Zambrana and Zapatero,
2017).
Our final sample includes 5,406 U.S. open-end domestic equity funds. The sample
spans the period from 1993 to 20127, and includes 1,106 management companies and
3,122 portfolio managers.
3.3.2 Specialist and Generalist
One goal of this study is to test if a specialist fund manager could over-perform
the generalist manager where “specialist” and “generalist” are defined in relation
to working experience. To fulfill this purpose, the index of the fund manager’s
past working experience in equity funds (Managerial Experience Index) prior to the
current position would be created. This index captures the working experience of
equity fund managers that can be transferred across mutual funds and management
companies. We consider three proxies to capture the managerial working experience.
3.3.2.1 Managerial Experience Factors
Managerial experience factors that we use in this study are obtained at the manager’s
level. To analyze if the managerial experience affects fund performance, we focus on
3 factors which are representative of the manager’s life-time experience: (1) number
of fund objective styles the manager has managed, (2) number of fund companies the
manager has worked for, and (3) number of industries the manager has invested in.
These 3 factors capture different aspects of the manager’s past working experience,
and are defined as follows:
1. Number of Fund Styles (X1): This variable measures the total number of differ-
ent mutual fund types a manager has managed e.g. Mid-Cap funds or Growth
7The sample ends at year 2012 is because of we only have the database access to an older version
of MFLINKS, which ends at March 2012 rather than the latest version.
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and Income Funds8. A fund manager who managed fewer types of mutual
funds may be considered more specialized in the investment objective(s).
2. Number of Fund Companies (X2): This is the total number of companies that
a mutual fund manager has worked for. A fund manager who worked for
multiple companies may be equipped with more diversified managing skills,
instead of company-specific skills.
3. Number of Invested Industries (X3): This variable captures the total industries
which the stocks the manager has invested in. A manager with stock holdings
in fewer industries may be considered as having more specific experience and
expertise in those industries than a manager with broader industry investment
experiences. This proxy will be calculated with accumulated number of holding
industries using the Fama-French 48 industrial classification code.
We calculate each type of managerial experience factor using historical data on
manager-level information. For example, we sort the data by the manager ID, date
and investment objective code and calculate the number of fund styles for each
manager which is accumulated over time. We do similar measurement to factor X2
(Number of Fund Companies) and factor X3 (Number of Invested Industries) for
each manager over time.
3.3.2.2 Managerial Experience Index
The Principal Component Analysis (PCA) will be applied to extract common com-
ponents and combine the three experience factors into a single index. PCA is helpful
in reducing the dimensionality of data, while keeping as much variation as possible
(Custo´dio et al., 2013). We are aware that using an index composed from individual
factors by PCA has certain limitations. Some information included in factors may
be missing in the index due to the PCA methodology. However, using a single index
instead of 3 separate factors makes the method easier to apply and interpret9.
The correlation coefficients among three managerial experience factors are below
0.4 as shown in Panel A of Table 3.1. In addition, it shows high correlations between
8CRSP U.S. Survivor-Bias-Free Mutual Funds database includes style and objective codes from
three different sources over the life of the database. The CRSP Style Code builds continuity within
the database by using three codes: Wiesenberger Objective codes, Strategic Insight Objective codes
and Lipper Objective codes as its base and provides consistency with those codes provided.
9The result using three individual managerial factors instead of the MEI index remains un-
changed.
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Table 3.1: Managerial Experience Index: Principal Component Analysis
Panel A: Correlation Structure
MEI Objective (X1) Company (X2) Industry (X3)
MEI 1
Objective Number (X1) 0.7784*** 1
Company Number (X2) 0.6164*** 0.2397*** 1
Industry Number (X3) 0.7601*** 0.3828*** 0.2115*** 1
Panel B: Principal Component Analysis
Objective (X1) Company (X2) Industry (X3)
Loadings 0.778 0.616 0.76
Scores 0.623 0.493 0.608
Proportion Explained 0.521
Eigenvalue 1.56
Panel A presents the correlation coefficient matrix of the Managerial Experience Index, the
Style Number (X1), the Company number (X2) and the Industry number (X3). Panel B sum-
marize the Principal Component Analysis estimation based on three managerial factors. The
factor loadings and correlation scores are given in the first two rows, followed by the propor-
tion explained by the component and the eigenvalue. The significance levels are abbreviated
with asterisks: *, ** and *** donate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
MEI and experience factors which ranges from 0.62 to 0.78. Panel B of Table 3.1
presents the outcome of principle component analysis for the Managerial Experience
Index. We obtain a component with an eigenvalue greater than 1 (eigenvalue = 1.56
in this study), which indicates that the extracted component has better explanatory
power than any one of the original experience factors. The proportion explained
by this component is 52.1% which represents over half of all observed variations.
Also, all positive factor loadings of PCA indicate a positive correlation between this
component and all initial factors. Therefore, a higher value of this index could reflect
more diversified past experience of managers.
The Managerial Experience Index of fund manager i in month t is calculated
by applying scores in Table 3.1 for each managerial experience factors as reported.
According to the score coefficients, the index gives close to equal weights to X1 (Style
Number) and X3 (Industry Number) and slightly less to X2 (Company Number).
The index has been standardized to have the mean of zero and the standard deviation
of one.
MEIi,t = 0.62X1i,t + 0.49X2i,t + 0.61X3i,t (3.3.1)
In Table 3.2 we document summary statistics for the Managerial Experience
Index and other managerial and fund characteristics. The MEI index ranges from
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A: Managerial Characters
Managerial Experience Index (MEI) 0 1.25 -2.22 6.6
Number of Managed Fund Style 1.42 0.75 1 6
Number of Employed Management Company 1.49 0.86 1 8
Number of Invested Stock Industry 32.09 11.91 1 48
Number of Equity Funds managed 2.84 2.55 1 24
Manager Tenure (in years) 2.8 2.69 0.08 18.5
Panel B: Fund Characters
Total Net Assets (TNA) (in Millions) 745.79 3229.12 5 109,796
Fund Age (in Years) 10.45 9.39 0.08 52.08
Expense Ratio (%) 1.36 0.59 -0.26 14.05
Turnover Ratio (%) 95.77 169.03 0 9150
Fund Load (%) 1.67 1.67 0 9
Raw Return (%) 0.65 5.79 -46.2 59.62
Total Number of Funds 5,406
Total Number of Managers 3,122
Total Number of Management Companies 1,106
Total Number of Observations 102,287
This table summarize the descriptive information of managerial and fund characters.
Panel A presents the summary statistics of the MEI and other managerial factors. The
MEI is extracted using the Principal Component Analysis based on 3 managerial expe-
rience factors: X1 (the style number), X2 (the company number) and X3 (the industry
number). Panel B reports the fund characteristics of the actively managed domestic
equity mutual funds included in this study.
-2.2 to 6.6 with the mean of zero, which demonstrates a significant variation across
individuals. The average manager tenure is 2.8 years and the average number of
funds managed by each manager is 2.84. Apparently, on average, individual man-
agers included in the sample have a relatively short tenure and manage multiple
funds. Funds managed by managers with more specialized experiences may differ
substantially from funds managed by generalist managers in several characteristics,
such as fund age, size, management fees and turnover ratio. The average age of
funds in our sample is 10.45 years. The 95.77% turnover ratio indicates that funds
included in the sample tend to be actively managed. The average monthly return is
0.65% but returns are distributed with large variation.
3.3.3 Timer and Picker
There are two potential managerial skills to be considered in our study, namely
stock-picking and market-timing ability. The hypothesis is that the fund manager
would exhibit either of these two portfolio management skills, and the skill would
be reflected in fund performance.
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Existing market timing measures, such as those of Henriksson and Merton (1981)
and Treynor and Mazuy (1966), are based on nonlinear regressions of realized fund
returns against contemporaneous market returns. As the literature shows, however,
the return-based timing measures using monthly fund returns tend to underestimate
timing ability. Most of recent studies use portfolio holdings to determine timing
and selection ability (Jiang, 2003; Kacperczyk et al., 2014). However, given the
shortcomings of the existing databases, the holding-based measurement of timing
and picking abilities does not fulfill our requirements10. Based on the market-timing
model of Treynor and Mazuy (1966), we estimate the following model with multi-risk
factors to identify the managerial skill:
Ri,t −Rf,t = αi + βi,m(Rm,t −Rf,t) + γi,m(Rm,t −Rf,t)2
+βi,smbSMBt + βi,hmlHMLt + βi,momMOMt + ε
j
t (3.3.2)
where Ri,t−Rf,t refers to the mutual fund’s before-expense return in month t minus
the risk-free rate; Rm,t − Rf,t is the market excess return; SMBt , HMLt and
MOMt are the monthly size, book-to-market and momentum factors as defined in
the Carhart (1997) 4 factor model.
Next, we obtain the timer and picker ability for each fund using coefficients αi and
γi,m. We classify a fund is being managed by a manager with stock-picking ability
if αi is significantly positive and with market-timing ability if γi,m is significantly
positive. We are aware that the timer indicator γi,m measures the market-timing
effect other than the momemtum factor MOMt, which already serves as a market-
timing index. For each fund, we estimate all factor coefficients using data covering
previous 36 months, and test each coefficient’s significance at the 10% significance
level.
Our estimates suggest that while most fund managers tend to exhibit either
stock-picking or market-timing ability, a small number of managers, which consists
of 4.3% of the sample, have both or none of these abilities. However, we eliminate
managers who are equipped with both or none of the two abilities to facilitate the
comparison of the pure effect between two skills.
10The database commonly used to obtain the portfolio holding information is the Thomson
Reuters Mutual Funds Holding S12 database. However, the S12 database reports portfolio holdings
infrequently as SEC requires mutual fund disclose holding semiannually before 2002 and quarterly
afterwards.
31
3.3.4 Performance Measures
In this study, fund performance is evaluated using factor-based measures from the
4 factor model of Carhart (1997), the conditional model of Ferson and Schadt
(1996), and the 5 factor model of Fama and French (2015). The estimated in-
tercept (Jensen’s αi) is the parameter that measures fund performance. Section 2.2
above summarizes each of these models in detail. However, the key equations are
outlined here for the purpose of completion.
The Carhart (1997) 4 factor model is as follow:
Ri,t −Rf,t = αi + βi,m(Rm,t −Rf,t) + βi,smbSMBt + βi,hmlHMLt
+βi,momMOMt + ε
j
t (3.3.3)
We also use the following Ferson and Schadt (1996) conditional measure by
adding four macro-economic variables in addition to the Carhart (1997) 4 factor
model:
Ri,t −Rf,t = αi + βi,m(Rm,t −Rf,t) + βi,smbSMBt + βi,hmlHMLt
+ βi,momMOMt +
4∑
j=1
βi,j[zj,t−1(Rm,t −Rf,t)] + εjt (3.3.4)
Finally, we estimate the fund performance following the Fama and French (2015)
5 factor model, which adds the profitability (RMW) and investment (CMA) factors
to the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993):
Ri,t −Rf,t = αi + βi,m(Rm,t −Rf,t) + βi,smbSMBt + βi,hmlHMLt
+βi,rmwRMWt + βi,cmaCMAt + ε
j
t (3.3.5)
We examine factor-adjusted returns before and after netting out expenses. Ac-
cording to Berk and Green (2004) and Kacperczyk et al. (2005), looking at the
before-expense returns enables us to better evaluate the investment ability of mutual
fund managers since managers with better skills normally charge higher expenses to
extract rents. On the other hand, understanding the after-expense fund performance
would be beneficial for mutual fund investors.
The monthly fund returns reported in CRSP are net from any expense or fees.
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However, as mentioned in Amihud and Goyenko (2013), fund gross return measures
fund managers’ skill before accounting for expenses. Therefore, we measure the
fund performance using fund returns before and after adjusting for expenses. The
fund gross return are calculated by adding the monthly expenses (annual expenses
divided by 12) back to the net fund return.
3.4 Empirical Results
This section reports our empirical results, starting from the quinitle portfolio anal-
ysis using fund gross and net returns. Next, we present the multi-variate regression
using difference fund performance measures. For robustness check, we also include
sub-periods multivariate analysis in this section. Finally, we provide the analysis of
stock-picking ability and market-timing ability.
3.4.1 Evidence from Univariate Analysis
We start off with the univariate analysis comparing the performance of mutual funds
managed by generalists with that of mutual funds managed by specialists. To this
end, we group the mutual funds into 5 quintile portfolios based on the ranking of
MEI, where Rank 1 captures portfolios managed by the most specialized managers
while Rank 5 captures portfolios managed by the most generalist or least specialized
managers. All mutual fund performance will be examined both before and after
adjusting for expenses.
Table 3.3 summarizes the portfolio performance estimated using the 4 factor
model of Carhart (1997), the conditional model of Ferson and Schadt (1996), and
the 5 factor model of Fama and French (2015), before and after adjusting for ex-
penses. For statistical inferences, we compute and use panel-corrected standard
errors (PCSE) which are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-fund serial corre-
lation in idiosyncratic errors (Beck and Katz, 1995). Our sample is an unbalanced
panel since most mutual funds do not exist for the whole sample period.
Firstly, the average fund performance is significantly positive before adjusting
for fund expenses. However, most of the outperformance disappears after consid-
ering expenses and fees, as the average abnormal returns for each factor becomes
significantly negative in Panel B of Table 3.3. This finding is consistent with most
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Table 3.3: Quintile Portfolio Performance Measures
Abnormal Return (% per month) Factor Loadings (Carhart Model)
MEI Carhart Ferson-Schadt Fama-French Market Size Value Momentum
Panel A: Before Expenses
All Funds 0.087*** 0.081*** 0.086*** 0.977*** 0.183*** 0.094*** -0.005**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Quintile 1 0.157*** 0.176*** 0.217*** 0.965*** 0.236*** 0.116*** -0.022
(0.038) (0.039) (0.044) (0.015) (0.021) (0.031) (0.013)
Quintile 2 0.086*** 0.091*** 0.061** 0.980*** 0.178*** 0.085*** -0.018*
(0.026) (0.027) (0.03) (0.01) (0.018) (0.018) (0.01)
Quintile 3 0.035 0.02 0.008 0.982*** 0.181*** 0.109*** -0.006
(0.022) (0.024) (0.027) (0.01) (0.018) (0.019) (0.008)
Quintile 4 0.085*** 0.065*** 0.051** 0.969*** 0.156*** 0.088*** 0.01
(0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.011) (0.018) (0.019) (0.008)
Quintile 5 0.076*** 0.065*** 0.079*** 0.988*** 0.166*** 0.079*** 0.006
(0.022) (0.023) (0.025) (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.008)
2nd half - -0.033 -0.054** -0.064*** 0.005 -0.362** -0.011 0.017*
1st half (0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.01) (0.16) (0.019) (0.009)
5th quintile - -0.080* -0.111*** -0.139*** 0.024 -0.07*** -.036 0.028*
1st quintile (0.045) (0.046) (0.051) (0.019) (0.027) (0.346) (0.015)
Panel B: After Expenses
All Funds -0.023** -0.027** -0.02 0.978*** 0.184*** 0.089*** -0.003
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.006) (0.009) (0.01) (0.004)
Quintile 1 0.057 0.082*** 0.131*** 0.971*** 0.238*** 0.092*** -0.015
(0.037) (0.038) (0.042) (0.014) (0.020) (0.030) (0.013)
Quintile 2 -0.033 -0.029 -0.055* 0.979*** 0.182*** 0.083*** -0.015
(0.025) (0.027) (0.03) (0.010) (0.018) (0.018) (0.010)
Quintile 3 -0.077*** -0.093*** -0.057*** 0.983*** 0.174*** 0.111*** -0.007
(0.022) (0.024) (0.026) (0.010) (0.018) (0.019) (0.008)
Quintile 4 -0.02 -0.043* -0.057*** 0.969*** 0.158*** 0.089*** 0.009
(0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.010) (0.017) (0.019) (0.008)
Quintile 5 -0.033 -0.043* -0.029 0.990*** 0.163*** 0.079*** 0.006
(0.022) (0.023) (0.025) (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.007)
2nd half - -0.032 -0.055** -0.07*** 0.01 -0.04*** -0.00 0.013
1st half (0.023) (0.024) (0.027) (0.46) (0.016) (0.019) (0.009)
5th quintile - -0.09** -0.125*** -0.16*** 0.019 -0.075*** -0.013 0.0211
1st quintile (0.044) (0.045) (0.049) (0.018) (0.026) (0.034) (0.000)
This table summarizes abnormal returns and the factor loadings using the Carhart (1997) 4 factor
model for different portfolios of mutual funds for the period of 1993 to 2012 using fund return
after adjusting for expenses. The second and third columns show the conditional Ferson and
Schadt (1996) conditional and Fama and French (2015) 5 factor model estimated abnormal return
before expenses. The last four columns summarize the factor loadings for the model using return
before expenses. We divide the sample into 5 quintiles based on Managerial Experience Index
constructed on 3 factors X1 (the style number), X2 (the company number) and X3 (the industry
number) calculated based on the past working experience information of individual equity fund
managers. The table includes the differences in the abnormal return between the top and the
bottom quintiles, and the top and the bottom halves of the mutual funds. The returns are expressed
at the monthly frequency and the portfolios are re-balanced monthly. Panel-corrected standard
errors are given in parentheses. The significance levels are abbreviated with asterisks: *, ** and
*** donate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
studies on mutual fund performance, which suggest that the outperformance on
the market would vanish when taking into account the fund expenses (Bollen and
Busse, 2005; Carhart, 1997; Fama, 1970; Wermers, 2004). The primary explanation
for this finding is that better-performing funds normally charge higher management
fees and therefore the outperformance could decrease by subtracting the fund fees
in the fund return calculation.
The abnormal performance estimates are similar across 3 measures – the greatest
outperformance concentrates in quintile 1 portfolios. The first 3 quintiles exhibit a
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decreasing trend in fund performance as the MEI increases. However, fund perfor-
mance bounces back at quintile 4 and quintile 5, which outperform quintile 3. The
difference between the 1st and 2nd halves of the portfolios (i.e. between portfolios
below and above the median MEI) and the difference between the 5th quintile and
the 1st quintile are mostly negative and significant, which indicate that more spe-
cialized portfolios (i.e. those with smaller MEI) tend to outperform less specialized
portfolios.
3.4.2 Evidence from Multivariate Regression
The univariate analysis above has two limitations: 1) the subgroup portfolio analysis
in the univariate approach does not control for mutual fund characteristics that may
affect fund performance and 2) the univariate analysis assumes that factor loadings
remain constant over time. In this section, the empirical study will be extended
to the multivariate approach, which involves a statistical analysis of more than
one outcome variable at a time. The multivariate regression analysis could help
us to investigate the relationship between the managerial experience factors and
subsequent fund performance. The multivariate analysis allows us to control for
other potential fund characteristics that are likely to affect the fund performance.
The primary purpose of the multivariate analysis is to test whether fund perfor-
mance is significantly related to how specialized the manager’s experience has been.
The significance of MEI in the multivariate regression would indicate the existence
of the relationship between managerial experience factors and fund performance.
3.4.2.1 Multivariate Regression Model
We first use 3 years of past monthly fund returns to estimate the coefficients of all
three measurement models. Then, we use each model’s fitted values to compute
expected returns and subtract the expected returns from realized returns to obtain
model-adjusted returns, which can be interpreted as abnormal returns. One lim-
itation of this methodology is that young funds which do not have a sufficiently
long history would be excluded. In the next stage, we regress the model-adjusted
abnormal return on the MEI and other fund characteristics. We include a series
of control variables when we evaluate fund performances including expense ratio,
turnover ratio, fund age, size and past return. The general form of multivariate
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regression model can be specified as below:
PERFi,t = αi + σiMEIi,t−1 + β1EXPi,t−1 + β2TUi,t−1 + β3LAGEi,t−1
+ β4LTNAi,t−1 + β5PastReturni,t−1 + ε
j
t (3.4.1)
The dependent variable in each regression model is one of four performance
measures of an individual mutual fund PERFi,t within a particular month t, using
the rolling window procedure with 36 lagged monthly return. The shortcoming
of the rolling window method is that we lose the fund performance in the first 3
years. However, the rolling performance can offer better insight into a fund’s more
comprehensive return history, which is not skewed by the most recent data. The
four performance measures include: (1) the raw fund return Ri,t; (2) the Carhart
(1997) 4 factor model adjusted return; (3) the Ferson and Schadt (1996) conditional
model adjusted return; and (4) the Fama and French (2015) 5 factor model adjusted
return.
Control variables in this study include the expense ratio of the fund EXP , the
turnover ratio TU , the age of the fund LAGE defined as the logarithm of (1+AGE),
the natural logarithm of total net assets under management of the fund LTNA, and
the average prior year return PastReturn as defined in Huang et al. (2011). As
suggested in Huang et al. (2011), mutual funds with bad prior performance are likely
to continue to perform poorly because of the inferior ability. Therefore we include
the past performance as a control variable. The expense ratio measures the cost of
the investment management while the turnover ratio refers to the percentage of a
mutual fund’s holdings that has been replaced with other holdings in a given year.
The fund age indicates the time duration since the inception of the fund, and finally
the total net assets measure the size and value of the mutual fund (Kacperczyk and
Seru, 2012). All control variables are lagged at least by one month in this study.
The first column of Table 3.4 shows the coefficients from the panel regression
that uses the monthly fund return before expenses as the dependent variable. The
sign and magnitude of the coefficient on MEI are consistent with the univariate
analysis above. Specifically, the increment on the MEI is negatively correlated with
the fund return. The adjusted returns based on the Carhart (1997) 4 factor model,
the Ferson and Schadt (1996) conditional model and the Fama and French (2015) 5
factor model yield similar results, with the coefficient estimates of -2.6%, -2.3% and
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Table 3.4: Multivariate Analysis
Fund Performance Measure
Raw Carhart Ferson-Schadt Fama-French
MEI -0.051*** -0.026*** -0.023*** -0.037***
(0.017) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
EXP (%) 17.5*** 5.188*** 6.809*** 10.484***
(4.216) (1.659) (1.743) (1.99)
TU (%) -0.019 -0.002 -0.002 0.01
(0.015) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
LAGE -0.13*** -0.07*** -0.076*** -0.078***
(0.031) (0.112) (0.110) (0.014)
LTNA 0.123*** 0.046*** 0.036*** 0.057***
(0.013) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Lag Return 6.3*** 4.08*** 3.79*** 4.58***
(1.354) (0.43) (0.581) (0.675)
Number of Observations 95,135 83,541 83,541 83,541
This table presents the output of the multivariate regressions using four different fund
performance measurements. The dependent variable, PERFi,t measures the monthly
abnormal return using the Carhart (1997) 4 factor model, the Ferson and Schadt (1996)
conditional model and the Fama and French (2015) 5 factor model based on 36 months
of lagged data. The independent variables are the expense ratio of the fund EXP , the
turnover ratio TU , the logarithm of monthly total net asset of the fund LTNA, the age of
the fund defined as the logarithm of the fund life length (1+AGE) and the lagged return
PastReturn which refers to the prior year average return. The numbers of observations
used in each regression is reported in the bottom of the table. The significance levels are
abbreviated with asterisks: *, ** and *** donate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
-3.7%, respectively. This effect is economically and statistically significant. Fund
expenses, TNA and prior year returns have statistically significant positive effects on
the fund performance. The fund age is negatively related to the fund performance,
which is consistent with the finding in Busse et al. (2015). But the turnover ratio
has no significant impact on any fund performance measure, which is not favored
by the finding in Pa´stor et al. (2015) that the fund’s next month’s gross return is
positively related to turnover ratio.
To conclude, the multivariate regression results agree with the preceding results
from the univariate analysis. MEI has a negative relationship with mutual fund
performance, which could be interpreted as evidence that the more concentrated the
manager’s experience has been, the better performance the manager could achieve
consistently.
3.4.2.2 Sub-Period Performance
Our whole sample spans 20 years from 1993 to 2013. Many fund characteristics
may change over time during 20 years. For example, the average TNA per fund
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increases substantially during the later time periods since more capital has been
invested in the fund market as time passes. To mitigate the effects of possible
structural breaks, we follow the method in Kacperczyk et al. (2005) to examine the
relationship between the manager experience concentration and fund performance
for three sub-sample periods: 1993 – 1998, 1999 – 2006 and 2007 – 2012.
In Table 3.5, we report the results from estimating the multivariate regression
model 3.4.1 for each sub-period. The dependent variable, PERF is measured as
the monthly abnormal return using the Carhart (1997) 4 factor model, the Ferson
and Schadt (1996) conditional model or the Fama and French (2015) 5 factor model
based on 36 months of lagged data. The results show a negative relationship between
the MEI and fund performance in all 3 time periods.
In this analysis, the estimated coefficients on MEI are significantly negative
across all sub-periods, providing robust evidence on the negative linkage between
fund performance and MEI. The coefficients on MEI based on the Carhart (1997) 4
factor model and the Ferson and Schadt (1996) conditional model are around -0.04
with no apparent trend across time periods. However, the coefficients on MEI using
the Fama and French (2015) 5 factor model varies somewhat from -0.07 to -0.04,
indicating the association between MEI and Fama and French (2015) 5 factor model
adjusted return becomes less negative overtime.
3.4.3 MEI and Managerial Ability
There are two basic abilities of portfolio managers examined in the literature based
on the theory of market efficiency with costly information: stock selectivity and
market timing (Ferson and Mo, 2016; Jiang, 2003; Kacperczyk et al., 2014). The
hypothesis is that the fund manager would exhibit either of these two portfolio
management skills, and the skill would be reflected in fund performance. We measure
the stock-selecting and market-timing ability at the fund level on the 36 month
rolling window basis, following the estimation model 3.3.2. Zambrana and Zapatero
(2017) classify the portfolio manager as a stock picker if αi for this particular fund
is greater than 0 and statistically significant, and as a market timer is γi is greater
than 0 and statistically significant. We follow this approach and use the αi and γi
as indicators for the stock selecting and market timing ability.
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Table 3.6: Stock-Picking and Market-Timing Ability
MEI Stock-Picking Estimator Market-Timing Estimator
Quintile 1 (More Specialised) 0.536*** -18.121**
(0.026) (1.353)
Quintile 2 0.252*** -5.728***
(0.013) (0.641)
Quintile 3 0.107*** 0.713
(0.010) (0.451)
Quintile 4 0.117*** 0.84*
(0.009) (0.444)
Quintile 5 (More Generalised) 0.07*** 1.034***
(0.008) (0.365)
Quintile 5 - 1 -0.466*** 19.255***
(0.027) (1.401)
The table reports the stock-picking and market-timing indicators in 5 MEI quintiles.
The stock-picking and market-timing abilities are calculated based on the regression
Ri,t−Rf,t = αi+βi,m(Rm,t−Rf,t) +γi,m(Rm,t−Rf,t)2 +βi,smbSMBt+βi,hmlHMLt+
βi,momMOMt + ε
j
t , using the 36-month rolling window procedure. The αi captures
the stock selecting skill while the γi represents the market timing ability. We sort the
sample into 5 quintiles based on MEI constructed based on 3 factors – X1 (the style
number), X2 (the company number) and X3 (the industry number) calculated based
on the past working experience information of individual equity fund managers. The
coefficients are the mean of estimators αi or γi in MEI quintiles. The significance levels
are abbreviated with asterisks: *, ** and *** donate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Specifically, we run the regression of model 3.3.2 for each fund-month observation
to obtain the αi and γi estimators. As we use the rolling window of prior 36 month
returns, the stock-picking and market-timing indicators starts from the 37th month
for each fund. Next, we sort the sample based on the MEI we constructed in the
previous analysis into 5 quintiles. For each MEI quintile, we calculate the mean of the
stock-picking and market-timing estimator, and test each coefficient’s significance
at the 10% significance level.
Table 3.6 presents the mean of stock-picking and market-timing estimators for
5 MEI quintiles. As mentioned before, Quintile 1 captures funds managed by the
most specialized managers while Quintile 5 captures mutual funds managed by the
most generalist or least specialized managers. The average stock-selecting ability
decreases from 0.536 to 0.07 from MEI quintile 1 to 5. On the other hand, the mean
of market-timing skill from Quintile 1 to 5 increases from -18.121 to 1.034. Most
of the mean coefficients are statistically significant, indicating they are different
from 0. The difference between coefficients of MEI quintile 5 and 1 are presented
in the bottom of Table 3.6. To conclude, the average stock-picking ability is more
prevalent in funds that are managed by managers with more concentrated working
experience. Funds managed by managers with more diversified experience exhibit
40
more market-timing ability.
We also present the relation between the MEI and two types managerial skills
in Figure 3.1. We sort the sample into 15 ranks containing an even number of
observations based on the MEI distribution instead using 5 quintiles, so that the
trend can be more clearly presented. The average stock-picking and market-timing
ability indicators are presented in line graph in two panels. The bars are average raw
fund returns of the 15 MEI groups. The picking and timing abilities are displayed
in two separate panels.
First of all, we present the average monthly gross return of mutual funds in bars,
which decreases along with the manager’s accumulated experience. Panel A displays
a negative link between market-timing ability and MEI – the market-timing ability
increases as the manager’s experience becomes more generalized. Panel B shows the
positive relationship between stock-picking ability with MEI – managers with more
concentrated experience exhibits greater stock-picking ability.
3.5 Summary
This chapter considers an individual’s past working experience as an essential deter-
minant of their current career performance and provides a new method to evaluate
the mutual fund performance from the perspective of manager’s lifetime working
experience. An individual’s past working experience may be considered as an es-
sential determinant that shapes their current career performance. The skills and
knowledge acquired from the prior working experience may be transferred to the
current working context, thereby influencing the current job performance (Schmidt
et al., 1986). Researchers have explored this topic from the perspectives of both
applied psychology and empirical finance, where the latter particularly pertains to
the CEO behavior analysis (Custo´dio et al., 2013). Building on this literature, we
investigate the relationship between the mutual fund manager’s past experience and
mutual fund performance.
Using U.S. mutual fund managers’ work experience data spanning year 1993
to year 2012, we extend the mutual fund performance literature by investigating
whether mutual fund performance relates to accumulated experience that the fund
manager has acquired during his or her career. To measure the experience gen-
erality of each manager, we use the Principal Component Analysis to construct a
41
-3-2-101
Market-Timing Ability
.5.7511.25
Mean Monthly Gross Return
-1
.76
-1
.31
-1
.06
-.8
7
-.6
7
-.4
8
-.2
8
-.0
5
.2
.5
.8
1.2
1.6
8
2.3
6
4.0
6
M
E
I
M
ea
n 
M
on
th
ly
 G
ro
ss
 R
et
ur
n
M
ar
ke
t-T
im
in
g 
A
bi
lit
y
-.002-.0010.001.002
Stock-Picking Ability
.5.7511.25
Mean Monthly Gross Return
-1
.76
-1
.31
-1
.06
-.8
7
-.6
7
-.4
8
-.2
8
-.0
5
.2
.5
.8
1.2
1.6
8
2.3
6
4.0
6
M
E
I
M
ea
n 
M
on
th
ly
 G
ro
ss
 R
et
ur
n
S
to
ck
-P
ic
ki
ng
 A
bi
lit
y
F
ig
u
re
3
.1
:
M
a
rk
e
t-
T
im
in
g
,
S
to
ck
-P
ic
k
in
g
A
b
il
it
y
a
n
d
M
a
n
a
g
e
ri
a
l
E
x
p
e
ri
e
n
c
e
In
d
e
x
T
h
e
fi
gu
re
il
lu
st
ra
te
s
th
e
re
la
ti
on
sh
ip
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
M
a
n
a
g
er
ia
l
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
In
d
ex
(M
E
I)
a
n
d
m
a
n
a
g
er
ia
l
sk
il
ls
.
S
a
m
p
le
is
so
rt
ed
in
to
15
ra
n
k
s
w
it
h
ev
en
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
s
b
as
ed
on
M
E
I.
T
h
e
st
o
ck
p
ic
k
in
g
a
n
d
m
a
rk
et
ti
m
in
g
a
b
il
it
y
fo
r
ea
ch
M
E
I
g
ro
u
p
a
re
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
a
s
th
e
m
ea
n
of
th
e
st
o
ck
-p
ic
k
in
g
es
ti
m
at
or
(α
i)
an
d
m
a
rk
et
-t
im
in
g
es
ti
m
a
to
r
(γ
i)
ca
p
tu
re
d
b
y
m
o
d
el
3
.3
.2
.
42
Managerial Experience Index (MEI) based on 3 professional experience factors from
the past career history of that manager: (i) investment objectives of the funds that
s/he has managed (Zambrana and Zapatero, 2017), (ii) fund companies that s/he
has worked for and (iii) industries of stocks in which s/he has invested (Kacper-
czyk et al., 2005). The resulting MEI increases as the manager accumulates more
experience in the three underlying factors.
We firstly group the sample into 5 quintiles from the lowest MEI score (most
concentrated experience) to the highest MEI score (most diversified experience).
Therefore, the “Specialist” refers to portfolio managers with a more concentrated
professional history while the “Generalist” refers to those with more diversified ex-
perience in mutual fund management. We use the Carhart (1997) and Ferson and
Schadt (1996) models to adjust fund returns, and find that the mutual fund man-
aged by a “Specialist” manager who has more concentrated experience tends to
outperform the mutual fund managed by a “Generalist” manager.
This finding is robust to the multivariate analysis controlling for the expense ratio
of the fund EXP , the turnover ratio TU , the age of the fund LAGE defined as the
logarithm of (1+AGE), the natural logarithm of total net assets under management
of the fund LTNA and the averaged prior year return PastReturn as proposed by
Huang et al. (2011). The conclusion stills holds in a sub-period analysis where we
perform the multivariate analysis separately for three time periods to mitigate the
effects of possible structural breaks following Kacperczyk et al. (2005).
We also examine the stock picking ability and market timing ability of fund
managers with different career histories. The results indicate that a “Specialist”
manager tends to exhibit significant stock-picking ability while a “Generalist” man-
ager tends to exhibit market-timing ability. This empirical study provides useful
implications for individual investors, since an observable managerial characteristic
such as managerial past experience would allow them to more appropriately choose
where to allocate their money for investment purposes. In addition, fund family
could also benefit from the findings in the portfolio manager recruitment process.
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Chapter 4
New Mutual Fund Opening and
Performance
4.1 Introduction
The mutual fund is considered as one of the largest asset classes in the financial
market, and the total net asset (TNA) of U.S. mutual funds has reached $16.3
trillion by the end of 2016. The capital size of the industry has increased about 40%
in the past 15 years, along with the large growth of the number of mutual funds
opening by 49.59% from 16,738 to 25,038. One interesting fact is that the number
of fund families drops slightly from 8,155 to 8,116 in the corresponding period. It
appears that fund families have strong incentive to create new funds to attract new
investors and money inflows. This growth, however, has varied from period to period
– some periods have bursts of new funds while other periods have much lower new
fund activity.
We present the volume of new funds opening in years from 1990 to 2012 in
Figure 4.1. The new fund creation seems to be highly correlated with the market
performance. For instance, during the hot market period 1998 - 2000, 1,337 new
funds opened, whereas only 138 opened during the financial crisis period 2008 -
2010. Also, we realized that the new fund activity is related to the initial public
offerings (IPOs), which also follows the market performance. In the corresponding
period, there were 1,139 IPOs initiated in 1998 - 2000 while only 153 during 2008 -
2010.
The increasing number of introduced new funds facilitated a debate among aca-
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demics and practitioners about fund performance. There is a sizable literature which
finds that a typical actively managed equity fund in the U.S. earns a negative after-
fee risk-adjusted alpha, which is estimated from asset pricing models (Brown and
Goetzmann, 1995; Carhart et al., 2002; Daniel et al., 1997; Elton et al., 1993; Ferson
and Schadt, 1996; Grinblatt and Titman, 1989; Kacperczyk et al., 2005). Although
some funds can generate superior performance, it is explained as an outcome of luck
instead of skill since fund performance is largely unpredictable (Bollen and Busse,
2005; Carhart, 1997; Gruber, 1996; Zheng, 1999).
Do newly-created funds add value in the emerging period? If so, how long would
the outperformance last, and could the outperformance be explained by size effect
or managerial characteristics? Moreover, given that extant literature shows that
mutual funds have preferential access to IPOs (Aggarwal et al., 2002; Reuter, 2006),
and that the typical IPO is substantially underpriced (Ritter and Welch, 2002),
another interesting question we may investigate is whether fund families would take
IPOs as investment opportunities in creating new funds. Specifically, this chapter
aims at addressing the following research questions:
• Can the outperformance of newly-created fund be explained by the fund or
managerial characteristics?
• Considering that fund creation is highly correlated with IPO volume, would
the fund’s access to IPO stocks become a valuable trading opportunity in
creating new funds?
Instead of focusing on the whole life of funds, this chapter concentrates on the
emerging period of mutual funds, defined as the first 6 months after creation of new
funds. Most of previous studies use fund age as the factor explaining performance
using cross-sectional regressions in calendar time. These studies are concerned with
the performance pattern of newly-created funds. Instead, we examine fund perfor-
mance using the event time approach, where the event is the time when the fund is
initiated. The event time approach is powerful as it is able to capture the outperfor-
mance concentrated among new funds, while the performance analysis by calendar
time will miss it. For instance, Karoui and Meier (2009) provide evidence that new
U.S. equity mutual funds outperform their peers by 0.15% per month over the first
3 years. However, the event time used in our study is measured in months since a
short horizon provides a more precise method to identify outperformance when it
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is short-lived (Bollen and Busse, 2005). We also eliminates the incubation bias by
by applying an incubation period filter following Evans (2010). Funds in incubation
outperform non-incubated funds by 3.5% on the basis of risk-adjusted returns, and
attract higher flows after becoming public than non-incubated funds, which will bias
our analysis.
Using U.S. mutual fund data from 1996 to 2015, we provide the empirical evi-
dence that new mutual fund can temporarily add value in its early stage although
the outperformance vanishes after a while. Reasons for the short-lived outperfor-
mance include the competitive nature of the mutual fund industry (Berk and Green,
2004; Chevalier and Ellison, 1999a). The emerging fund short-term outperformance
is negatively related with the fund size. Also, we find that funds created by individ-
ual managers do not outperform funds created by multiple managers in the emerging
period, and the experience of fund managers does not make significant difference.
Karoui and Meier (2009) find that funds start off with investing more actively in
small-cap stocks and holding more industry-concentrated portfolios, and gradually
increase their exposure to market risk and reduce unsystematic risk relative to total
risk. Therefore we also look into the stock holding of newly-created funds, and find
that the short-term outperformance is more likely to be determined by the access
to IPO stocks. This result indicates that newly created mutual funds, especially
new funds with IPO allocations contain great investment opportunity especially in
first 6 months of their lives. We find that opportunities for trade such as IPO allo-
cations, whose usefulness can fade away over time, could also induce a short-lived
performance effect.
Our study focuses on the emerging period of mutual funds, defined as first 6
months of existence. The main reason for focusing on fund creation is to under-
stand why and how managers start a new fund. We examine the relation between
emerging funds performance and fund size at creation to understand if the total net
asset at the creation month will influence fund performance in the emerging period.
Moreover, we attempt to analyze the fund performance in the emerging period from
the perspective of a portfolio manager. Fund managers have strong incentives to
make optimal investment decisions since their compensation is directly related to
the fund performance, which is the outcome of their decision. Existing portfolio
managers are motivated to outperform to preserve or improve their reputation and
to attract more inflows for both existing and newly established funds, while new-
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entry managers have strong incentives to prove their ability in the beginning of their
careers11.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Firstly we review the prior
literature related to the topic of mutual fund creation, then we describe the data
and methodology in the next section. Next, we report main results with robustness
tests. We close the chapter with some conclusions.
4.2 Prior Literature
The well-documented evidence indicates that a typical actively managed equity fund
in the U.S. earns a negative after-fee risk-adjusted alpha estimated from asset pricing
models (Carhart et al., 2002; Fama and French, 2010; Gruber, 1996). Grinblatt and
Titman (1989) show positive gross alphas for both small funds and growth funds.
Chevalier and Ellison (1999a) find the evidence of outperformance of some fund
managers and explain it by behavioral difference and selection biases. Cremers
and Petajisto (2009) show that the amount a fund deviates from its benchmark is
associated with better performance, and that this superior performance is persistent.
4.2.1 Fund Size
Creation of new funds may be attractive for a number of reasons. One argument
closely linked with the new fund creation is the size. The definition of fund size is
given as “the month-end net assets of the mutual fund” by MorningStar, and nor-
mally recorded in millions of dollars. Mutual funds normally start from a relatively
small size when being created, and attract investment flow gradually. The evidence
investigating the relation between fund size and performance in the mutual fund
industry is mixed. It is believed in some literature that large asset size would erode
mutual fund performance due to higher trading cost associated with liquidity impact
(Perold and Salomon Jr, 1991). Meanwhile, small funds could be easily managed by
putting all assets into the best portfolio, while this strategy is difficult to apply in
large funds (Chen et al., 2004). However, the negative relationship between size and
performance contradicts the finding in Grinblatt and Titman (1989) and Wermers
(2000) that there is no significant difference across net performance of small and
11Aggarwal and Jorion (2010) argue that new managers tend to put more effort in improving
portfolio performance rather than marketing to new investors.
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large funds. In a related empirical study, Chen et al. (2004) find that smaller funds
tend to outperform larger funds due to diseconomies of scale.
4.2.2 Managerial Characteristics
Another set of arguments for emerging funds is related to the manager effect. Money
managers have strong incentive to make optimal investment decisions because their
salary is based on the fund performance directly. Kacperczyk et al. (2005) argue
that mutual fund managers might still differ substantially in their investment abil-
ities although strong evidence shows that actively managed funds underperform
passive benchmarks on average. In the mutual fund industry, Massa and Patgiri
(2009) compare the usual fixed management fee setup with arrangements where this
fee decreases as a function of asset size. This concave function provides a nega-
tive incentive effect, which is found to be associated with worse performance, as
predicted.
Managerial experience can be influential in the new fund creation. Although
they both have incentives to outperform, the investment outcome may vary because
of informational advantage or lack of experience. For existing portfolio managers,
they are motivated to outperform for the reputational reason and to attract more
inflows for both existing and newly established funds (Aggarwal and Jorion, 2010).
For emerging managers, they have strong incentives to prove their ability at the
beginning of their career. However, Aggarwal and Jorion (2010) argue that new
managers tend to put more effort in improving portfolio performance rather than
marketing to new investors to attract new flow. Also, in terms of marginal util-
ity, non-experienced managers have stronger incentive to outperform than existing
managers because their initial wealth is smaller (Aggarwal and Jorion, 2010).
Some studies attribute the superior performance to the specialized knowledge
and information held by portfolio managers. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) find that
geography is important – funds that invest a greater proportion of their assets locally
tend to do better. Kacperczyk et al. (2005) conclude that funds that concentrate
on a few industries do better than funds that do not. Shumway et al. (2009) pro-
duce evidence that superior performance is associated with beliefs that more closely
predict future performance. Cohen et al. (2008) provide evidence that portfolio man-
agers place larger bets on firms they are connected to through their social network,
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and perform significantly better on these holdings relative to their non-connected
holdings.
4.2.3 IPO Allocation
Our study also relates to the literature on IPO allocations and fund performance.
It is well accepted that underwriters have a considerable latitude in how to allocate
IPO stocks. In this vein, Aggarwal et al. (2002) find that underwriters allocate
to institutional investors IPO stocks in excess of that explained by bookbuilding
alone. Reuter (2006) looks within institutional investors and finds that allocations
of underpriced IPOs are positively associated with the level of brokerage business
directed to lead underwriters. We extend the existing literature by linking IPO
allocations to new fund performance. Thus, access to IPO allocations could be a
motive for creating new funds. Other motives include whether the new fund helps
the family to generate additional fee income and economies of scale within fund
families (Khorana and Servaes, 1999).
4.3 Data and Methodology
This section includes the data description on actively-managed domestic equity
funds in the U.S., managerial information, their portfolio holdings and returns. We
also describe the method in incubation fund identification and event time approach.
4.3.1 Sample Selection
The sample used in this study is built from several databases. Firstly, we start with
the CRSP U.S. Survivorship-Bias-Free Mutual Fund Database, which includes fund
returns and comprehensive fund characteristics such as total net asset (TNA), fund
returns, fund management structures, investment objectives, turnover ratios and
fund manager’ identity (Kacperczyk et al., 2005). We mainly focus on the actively
managed diversified domestic equity mutual fund in U.S. by excluding international,
balanced, sector, bond, money market, and index funds. To ensure the sample
consists of funds that mainly invest in equities, we only include funds that have an
average of 80% or greater of assets held in common stock (CRSP variable per com).
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Further, we exclude all non-U.S. funds using investment objective codes12.
Next, we merge this database with a list of mutual fund tickers and their creation
date from the NASD13. This list covers the period from January 1999 to August 2008.
Therefore, all the new funds created prior to 1st January, 1999 or after 31st August,
2008 are excluded. The NASD ticker creation date is the actual date that the NASD
assigned a ticker to a particular fund. To address the possibility of incubation bias,
we measure the difference between the ticker creation date and the date of the first
reported monthly return for the fund in CRSP. Finally, we drop funds with fewer
than 12 months of performance.
4.3.2 Identification of Fund Incubation
Evans (2007) mentions the substantial incubation bias existing in mutual funds.
The fund incubation refers the creation and management of a mutual fund before
opening it to the public, and is a strategy that fund families use to develop new
fund offerings. During incubation, families open multiple new funds (normally with
limited amount of internally-raised funds) and choose to have IPO’s or to shut down
funds at the end of an evaluation period. Evans (2007, 2010) show evidence that
the return of incubated funds can be unusually high during the incubation period.
The incubation bias arise when the fund family incubate several new funds and only
keep the tracking record of the surviving incubated funds, not the terminated funds.
There are various ways to exclude incubation funds. For instance, Kacperczyk
et al. (2014) exclude observations for which observation year is prior to the initial
information reporting year in the CRSP database. Kacperczyk et al. (2014) also
exclude funds that have TNA less than $5 million or fewer than 10 stocks in the
latest reporting month, as incubation funds are likely to be small in size and have
fewer stock in the portfolio holding. However, non-incubated funds can be meanwhile
excluded if they have less capital to start with. Therefore, we adopt the method in
Evans (2010) to address the possibility of incubation bias.
Specifically, the fund family or sponsor would apply for a ticker symbol when the
fund is to be sold to the public. The NASD would keep the record of the date that
12We remove those observations where the CRSP variables icdi obj, sp style cd, and policy are
equal to C&I, GE, IE, AGF, DSC, EAP, EAX, ECH, EEU, EGA, EIA, EJP, ELA, ESC, SCI,
SGL.
13These data and instructions is provided in Evans (2010), and can be found in the Supplements
& Datasets section of the Journal of Finance website: http://afajof.org/page/Supplements.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total Net Assets (TNA) (in Millions) 483.5 2,879 0.1 143,043
Fund Age (in Years) 10.72 3.65 0.08 17
Expense Ratio (%) 1.27 0.62 -0.03 14.71
Turnover Ratio (%) 85.66 147.61 0 5,466
Fund Load (%) 0.18 0.63 0 6.01
Raw Return (%) 0.51 5.51 -41.6 48.87
Fund Flow (%) 14.61 880 -131 185,492
Total Number of Funds 1,569
Total Number of Observations 166,556
Total Number of Recognizable Managers 957
Total Number of Fund Families 584
This table presents the summary statistics of the actively-managed equity mutual
funds. Funds included in the sample are non-incubated. The Mean, Standard
deviation, Minimum and Maximum are reported for the total net assets of the fund
($M), fund age in years, expense ratio (%), turnover ratio (%), fund load (%), return
after expenses (%) and fund flow (%). The table also reports the number of funds,
individual fund managers and fund families.
the ticker symbol is issued to the fund. This NASD ticker issue date is considered
as the end of incubation date for incubated funds. While for non-incubated funds,
the NASD ticker issue date is the date of new fund creation. Next, we examine the
difference between the NASD ticker issue date and the CRSP first return reporting
date for each fund. On one hand, a more negative difference represents either an
error in the ticker creation date data or an error in the ticker match. Therefore,
we remove funds with a negative difference greater than 3 months following Evans
(2010) which consists 4.26% of the sample. On the other hand, a positive difference
indicates a delay between the authorization of a ticker for the fund and the start
of the fund, which is likely to be related to the strategy of fund incubation. In the
prior literature, there are different selection criteria applied – Evans (2010) sets a
cut-off point of 12 month difference while Aggarwal and Jorion (2010) set a cut-off
of 6 month. We set the stricter cutoff of 12 months in this study following Evans
(2010). In other words, if the difference between the NASD ticker date and the
CRSP first report date is greater than 12 months, the fund would be classified as
the incubated fund.
4.3.3 Summary Statistics
Our final sample spans the time period between January 1998 and December 2015
because of the data availability. Overall, we have 1,569 incubation-free equity funds
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included in the sample, with 166,556 fund-month observations. There are 957 in-
dividual portfolio managers that can be identified in the sample, coming from 584
fund families. The summary statistics are presented in Table 4.1.
The average of total net asset (TNA) ranges across funds is $483.5 million,
ranging from $0.1 to $143 billion. The CRSP reported TNA as 0.1 indicates the
size of fund is less than 1 million. We do not apply any filter on fund TNA because
we are interested in every fund’s emerging period performance regardless of their
sizes. The average fund age is 10.7 years, with the longest existing funds survives
for 17 years. The average expense ratio is 1.27% per year, whereas the average fund
load stands at 0.18%. The average turnover is 85.6% which indicates funds’ holding
position is regularly changed. The mean of fund flow is 14.6%, indicating mutual
fund on average attracts positive inflow even the variation is huge with the minimum
flow is negative at -131%. On average, funds included in our sample attract positive
inflows.
4.3.4 Performance Measurement
We implement the main performance analysis using an event time approach. Specif-
ically, we consider the first reported month of fund performance as month zero.
During the sample period, we have 204 months in total event time. Starting from
month 1 we have 1,569 funds and this number falls due to fund attrition. Overall,
with this approach the largest number of funds is in month 1, and declines smoothly
in event time.
To examine the performance pattern of new mutual funds, we use the factor-
based performance measures, namely the Carhart (1997) 4 factor and Ferson and
Schadt (1996) conditional model. We use Jensen’s Alpha as the indicator of portfolio
performance.
Most studies in the literature implicitly assumes that the riskiness of the man-
ager’s portfolio can be measured using the risk and style factors identified by Carhart
(1997). This Carhart (1997) 4 factor model especially considers the momentum ef-
fect in stock returns (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) besides Fama and French (1995)
factors. However, traditional unconditional fund performance measures might be
unreliable because of the common variation will be confounded with average perfor-
mance (Ferson and Schadt, 1996; Kacperczyk et al., 2005). Therefore, we adopt the
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Ferson and Schadt (1996) conditional model for the purpose of robustness check.
Ferson and Schadt (1996) advocate the use of predetermined instruments to capture
time-varying loadings. The detail of model discussion is presented in Section 2.2.
However, we list the key equations here for the purpose of completion.
The Carhart (1997) 4 factor model is as follow:
Ri,t −Rf,t = αi + βi,m(Rm,t −Rf,t) + βi,smbSMBt + βi,hmlHMLt
+βi,momMOMt + ε
j
t (4.3.1)
We also use the following Ferson and Schadt (1996) conditional measure by
adding four macro-economic variables in addition to the Carhart (1997) 4 factor
model:
Ri,t −Rf,t = αi + βi,m(Rm,t −Rf,t) + βi,smbSMBt + βi,hmlHMLt
+ βi,momMOMt +
4∑
j=1
βi,j[zj,t−1(Rm,t −Rf,t)] + εjt (4.3.2)
Similarly as in the previous chapter, we examine factor-adjusted returns before
and after netting out expenses. The monthly fund returns reported in CRSP are
net from any expense or fees. The fund gross return are calculated by adding the
monthly expenses (annual expenses divided by 12) back to the net fund return.
4.4 Empirical Result
We report and discuss empirical evidences in this section, including the portfolio
performance in event times and the size effect. The multivariate estimation in
different model specifications are also included.
4.4.1 Short-Term Outperformance of New Funds
We first present estimation results for alphas and liquidity factor loadings based
on Carhart (1997) and Ferson and Schadt (1996) models in event time, in order to
examine the performance pattern of new funds. Table 4.2 and 4.3 demonstrate the
same set of results using fund returns before and after expenses, respectively. As we
are interested in the emerging period of newly established funds, we only report the
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Table 4.2: Mutual Fund Monthly Performance after Inception in Event Time
(Before Expenses)
Fund Age Abnormal Performance (%) Factor Loadings on Carhart Model
(month) Carhart Ferson-Schadt Market Size Value Momentum
1 0.446*** 0.42*** 1.021*** 0.207*** -0.001 0.042
(0.108) (0.119) (0.033) (0.043) (0.04) (0.028)
2 0.537*** 0.561*** 0.993*** 0.26*** -0.079* 0.094***
(0.103) (0.108) (0.031) (0.053) (0.041) (0.024)
3 0.315*** 0.35*** 1.031*** 0.242*** -0.075 0.098***
(0.096) (0.102) (0.032) (0.042) (0.046) (0.026)
4 0.175* 0.173 1.033*** 0.229*** -0.045 0.094***
(0.101) (0.11) (0.033) (0.048) (0.04) (0.026)
5 0.231** 0.273** 1.082*** 0.217*** -0.048 0.082***
(0.107) (0.118) (0.036) (0.045) (0.048) (0.025)
6 0.264*** 0.262** 1.086*** 0.147*** -0.078 0.076***
(0.1) (0.106) (0.032) (0.044) (0.048) (0.028)
7 0.04 0.114 1.054*** 0.258*** 0.017 0.074***
(0.09) (0.104) (0.029) (0.044) (.038) (0.024)
8 -0.014 -0.038 1.076*** 0.179*** -0.114*** 0.044*
(.094) (0.102) (0.031) (0.052) (0.043) (0.025)
9 0.071 0.054 1.101*** 0.17*** -0.074 0.039
(0.105) (0.116) (0.031) (0.045) (0.048) (0.028)
10 -0.119 0-.155 1.06*** 0.25*** 0.011 -0.009
(0.09) (0.096) (0.025) (0.04) (0.04) (0.024)
11 0.003 -0.043 1.101*** 0.147*** -0.074* 0.019
(0.092) (0.099) (0.028) (0.047) (0.04) (0.029)
12 0.065 0.035 1.088*** 0.065* -0.041 0.03
(0.092) (0.106) (0.03) (0.039) (0.04) (0.025)
1 - 6 0.323*** 0.335*** 1.039*** 0.22*** -0.055** 0.079***
(0.048) (0.05) (0.048) (0.25) (0.026) (0.14)
This table presents estimated abnormal returns and factor loadings performance of portfolios
aligned by fund age within 1 year of fund inception. Funds included in the sample are non-
incubated. Fund gross return is used in calculating excess return. Carhart (1997) and Ferson and
Schadt (1996) adjusted alphas are presented in the first two columns. Factor loadings of Carhart
4 factor are reported. Pooled regression estimation of subsample with fund age less and greater
than 6 months are also reported in the bottom rows. The significance levels are abbreviated with
asterisks: *, ** and *** donate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Clustered
standard errors are in parentheses.
estimated coefficients within the first year after inception. Overall, we observe the
short-term outperformance of mutual fund, which lasts for the first 6 months after
fund creation.
First two columns in Table 4.2 reports estimated abnormal alphas before ex-
cluding expenses in event time. First of all, we can observe the statistically signifi-
cant outperformance in first 6 months after fund inception from both Carhart and
Ferson-Schadt measures. The outperform peaks in month 2 at 0.537% from Carhart
measure and 0.561% from Ferson-Schadt measure, respectively. It starts to drop
from month 3 at 0.21% to the 6th month at 0.10% remaining positive. Estimated
performance becomes statistically insignificant and even negative from the month
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7. As the Ferson-Schadt measure gives very similar estimated coefficients compared
to the Carhart measure, we mainly report estimation results for the Carhart (1997)
measure.
In the bottom of Table 4.2, we also report the pooled OLS regressions of fund-
month observations that are within 6 month existence, and those that are older
than 6 months. The pooled regression results are consistent with our finding in
event time analysis. The Jensen’s Alpha of new fund observations (fund-month that
are younger than 6 months) is 0.323% in Carhart measure while 0.335% in Ferson-
Schadt estimation. The outperformance vanishes for fund observations that are more
than 6-month old, standing at 0.008% and 0.024% for Carhart and Ferson-Schadt
measures, respectively.
The right section of Table 4.2 presents the Carhart factor loadings in every
estimation. The market and size factors are significantly positive in all estimations.
Apart from month 2, other market estimates are well above 1, suggesting that
funds are generally taking greater risk than the market portfolio. The positive size
estimators suggest that the small size effect exists in each pooled regression. The
value factor shows mostly negative estimates, but the significance is not consistent.
Finally, we have the momentum factor which is mostly positive, and statistically
significant from month 2 to 8.
The outperformance period is shortened to 3 months when we apply the same set
of analysis using fund returns after adjusting for expenses as reported in Table 4.3.
In contrast with other studies which report a negative after-fee alpha, we still observe
significantly positive alphas in the first 3 months after fund inception. The peak
performance appears in month 2 at 0.537% and 0.561% for two different measures.
Estimated performance becomes significantly negative from month 4.
We also report the pooled OLS regressions that from month 1-6 in the bottom
row. Consistently we have significantly positive alphas for new fund observations
which are above 0.2%. The Carhart factor loadings are very similar to what we
reported in the previous table.
Overall, we find short-term outperformance for newly created funds using the
incubation-free equity fund sample. The outperformance lasts for 6 months after
fund inception using fund gross return, whereas for 3 months using net returns. We
also present the results in graphs as shown in Figure 4.2. It plots estimated alphas
based on Carhart (1997) and Ferson and Schadt (1996) measures over the 12 months
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Table 4.3: Mutual Fund Monthly Performance after Inception in Event Time
(After Expenses)
Fund Age Abnormal Performance (%) Factor Loadings on Carhart Model
(month) Carhart Ferson-Schadt Market Size Value Momentum
1 0.333*** 0.306** 1.021*** 0.207*** -0.002 0.042
(0.108) (0.119) (0.033) (0.043) (0.04) (0.028)
2 0.426*** 0.449*** 0.994*** 0.259*** -0.08** 0.095***
(0.103) (0.108) (0.031) (0.053) (0.041) (0.024)
3 0.203** 0.238** 1.031*** 0.241*** -0.077* 0.097***
(0.096) (0.102) (0.032) (0.042) (0.046) (0.026)
4 0.061 0.06 1.034*** 0.228*** -0.046 0.096***
(0.101) (0.109) (0.033) (0.048) (0.04) (0.026)
5 0.121 0.163 1.081*** 0.216*** -0.051 0.082***
(0.107) (0.118) (0.036) (0.045) (0.048) (0.025)
6 0.153 0.149 1.087*** 0.145*** -0.079* 0.076***
(0.1) (0.106) (0.032) (0.044) (0.048) (0.028)
7 -0.073 0.002 1.054*** 0.257*** 0.017 0.075***
(0.09) (0.104) (0.029) (0.044) (0.038) (0.024)
8 -0.126 -0.149 1.075*** 0.178*** -0.116*** 0.044*
(0.094) (0.102) (0.031) (0.052) (0.043) (0.025)
9 -0.04 -0.056 1.101*** 0.168*** -0.075 0.039
(0.105) (0.116) (0.031) (0.045) (0.048) (0.028)
10 -0.231** -0.268*** 1.059*** 0.251*** 0.01 -0.009
(0.09) (0.096) (0.025) (0.04) (0.04) (0.024)
11 -0.109 -0.154 1.101*** 0.145*** -0.076* 0.02
(0.092) (0.099) (0.028) (0.047) (0.04) (0.029)
12 -0.048 -0.08 1.089*** 0.065* -0.041 0.03
(0.092) (0.106) (0.03) (0.039) (0.04) (0.025)
1 - 6 0.211*** 0.222*** 1.039*** 0.219*** -0.056** 0.08***
(0.048) (0.05) (0.013) (0.025) (0.027) (0.014)
This table presents estimated abnormal returns and factor loadings performance of portfolios
aligned by fund age within 1 year of fund inception. Funds included in the sample are non-
incubated. Fund net return is used in calculating excess return. Carhart (1997) and Ferson and
Schadt (1996) adjusted alphas are presented in the first two columns. Factor loadings of Carhart
4 factor are reported. Pooled regression estimation of subsample with fund age less and greater
than 6 months are also reported in the bottom rows. The significance levels are abbreviated with
asterisks: *, ** and *** donate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Clustered
standard errors are in parentheses.
after fund inception. Panel which uses fund return before and after adjusting for
expenses are presented in the top and bottom, respectively. We also include monthly
means returns to compare the estimated performance and actual fund returns.
Figure 4.2 shows that the average monthly return of mutual funds is usually
between -0.1% and 1.1% before excluding expenses, -0.1% and 1.0% after expenses.
We can observe the decreasing trend in estimated alphas (both Carhart and Ferson-
Schadt alphas) as well as the average fund monthly returns as the fund age increases.
Interestingly, the alphas and mean return in month 12 have a jump back. Neverthe-
less, Figure 1 suggests the estimated fund performance is different from the actual
realized returns, and is decreasing in first 12 months after creation.
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4.4.2 Controlling for Size
One potential explanation for the short-term outperformance is the small-size effect.
In prior studies, Chen et al. (2004) report some evidence of a negative relationship
between fund returns and size, but this is exclusively confined to funds that invest in
small stocks, which tend to be illiquid. The finding is confirmed by Allen (2007), who
reports no difference across size for institutional investors except for the small cap
category, which is capacity-constrained and for which small funds perform better.
To test the hypothesis if the short-term superior performance is related with the
size, we firstly group funds into different size groups based on the fund size at the
time of inception. Next, we compare the portfolio performance in each size group
during different time period.
We track the fund performance in different size groups in different stages. Based
on the fund size at the inception time (TNA reported in the first month), we cat-
egorize funds into Minor (TNA<1 million), Small (1<TNA≤15 million), Medium
(15<TNA≤50 million) and Large (TNA>50 million) groups. As most new funds
starts with limited capitalization, over 65% of mutual funds start with the TNA less
than $15 million.
Next, we perform the pooled regression analysis in different age period, keeping
each fund in the same size group without re-balancing. In other words, funds may
increase or decrease in the TNA, but their assigned groups remain unchanged since
it is based on the size at inception. This analysis could be viewed as choosing funds
based on their sizes when they start. Therefore, this could answer the question of
whether funds that are small initially outperform or not. One limitation of this
method is that it does not ensure a continuously balanced allocation to size groups.
To be consistent with the finding reported in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, we enlarge the
time horizon into fund age within month 1-6, 7-12, 13-18, 19-24 and 24 onwards. The
result is presented in Table 4.4, with portfolio alphas estimated based on the Carhart
4-factor model. Table 4.4 includes 2 panels where panel A reports estimations using
fund gross returns and panel B presents results using net returns.
The first column in Panel A presents portfolio performance in the first 6 months
after fund inception before adjusting expenses for 4 different size portfolios. Mi-
nor, Small and Medium funds all outperform the market with significantly positive
alphas, while Large funds have no significant return. Small funds have the largest es-
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Table 4.4: Mutual Fund Portfolio Performance by Fund Age in Different Size
Groups
Fund Age (month)
Fund Size ($ million) ≤ 6 7-12 13-18 19-24 > 24
Panel A: Before Expenses
Minor (TNA ≤ 1) 0.227*** -0.046 0.056 0.08 0.023**
(0.077) (0.061) (0.050) (0.059) (0.012)
Small (1 < TNA ≤ 15) 0.5*** 0.119* 0.096 0.121* 0.002
(0.092) (0.069) (0.070) (0.063) (0.013)
Medium(15 < TNA ≤ 50) 0.324*** -0.034 0.029 0.11* -0.012
(0.105) (0.086) (0.070) (0.063) (0.012)
Large(TNA > 50) 0.173 -0.094 0.103 -0.182** -0.025**
(0.134) (0.108) (0.081) (0.083) (0.011)
Panel B: After Expenses
Minor (TNA ≤ 1) 0.102 -0.171*** -0.069 -0.045 -0.095***
(0.077) (0.061) (0.049) (0.058) (0.012)
Small (1 < TNA ≤ 15) 0.384*** 0.004 -0.02 0.004 -0.106***
(0.092) (0.069) (0.070) (0.063) (0.013)
Medium(15 < TNA ≤ 50) 0.221** -0.138 -0.074 0.006 -0.109***
(0.105) (0.086) (0.070) (0.064) (0.012)
Large(TNA > 50) 0.082 -0.183* 0.013 -0.273*** -0.107***
(0.134) (0.108) (0.081) (0.083) (0.011)
This table presents the portfolio performance of different size groups in different stages.
Estimated Alphas are measured by Carhart (1997) 4-factor model using fund return be-
fore and after excluding expenses, and presented in percentage. Funds are categorized
into Minor (TNA<1 million), Small (1<TNA≤15 million), Medium (15<TNA≤50 mil-
lion) and Large (TNA>50 million) groups based on the fund size at the inception time.
The fund ages are divided into 5 stages as month 1-6, 7-12, 13-18, 19-24 and month 24
onwards. The significance levels are abbreviated with asterisks: *, ** and *** donate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Clustered standard errors are in
parentheses.
timated abnormal return of 0.5%. After the first 6 months after fund inception, only
the Small fund group still shows some statistically significant outperformance. We
also notice that 2 years after new fund establishment, Minor funds still continue to
provide a significantly abnormal return around 0.023%, which cannot be observed in
other groups. One hypothesis is that the size of Minor funds still remains relatively
small capitalization after being created for 2 yeas.
Panel B shows that Minor and Large funds do not provide evidence in generating
abnormal performance in emerging period using fund net returns. The reason for
the vanishing outperformancec of Minor funds might be the high expense ratio
on minor fund operation. But Small and Medium funds still provide significant
positive alphas even after excluding expenses at 0.384% and 0.221%, respectively.
This contradicts the evidence provided in Grinblatt and Titman (1989) and Wermers
(2000) that there is no significant difference across the net performance of small and
large funds.
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Table 4.5: Fund Portfolio Performance by Access to IPO Stocks
Fund Age Carhart Alpha Before Expenses (%) Carhart Alpha After Expenses (%)
(month) IPO Fund Non-IPO Fund IPO Fund Non-IPO Fund
1 0.942*** 0.026 0.822*** -0.082
(0.192) (0.116) (0.192) (0.116)
2 0.832*** 0.172* 0.715*** 0.065
(0.196) (0.093) (0.195) (0.093)
3 0.732*** -0.031 0.615*** -0.14
(0.17) (0.098) (0.17) (0.098)
4 0.431** -0.076 0.311* -0.185*
(0.176) (0.102) (0.176) (0.102)
5 0.418** 0.074 0.303 -0.031
(0.192) (0.098) (0.192) (0.098)
6 0.414** 0.145 0.298 0.036
(0.182) (.097) (0.182) (0.097)
7 0.04 -0.031 -0.079 -0.14
(0.156) (0.097) (0.157) (0.096)
8 0.019 -0.107 -0.098 -0.213**
(0.171) (0.086) (0.171) (0.086)
9 0.176 -0.12 0.059 -0.228**
(0.192) (0.109) (0.192) (0.109)
10 -0.152 -0.086 -0.27* -0.194**
(0.164) (0.091) (0.164) (0.091)
11 0.031 -0.028 -0.086 -0.135
(0.167) (0.095) (0.167) (0.095)
12 -0.014 0.091 -0.134 -0.018
(0.177) (0.093) (0.177) (0.093)
1 - 6 0.62*** 0.053 0.501*** -0.055
(0.088) (0.043) (0.088) (0.043)
This table presents estimated abnormal returns and factor loadings performance of port-
folios aligned by fund age within 1 year of fund inception. Funds included in the sample
are non-incubated equity funds, and are catergorised into IPO funds which hold IPO(s)
during the first 6 months after inception, and Non-IPO funds which are funds have no
IPO allocation. Carhart-adjusted alphas are presented using both gross and net fund
return. Pooled regression estimation of subsample with fund age less and greater than 6
months are also reported in the bottom rows. The significance levels are abbreviated with
asterisks: *, ** and *** donate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
In general, our finding suggests that variation across size groups is as important
as variations across fund age stages. In other words, picking a fund by its age is
as essential as by its size. To the extent that there are significant patterns due
to size effect in the first 6 months after fund inception, Small and Medium funds
seem to perform better than Minor and Large funds, even after controlling for fund
expenses.
4.4.3 IPO Allocation and Fund Creation
In this section, we analyze the effect of IPOs on new fund performance. Previous
studies on IPOs find evidence that the typical IPO provides substantial first-day
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returns, a phenomenon known as underpricing (Ritter and Welch, 2002). In addi-
tion, mutual funds seem to have preferential treatment in IPOs. Reuter (2006), for
instance, finds a positive relation between underpriced IPO allocations to mutual
fund families and brokerage commissions that families paid the underwriters in the
months surrounding the IPO. Similarly, Aggarwal et al. (2002) argue that underwrit-
ers may favor institutional investors by allocating them more shares in hot issues.
Therefore, access to IPOs could be a potential explanation about new mutual fund
outperformance. We test this hypothesis by investigating whether the new fund
short term outperformance concentrated among funds that hold IPO stocks in the
6-month emerging period.
We separate the incubation equity fund sample into two categories – those have
IPO stock allocation during the emerging period and those do not. We use the Secu-
rities Data Companys (SDC) New Issues database to identify IPOs issued in North
America during the period 1998-2008. For each of these IPOs, SDC provides the
ISIN (International Securities Identification Number) of the issuing firm. Because
IPO allocations are not publicly available, we construct a proxy for IPO allocations
by matching the IPO information with the mutual fund holdings using all the re-
ports with the reporting period starting within the 6-month after the inception. If
a new fund holds at least one IPO stock holding, then we classify the fund as an
IPO new fund, alternatively as a non-IPO new fund. Among our 1,569 new funds,
698 funds (or 44.49% of the sample) are identified as IPO funds, while 871 funds (or
55.51% of the sample) are non-IPO funds. This shows that access to IPO allocations
is popular among new mutual funds.
We present the event time portfolio performance estimation results for IPO and
Non-IPO funds in Table 4.5. Our main interest is the portfolio alphas therefore we
abbreviate factor loadings. Also, we abbreviate Ferson-Schadt alphas because they
are very similar to Carhart measures. Table 5.4 reports Carhart alphas using fund
returns before and after adjusting for expenses. We can observe the statistically
significant outperformance of IPO funds in first 6 months while mostly no signifi-
cant abnormal performance for Non-IPO funds. The risk-adjusted performance for
new funds which have access to IPO allocation peaks at 0.942% in month 1, and
decreasing gradually until month 6. The outpeformance still holds for IPO funds
even after subtracting expense in fund return, though the outperforming period re-
duces to 4 months instead of 6 months. Funds which have no IPO allocation in
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the emerging period have no significantly positive alpha in the first 12 month after
inception. The pooled OLS regression estimates in the bottom two rows suggest
the consistent finding, that funds have access to IPO stocks in the emerging period
generate significant outperformance relative to those who have no IPO access.
4.4.4 Fund Manager and Fund Creation
Apart from the size effect and IPO stock allocation, the managerial characteristics
can used to explain the short-term outperformance of newly established funds. Ba¨r
et al. (2011) examined investment decisions of single fund managers and management
teams. They conclude that team-managed funds present less extreme performance,
less extreme investment objectives and less industry concentration in stock holdings
than individual-managed funds. This might also be explained as that individual
team members have different opinions, thus the team decision will be a compromise
(Sah and Stiglitz, 1986, 1988). Therefore, we investigate if the superior performance
of new funds is driven by individual managers rather than management teams in
this section14.
We firstly identify the managerial information for each fund at the inception
month. At the creation month, if the fund is reported as under the management of a
single manager, it is defined as the fund created by Individual Manager 15; if the fund
is reported as under the management of multiple managers or a management team,
it is defined as a fund created by Multiple Manager. Next, we separate the sample
into two groups based on the number of portfolio managers in the management team
at the inception month. In our sample, out of the 1,569 new funds, 862 (or 54.94%)
are managed by teams, while 707 (or 45.06%) are managed by individual managers.
Using each of these sub-samples, we re-estimate the Jensens Alpha for the event
time portfolios.
The result is presented in Table 4.6, which includes estimated event time portfolio
performance using both fund returns before and after adjusting for expense. Gen-
14The manager information is not fully disclosed in the CRSP since the manager information
is not required to disclose by the SEC prior to 1988. Even after 1988, funds are not required to
disclose detailed information of each manager in the team by the SEC. Until February 2006, funds
are required to disclose information about each manager in a team (up to at least four of the
members) by the SEC. Therefore, we group our sample into 2 categories: mutual funds created by
an individual manager and by multiple managers.
15We assign each recognizable individual manager with a unique ID as described in Appendix
A.
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Table 4.6: Fund Portfolio Performance by Manager Types
Fund Age Before Expenses (%) After Expenses (%)
(month) Individual Manager Multiple Manager Individual Manager Multiple Manager
1 0.545*** 0.39*** 0.431** 0.278**
(0.17) (0.137) (0.17) (0.137)
2 0.638*** 0.446*** 0.525*** 0.335**
(0.161) (0.136) (0.161) (0.136)
3 0.481*** 0.177 0.367** 0.067
(0.147) (0.126) (0.147) (0.126)
4 0.307* 0.07 0.192 -0.042
(0.164) (0.126) (0.163) (0.126)
5 0.265 0.227 0.153 0.118
(0.165) (0.142) (0.165) (0.142)
6 0.273* 0.272** 0.159 0.162
(0.149) (0.135) (0.149) (0.135)
7 0.208 -0.105 0.093 -0.216*
(0.143) (0.116) (0.143) (0.117)
8 0.02 -0.003 -0.092 -0.113
(0.158) (0.116) (0.158) (0.116)
9 0.15 -0.008 0.037 -0.118
(0.176) (0.129) (0.176) (0.129)
10 -0.071 -0.159 -0.186 -0.27**
(0.143) (0.115) (0.143) (0.115)
11 0.109 -0.078 -0.005 -0.188
(0.145) (0.119) (0.145) (0.119)
12 -0.05 0.156 -0.165 0.044
(0.146) (0.117) (0.146) (0.117)
1 - 6 0.409*** 0.258** 0.294*** 0.148**
(0.075) (0.062) (0.075) (0.062)
This table presents estimated abnormal returns and factor loadings performance of portfolios
aligned by fund age within 1 year of fund inception. Funds included in the sample are non-
incubated equity funds, and are categorized into funds created by individual managers, and funds
created by multiple managers. Carhart-adjusted alphas are presented using both gross and net
fund return. Pooled regression estimation of subsample with fund age less and greater than 6
months are also reported in the bottom rows. The significance levels are abbreviated with as-
terisks: *, ** and *** donate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Clustered
standard errors are in parentheses.
erally, the results indicate that the Alphas for both funds created by an individual
manager or a team are positive and statistically significant in the pooled portfolio
regression. The estimated alphas in the emerging period are 0.409 and 0.258 for indi-
vidual and team manager created funds, respectively. However, the result is slightly
different in the event time portfolios. Individual manager outperform the market in
5 out of 6 months in the emerging period, while only outperform in only 3 months
for multiple manager funds. Also, the magnitude of alphas is greater for individual
managers than multiple managers. The result still holds while applying fund net
returns as shown in the right section of Table 4.6. Overall, the management team
does not make a significant difference in explaining the short-lived outperformance
of new funds in the first 6 months after inception.
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Further, we attempt to investigate the new fund outperformance in relation to
managerial characteristics by taking a deeper look at individual managers. Exist-
ing and newly emerging portfolio managers all have incentives to generate superior
returns for various reasons. We can test if experience in managing mutual funds mat-
ters in outperforming the market for newly-created funds. For funds managed by
individual managers, we again categorize them into experienced and non-experienced
managers, by examining if this fund is the first mutual fund managed in his/her ca-
reer. We sort the sample by the manager name, time and fund identification number.
If the fund is identified as the first funds under management of the manager, then
we flag the manager as Non-Experienced Manager. Otherwise, if other funds are
managed by the manager before the new fund creation date, we flag the manager as
Experienced Manager. However, the identification method is not optimal given the
nature of database. The manager information disclosure is not required by the SEC.
It is possible that our identified Non-Experienced Manager actually has experience
but the corresponding information is not disclosed and trackable.
The event time portfolios of Experienced Manager and Non-Experienced Man-
ager are reported in Table 4.7, applying both fund return before and after adjusting
for expenses. Firstly, Experienced Manager and Non-Experienced Manager both
have some statistically significant outperformance within the first 6 months after
being created. Specifically, funds created by Experienced Manager have significant
performance from month 1-4, peaking at 0.628% in month 2. Funds initiated by
Non-Experienced Manager provide outperformance at month 1, 3 and 6 above 4%.
Secondly, the pooled regression presented in the bottom raws indicates that man-
agerial experience does not make a difference in generating outperformance within
6 month of the emerging period (p-value 0.13). Finally, the result is confirmed
by applying fund net returns. In short, managerial experience is not a powerful
determinant in explaining the short-term outperformance for new funds.
Generally, we aim at comparing performance of new funds in emerging period
(first 6 months after inception) among different groups. Firstly, we examine per-
formance of funds created by Individual Manager and Multiple Managers. Next,
we compare the performance of funds created by Experienced Manager and Non-
Experienced Manager. Overall, we find out funds created by individual managers
exhibit slightly better performance than funds managed by multiple managers dur-
ing the new fund emerging period, defined as 6 months after fund creation. This
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Table 4.7: Fund Portfolio Performance by Individual Manager Experience
Fund Age Before Expenses (%) After Expenses (%)
(month) Experience Mgr No Experience Mgr Experience Mgr No Experience Mgr
1 0.535** 0.578** 0.416** 0.472*
(0.211) (0.264) (0.211) (0.263)
2 0.628*** 0.324 0.509** 0.218
(0.199) (0.249) (0.199) (0.249)
3 0.448** 0.485** 0.331* 0.378
(0.182) (0.236) (0.182) (0.236)
4 0.395* 0.323 0.275 0.216
(0.206) (0.239) (0.205) (0.238)
5 0.251 0.171 0.133 0.072
(0.207) (0.225) (0.207) (0.225)
6 0.178 0.4* 0.058 0.296
(0.193) (0.214) (0.193) (0.214)
7 0.241 0.181 0.121 0.078
(0.189) (0.182) (0.188) (0.182)
8 0.19 -0.207 0.073 -0.31*
(0.214) (0.186) (0.214) (0.186)
9 0.23 0.082 0.112 -0.02
(0.21) (0.249) (0.21) (0.249)
10 -0.061 -0.117 -0.179 -0.224
(0.18) (0.207) (0.181) (0.207)
11 0.27 -0.198 0.152 -0.303
(0.183) (0.215) (0.183) (0.215)
12 -0.153 0.199 -0.273 0.095
(0.182) (0.2) (0.183) (0.199)
1 - 6 0.398*** 0.356** 0.279*** 0.251***
(0.098) (0.086) (0.098) (0.085)
This table presents estimated abnormal returns and factor loadings performance of portfolios
aligned by fund age within 1 year of fund inception. Funds included in the sample are non-incubated
equity funds that are created by individual managers. The sub-sample is further categorized into
funds created by experienced individual managers, and funds created by inexperienced managers.
Carhart-adjusted alphas are presented using both gross and net fund return. Pooled regression
estimation of subsample with fund age less and greater than 6 months are also reported in the bot-
tom rows. The significance levels are abbreviated with asterisks: *, ** and *** donate significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
evidence supports the finding in Ba¨r et al. (2011) that management teams are less
likely to achieve extreme performance. One explanation is the hypothesis of di-
versification of opinions (Sah and Stiglitz, 1986, 1988), which indicates that team
decisions are averaged and compromised from individual members’ ideas. Another
hypothesis is that information advantage known by individuals is easier to realize if
he/she manage the fund alone than in a management team. However, the managerial
experience does not provide evidence in explaining the short-term outpeformance,
as both Experienced Manager and Non-Experienced Manager presents significant
positive risk-adjusted returns in event time analysis and pooled regression. This is
because that both new-entry and existing managers have strong incentive to generate
abnormal performance.
66
4.4.5 Flow-Performance Analysis
From the previous analysis, it seems that new funds outperform during the 6-month
period after inception. We also investigate several mechanism that can explain the
short-lived outperformance, including IPO stock allocation and managerial charac-
teristics. It is concluded in the prior literature that abnormal performance is the
key in attracting investment flow. Therefore, in this section, we further extend
our analysis using multivariate regressions to examine flow-performance relation of
different types of new funds. The multivariate analysis differs from the portfolio
analysis applied in previous sections by simultaneously controlling for other mutual
fund characteristics that are related to fund performance.
Given that outperformance is relatively short-term, investors may not give cre-
dence to these returns, and thus provide no additional investment flow. However,
flow is highly sensitive to past performance because investors chase returns (Kos-
tovetsky and Warner, 2015). Therefore we are interested in investigating if new fund
attract significant flow in the emerging period.
To do this, we firstly build the indicator New Fund which equals 1 if the fund-
month observation is within the emerging period, and equals 0 otherwise. To be
consistent with the previous analysis, we split the New Fund into two groups: funds
created by Individual Manager and funds created by Multiple Manager. Finally, we
split the Individual Manager into two groups again: funds created by Experienced
Manager and funds created by Non-Experienced Manager. Specific multivariate
models are listed in following equations:
Flowjt = α0 + α
j
1NewFund
j
t + α2X
j
t + ε
j
t (4.4.1)
Flowjt = α0 + α
j
1IPOFund
j
t + α
j
2NonIPOFund
j
t + α3X
j
t + ε
j
t (4.4.2)
Flowjt = α0 + α
j
1IndManager
j
t + α
j
2MultiManager
j
t + α3X
j
t + ε
j
t (4.4.3)
Flowjt = α0 + α
j
1ExpManager
j
t + α
j
2NonExpManager
j
t + α
j
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The dependent variable Flowjt is the monthly net dollar flow into the fund calcu-
lated as
TNAjt−TNAjt−1(1+Rjt )
TNAjt−1
, starting from month 2, ranked by year and month. The
reason why we use the fractional rank of net dollar flow instead of the commonly
used percentage measure is because that news funds exhibit substantial variation in
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the total net assets and the fractional rank controls for such outlier effects (Evans,
2010). In addition, there is substantial variation in the net dollar flow across differ-
ent market states. Thus, ranking flows within year and month also controls for this
variation. We also use the fractional rank methodology in calculating some of the
control variables for the same purpose.
X is a vector of fund-specific control variables, including the fund size factor
Log(TNA) measured as the natural logarithm of funds monthly total net assets, the
fund family size factor Log(Family TNA) computed as the natural logarithm of fund
familys monthly total net asset, Fund Age measured as the difference between the
current calendar year and fund’s initiation year, Expense Ratio Rank calculated as
the demeaned monthly fractional rank of funds expense ratio, Turnover Rank calcu-
lated as the demeaned monthly fractional rank of funds turnover ratio, Fund Load
Rank calculated as the demeaned monthly fractional rank of funds load, Lag Fund
Flow Rank computed as the demeaned monthly fractional rank of funds one month
lag of fund flow, and Cumulative Total Return measured as the funds cumulative
net return since inception16.
We estimate the regressions with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) which
adjust for not only the contemporaneous correlation and heteroskedasticity among
fund returns, but the autocorrelation within each funds returns (Beck and Katz,
1995). We analyze the unbalanced panel, since most mutual funds do not exist
over the whole sample period. Table 4.8 and 4.9 reports the multivariate regression
estimations. The number of observations, adjusted R-squared and number of cluster
for each model specification are also reported in the bottom of tables.
Table 4.8 reports the flow-performance estimation result of new funds, and funds
with/out IPO stock allocation. Model specification (1)-(3) focus on the New Fund
indicator variable, aim at examining whether the 6-month outperformance leads to
greater investment flows, while specification (4) and (5) further split the New Fund
into the IPO Fund and the Non-IPO Fund.
The results of model (1) show that new funds in the emerging period attracts
investment flow, as the coefficient is 0.101 and statistically significant, including only
16Kacperczyk et al. (2005) and Huang et al. (2011) use alternative fund performance measures
which is the model adjusted alpha based using rolling window calculation. The window ranges from
12-36 months. We do not consider such method for the reason that any rolling window procedure
would waste first 12-36 months observations, which makes it impossible for us to examine the
performance in new fund emerging period.
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Table 4.8: Multivariate Analysis: New Funds and IPO Allocation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
New Fund 0.101*** 0.027*** 0.011***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.003)
IPO Fund 0.045*** 0.019***
(0.009) (0.005)
Non-IPO Fund 0.008 0.001
(0.008) (0.004)
Difference (IPO vs. Non-IPO) 0.037*** 0.018***
(0.011) (0.006)
Log(Family TNA) 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log(TNA) 0.006*** -0.000 0.006*** -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Fund Age -0.026*** -0.013*** -0.026*** -0.013***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Expense Ratio Rank -0.073*** -0.042*** -0.073*** -0.042***
(0.011) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005)
Turnover Rank -0.056*** -0.023*** -0.056*** -0.023***
(0.009) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004)
Fund Load Rank -0.006 -0.001 -0.006 -0.001
(0.011) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005)
Lag Fund Flow Rank 0.550*** 0.549***
(0.008) (0.008)
Cumulative Total Return 0.041*** 0.041***
(0.005) (0.005)
Constant 0.399 0.480*** 0.206*** 0.481*** 0.208***
(0.354) (0.0759) (0.0703) (0.079) (0.072)
Observations 164,962 133,014 131,881 133,014 131,881
Adjusted R2 (%) 0.483 5.98 34.9 5.99 34.9
Number of Cluster 1,568 1,510 1,510 1,510 1,510
This table presents the coefficients from regressions of funds investor flows on performance
and new fund characters. The dependent variable is the monthly net dollar flow to the fund,
starting from month 2, ranked by year and month. Indicator variable New Fund equals 1 if the
fund-month observation is within the emerging period, and 0 otherwise. IPO equals 1 if the
fund holds IPO stock(s) within the 6 months after fund inception, and 0 otherwise. Similarly,
indicator variable Non-IPO equals 1 if the fund does not hold any IPO stock within the 6
months after fund inception, and 0 otherwise. Control variables include fund size, measured
the natural log of funds total net assets (Log TNA), log of fund familys total net asset (Log
Family TNA), fund age in year (Fund Age), the demeaned monthly fractional rank (between
0 and 1) of funds expense ratio (Expense Ratio Rank), turnover ratio (Turnover Rank) and
load (Fund Load Rank), one month lag of fund flow rank (Lag Fund Flow Rank) and funds
cumulative net return since inception (Cumulative Total Return). The differences between
indicator variables and Non-IPO dummy are reported. Monthly fixed effect are included
in regressions and clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The significance levels are
abbreviated with asterisks: *, ** and *** donate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
month fixed effects to control for time trends on flows. In specification (2) and (3), we
consider control variables which lead to some loss of observations due to the missing
data. Largely, the coefficient estimates of the control variables are consistent with
the prior literature. Specifically, fund size and family size have a positive impact
on investment flows, while fund age, expense ratio and turnover affect negatively on
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flows. Most importantly, however, the inclusion of control variables does not affect
our previous findings. The results consistently show that the new fund is associated
with significant net dollar flow rank within 6 month after inception. One thing to
note is that with the lagged dependent variable (Lag Fund Flow Rank) and funds
cumulative net return since inception (Cumulative Total Return) included in model
(3), the indicator variable coefficient decreases slightly from 0.027 to 0.011 but with
any change in the significance level.
We split the New Fund into two dummy variables IPO Fund and Non-IPO Fund,
based on if the fund holds IPO stock in the emerging period or not. Model (4) and
(5) indicate that IPO fund have positive net dollar flow ranks, with statistically
significant coefficients. These results support the view that investors recognize the
short-lived nature of new fund outperformance, especially that of a fund which has
access to IPO stock(s). Moreover, the market provide additional investment flow to
IPO funds relative to non-IPO funds, as the differences are tested to be statistically
significant.
Next, we examine whether the portfolio manager characteristics has any impact
on investment flows and results are presented in Table 4.9. To do so, we perform a
simple regression as specification (1), with two indicator variables Individual Man-
ager which equals 1 if the fund is created by an individual portfolio manager and
within the 6 months after fund inception, and 0 otherwise, and Multiple Managers
equals 1 if the fund is initiated by a team and within the 6 months after fund in-
ception and 0 otherwise. We find that both individual-created and team-created
funds are linked with significant flow rank in the first 6 month after inception. The
difference between individual and multiple manager created funds is estimated as
-0.027 and is statistically significant (p<0.01), as shown at the bottom of Table 4.9.
In other words, new funds attract flows regardless of the number of managers at the
time of inception, but team managers outperform individuals slightly.
We are also interested in the managerial experience in attracting fund flow into
new funds. Therefore, we identify funds created by individual managers into two
subgroups – Experienced Individual Manager and Non-Experienced Individual Man-
ager which depends on if the manager has experience in managing other funds prior
to the fund creation date. We run the regression without control variables in model
(2), and gradually add control factor in (3) and (4). In specification (3), we find that
all types of managers are associated with positive flows, but it is the inexperienced
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Table 4.9: Multivariate Analysis: Managerial Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual Manager 0.073***
(0.008)
Multiple Manager 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.026*** 0.011**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004)
Experienced Individual Manager 0.089*** 0.003 -0.007
(0.013) (0.014) (0.008)
Non-Experienced Individual Manager 0.066*** -0.001 -0.005
(0.01) (0.011) (0.006)
Log(Family TNA) 0.009*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
Log(TNA) 0.002 -0.002***
(0.002) (0.001)
Fund Age -0.013*** -0.0071***
(0.001) (0.001)
Expense Ratio Rank -0.078*** -0.043***
(0.012) (0.005)
Turnover Rank -0.064*** -0.026***
(0.01) (0.004)
Fund Load Rank -0.017 -0.006
(0.011) (0.005)
Lag Fund Flow Rank 0.559***
(0.008)
Cumulative Total Return 0.033***
(0.004)
Difference -0.027***
(Individual vs. Multiple) (0.01)
Difference -0.011 -0.023 -0.018**
(Experienced Ind vs. Multiple) (0 .014) (0.015) (0.008)
Difference -0.035*** -0.026** -0.015**
(Non-Experienced Ind vs. Multiple) ( 0.012) (0.013) (0.007)
Constant 0.496*** 0.496*** 0.567*** 0.262***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.006)
Observations 164,962 164,962 133,014 131,881
Adjusted R2 (%) 0.491 0.492 4.14 34.5
Number of Cluster 1,568 1,568 1,510 1,510
This table presents the coefficients from regressions of funds investor flows on perfor-
mance and new fund characters. The dependent variable is the monthly net dollar flow
to the fund, starting from month 2, ranked by year and month. Indicator variable Indi-
vidual Manager equals 1 if the fund is created by an individual portfolio manager and the
observation is within the 6 months after fund inception, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, indi-
cator variable Multiple Managers equals 1 if the fund is initiated by a team and within
the 6 months after fund inception and 0 otherwise. We further split the Individual Man-
ager subsample into individual managers with experience in managing equity fund before
Experienced Individual Manager and those who do not have experience Non-Experienced
Individual Manager. Control variables include fund size, measured the natural log of
funds total net assets (Log TNA), log of fund familys total net asset (Log Family TNA),
fund age in year (Fund Age), the demeaned monthly fractional rank (between 0 and 1)
of funds expense ratio (Expense Ratio Rank), turnover ratio (Turnover Rank) and load
(Fund Load Rank), one month lag of fund flow rank (Lag Fund Flow Rank) and funds cu-
mulative net return since inception (Cumulative Total Return). The differences between
indicator variables are reported. Monthly fixed effect are included in regressions and
clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The significance levels are abbreviated with
asterisks: *, ** and *** donate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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individual managers who significantly underperform team managers. In specifica-
tion (4), we include the fractional rank variable of one-month lag fund flow (Lag
Fund Flow Rank) and the funds cumulative return since inception (Cumulative To-
tal Return) as additional control variables. Essentially, this specification addresses
concerns about a potential dynamic endogeneity impact on investment flows. The
results show that lagged fund flows and cumulative return have a positive impact
on the net dollar flow ranks. In addition, the inclusion of additional control vari-
ables makes the difference in flows between experienced individual managers and
team managers – the difference between these two becomes statistically significant
(p<0.05).
Overall, these results are consistent with the view that investors differentiate
among new funds created by multiple managers, and reward them with additional
flow during the 6-month period after inception. Recall the previous finding that the
event time portfolio performance of individual-created and team-created funds do
not differ. This phenomenon can be explained by that investors have confidence in
team management as they are a safer choice.
4.5 Summary
With a large growth in the number of new funds offered to the market, understanding
the performance of new funds during the first few months following their creation
is becoming an increasingly relevant issue. Several recent studies have analyzed
various aspects of mutual fund performance, but very little about the issue of the
early stage performance of mutual funds when they may be considered as “new”. Our
study provides the analysis of the performance patterns of new mutual funds, and
investigate the explanation for the short-lived outperformance. Using U.S. mutual
fund data from 1996 to 2015, we address the questions of whether new mutual funds
outperform the market and if they do, what may explain their superior performance.
Our analysis and main findings may be summarized as follows.
First, we examine how the performance of mutual funds evolves over time fol-
lowing their inception using the event time approach. This approach allows us to
develop deeper insight into the relationship between fund performance and fund age
than the common practice of treating fund age merely as a control variable. We
find evidence of new funds outperformance during their emerging period, which is
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defined as the first 6 months of their existence, both before and after fund expenses
are taken into account. This outperformance, however, only lasts for a short term
and disappears soon after the emerging period.
Second, our findings suggest that performance variations across fund age stages
are as important as more well-known variations across size groups. The size effects
seem to become relevant as early as during the first 6 months after fund inception:
Minor, Small and Medium funds seem to perform better than Large funds especially
during the first 6 months.
Thirdly, we link the new fund outperformance with IPO allocation and find that
funds have access to IPO stocks in the emerging period largely outperform those
have no IPO access. Therefore, IPO allocation seems to be an effective strategy to
start a new funds. This finding is also consistent with the prior literature which
finds a positive relation between under-priced IPO allocations to mutual fund fam-
ilies and brokerage commissions that families paid the underwriters in the months
surrounding the IPO (Reuter, 2006).
Finally, we find that funds created by individual managers slightly outperform
team-created funds during the 6-month emerging period. This is consistent with
the findings of Ba¨r et al. (2011) which show that management teams are less likely
to achieve extreme performance. We also find that the managerial experience in
managing mutual funds does not improve the performance of newly created funds,
which indicates that the short-term ourperformance is due to information advantage
rather than managerial experience.
We also contribute to the literature on fund flows for new funds. Existing liter-
ature largely focuses on the relationship between investment flows with past perfor-
mance (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998), fund ratings (Del Guer-
cio and Tkac, 2008), incubation bias (Evans, 2010), media coverage (Solomon et al.,
2014), and trendy mutual funds (Greene and Stark, 2016). We show that IPO al-
locations is an effective strategy that enhances investment flows during their early
months after the inception of a new fund. Also, funds created by team managers are
likely to be awarded with more flows than individual managers. The findings have
implications for both portfolio managers and fund families, since we show that IPO
allocation is an effective strategy in enhancing investment flows during the emerging
period of a new fund.
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Chapter 5
Fund Manager Replacement and
Risk Taking
“...While past performance is not indicative of future results, it’s even less relevant
when the management team changes hands. ...You start over to some extent. We
punish funds for a manager change, even though that change could be good or bad,
but it adds unknowns and that’s a risk people should be aware of. ...”
— Jonathan Burton at marketwatch.com
5.1 Introduction
The previous empirical study focuses on the new mutual fund opening, and finds out
that new funds opened by individual managers, especially inexperienced individual
managers generate slightly better performance than funds opened by multiple man-
agers. The finding is consistent with Aggarwal and Jorion (2010) which argue that
newly-entry managers have strong incentives to prove their ability in the beginning
of their careers by putting more effort in enhancing portfolio performance rather
than marketing those funds to new investors. Therefore, we investigate further in
the topic of fund manager career concern in this chapter.
This chapter investigates the idea that fund managers would take into account
turnover risk that they face when adjusting the volatility of portfolios under their
management. In addition to exploring a statistical correlation between a manager’s
discharge from a fund and the realized volatility of the fund that she is managing,
we use an instrumental variable (IV) approach to study whether one may infer
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causality from such a correlation. Specifically, our structural equation describes a
fund’s volatility as a function of whether its manager has been recently replaced,
and we address the potential endogeneity of manager replacement using an IV that
is motivated by the notion of a family tournament.
The basic structure of the family tournament that we postulate is as follows.
Each fund manager observes the position of her funds relative to other funds in
the same family (family rank) on a continuous basis. Based on this family rank,
fund managers decide on the amount of risk to take accordingly. Thus, it may be
reasonable to assume that a fund manager’s primary goal is to reach a top position
by the end of a calendar year based on the performance within that year. We
perform the analysis on a yearly basis since most fund managers are compensated in
relation to their performance during a calendar year. Although investment decisions
by some fund investors and decisions by families to advertise or promote managers
might depend on longer period horizons, the one-year horizon is the most natural
choice (Kempf and Ruenzi, 2008). Moreover, according to Sirri and Tufano (1998),
a manager’s performance in the prior year is the most important determinant of
investment decisions by fund investors. Thus, trying to reach a top position by the
end of the year based on the performance within this year is arguably a natural goal
for fund managers to pursue.
Previous work shows that manager risk-shifting behavior is affected by compen-
sation and employment incentives. Empirical studies indicate that fund managers
would try to secure their position in the family tournament so as to avoid dismissal
risk and achieve better compensation. For example, Hu et al. (2011) find that the
managers compensation and employment risk incentives would lead to a nonmono-
tonic (U-shaped) relation between the risk choices relative to peers and prior relative
performance from the pooled OLS regressions.
However, the omitted variable bias may exist since manager replacement factor
could be correlated with the error term in the risk choice model. Our focus is to
examine the casual effect of manager turnover risk on the riskiness of a manager’s
investment portfolio. To test the casual relation, we adopt an instrumental variable
(IV) estimator. The IV estimator can be computed in two stages where the first
stage regression models the replacement risk of fund managers, and the second
stage regression uses the predicted replacement risk from the first stage to explain
the riskiness of an investment portfolio. We employ this approach, but we are also
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mindful of the fact that several fund and manager characteristics associated with
the manager turnover are also arguably directly related to the portfolio’s riskiness.
Our task, therefore, is to identify factors providing exogenous variation in manager
turnover risk without affecting investment decisions by managers via other channels.
Our identification strategy relies on the idea that manager replacement does
not only occur when a manager’s investment performance has been persistently
poor. For instance, fund flow (i.e. proportional change in total assets not due
to returns) increases assets under management, thereby generating more fees for
the fund sponsor, so it is natural that mutual fund companies would want to hire
managers who can attract greater flow. Therefore, a board may review and monitor
a manager’s contribution in terms of attracting a new flow and replace those who are
incapable of attracting significant flows. We hypothesize that managers who attract
less flow in the family tournament are more likely to get replaced. In short, the
manager’s fund flow rank within the family should predict manager replacement.
As a proxy for the fund’s position in the family tournament, we adopt the “Rank-
of-Ranks” approach of Kempf and Ruenzi (2008). The advantage of this method
is that it ensures the performance of funds from different segments can be easily
compared. This “Rank-of-Ranks” variable signals different but related employment
risk fund managers are facing in the tournament, making it more likely that the
board will consider replacing the management team.
We first document that fund managers are exposed to the replacement risk if
they have peer pressure from the family tournament. Then, we show that the
changeability of the fund’s position in the family tournament is unlikely to affect
the fund’s realized volatility directly, in an analysis that controls for various other
factors such as fund characteristics and family size. Finally, we use not only the
idiosyncratic risk of fund return on Lipper return, but also Carhart 4 factor model
adjusted idiosyncratic risk to the measure of the fund’s realized volatility. The
former one allows us to understand the segment peer adjusted risk, while the latter
allows us to understand the market-adjusted realized volatility. We also control for
a range of factors shown to influence the fund volatility, including fund and family
characteristics.
Our central finding is that there is a robust and significantly positive association
between predicted manager turnover risk and the fund realized idiosyncratic risk.
Across various regression specifications, the results indicates a one percentage point
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increase in replacement risk is associated with about 1% greater fund idiosyncratic
volatility. The result is in line with the manager employment concern literature.
This study provides an innovative explanation for the relationship between fund
risk taking and the family tournament. Fund managers that perform badly in the
tournament may have greater career concerns since they are more likely to be re-
placed. Under this career dismissal pressure, those managers tend to hold more
volatile portfolios to improve their relative position in the family. In other words,
the manager replacement risk driven by the peer pressure from the tournament is
likely to reflect in the fund’s idiosyncratic risk.
We use an instrumental variable (IV) approach to study whether fund managers
would take into account turnover risk that they face when adjusting the volatility
of portfolios. The instrumental variable measures the peer flow pressure that a
fund is facing in the tournament, and is constructed by following the “Rank-of-
Ranks” approach of Kempf and Ruenzi (2008), which allows the performance of
funds from different segments to be easily compared. Generally, we show that the
risk-taking behavior of fund managers depends on the competitive situation they
face. Tournament losers are facing more career risk than winners and they are
more likely to increase the riskiness of their investment portfolios to improve their
position. The results remain robust when we account for a more generalized segment
(investment style) tournament instead of a family tournament.
To sum, the following research questions are addressed in this chaper:
• Is the peer flow pressure from the fund tournament a significant determinant
of whether a mutual fund manager is replaced?
• Do fund managers adjust the risk of their funds based on the career risk that
they are facing from the tournament?
The following Section 5.2 includes the discussion of prior literature on the topic
of mutual fund tournament and fund manager turnover. The main methodology of
the two-stage least squares approach is presented in the next section. The discussion
of sample selection and variable construction are included in Section 5.4. The next
section includes the main empirical resutl and robustness checks. We close the
chapter with some conclusion in the end.
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5.2 Prior Literature
We provide the discussion of prior literature in different aspects including the fund
tournament, portfolio manager turnover and fund volatility.
5.2.1 Mutual Fund Tournament
According to Conyon et al. (2001), tournament is defined as the competition in a
group with the purpose of being rewarded on their relative performance. There are
two types of fund tournaments discussed in the prior mutual fund literature: the
segment tournament (Brown et al., 1996) and the family tournament (Kempf and
Ruenzi, 2008).
It is Brown et al. (1996) who pioneered the idea the mutual fund market may be
modeled as a tournament in which all funds having comparable investment objectives
compete with one another. This approach undoubtedly provides a useful framework
for a better understanding of the portfolio management decision-making process.
Later on, Kempf and Ruenzi (2008) take a deeper look at the fund family, and
argue that the family tournament also creates career concern for fund managers
– portfolio managers decide on the portfolio risk to take based on their current
position relative to other funds in the same family (family rank). This offers a novel
perspective on fund families, specifically that funds belonging to the same family
should not be viewed as coordinated entities, contrary to what has been implicitly
assumed in the literature. They should rather be seen as competitors in an intense
intra-firm competition.
As shown in Nanda et al. (2004), more than 80% mutual funds belong to the
family and the average number of mutual funds included in the family is 7. There
are many advantage of being a member of a fund family than being alone, such
as economies of scale to the servicing, distribution, human resources allocation and
promotion of mutual funds (Nanda et al., 2004). As most mutual funds belong to
a family, family tournament phenomenon is observed in many studies. Funds with
better performance in the tournament are normally associated with better resources
while those with worse performance are facing removal risk. For instance, Gaspar
et al. (2006) examine how a fund family allocates resources to promote those funds
which have greater potential to improve the profits of the entire fund family. Elton
et al. (1996) find that fund families merge funds that are doing poorly into partner
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funds that have excellent performance.
The best-performing fund (star fund) in the tournament not only attracts sig-
nificant cash inflow to the fund itself, but also to other peer funds in the same
family (Nanda et al., 2004). Being on the top benefits both the fund and the fam-
ily. Therefore, managers are induced to take riskier investment positions in order
to beat their peers if they are currently at the bottom of the tournament (Taylor,
2003). In addition, the position of a fund in the tournament is normally measured
as the ordinal ranking of performance measures, since investors care more about
rankings than absolute performance (Patel et al., 1994). Therefore, we assume that
fund managers have incentives to compete with the peers from the same family to
achieve better performance and better rank.
5.2.2 Mutual Fund Manager Turnover
Manager turnover is commonly observed in cooperations as well as fund companies.
There are many studies investigating the reasons for manager turnover. For example,
Peters and Wagner (2014) assume that the manager’s decision to leave the current
position is explained by the opportunity cost of departure, which is measured as the
compensation that the manager could receive by staying. More recently, Kostovetsky
(2017) investigates the determinants of the fund manager’s decision to quite the
industry. Similarly, managers with greater assets under management are less likely
to leave the mutual fund industry, while managers who work in bigger fund families
or with more co-managers are more likely to exit the industry (Kostovetsky, 2017).
The past fund performance has long been examined as an essential determinant
for fund manager turnover. Many studies reveal an inverse relation between the
fund performance and manager turnover, indicating that the manager is more likely
to leave the fund if the performance is unsatisfactory (e.g., (Chevalier and Ellison,
1999b; Khorana, 1996)). However, only performance in recent 1 or 2 years matters
in determining the managerial replacement probability as mentioned in Khorana
(1996). Moreover, Kostovetsky and Warner (2015) raise the concern that it is diffi-
cult to distinguish between forced and voluntary manager departures, therefore the
noisy manager turnover information is biasing downward any estimate of the true
turnoverperformance relation. Also, Adams et al. (2013) argue that fund manager
replacement can be endogenous decision from the board by examining the associa-
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tion between the fraction of independent directors in the board and fund manager
turnover.
Khorana (2001) finds that the turnover of outperforming managers results in
deteriorating performance in the future. Furthermore, manager changes are often
followed by a spike in the turnover of holdings, incurring additional transactions costs
and tax liabilities for fund investors (Bergstresser et al., 2003). On the other hand,
the possibility of promotion to hedge funds can work to mitigate agency problems,
by creating additional incentives for managerial effort Kostovetsky (2017).
5.2.3 Risk Taking by Mutual Fund
The empirical findings on the fund risk taking behavior and past performance are
somehow mixed. Busse (2001) finds that funds that are ranked above the median
fund in their category increase total risk more than below-median funds, a result
contradicting Brown et al. (1996).
The incentives for the portfolio manager’s risk-taking behavior include employ-
ment risk, compensation, and etc. The compensation incentive for the fund man-
ager from the convex performance-flow relationship are examined in great detail by
Brown et al. (1996); Kempf et al. (2009); Koski and Pontiff (1999), and Elton et al.
(2003). Kempf et al. (2009) also study the impact of employment incentives on the
risk taking decisions by mutual fund managers. Typically, mutual fund managers
are compensated with a fixed fee based on their assets under management. Taylor
(2003) reveals that mutual funds are motivated to maximize the investor’s inflow
because they funds frequently charge a fixed percentage of the assets invested in
the fund as a management fee. Given that Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri
and Tufano (1998) find that a disproportionate amount of investor flow volume is
directed toward top-performing funds each year, this “risk-increasing” tournament
behavior seems like a rational response by compensation-maximizing managers.
However, there are many previous studies that have examined risk-taking deci-
sions by fund managers, after relative underperformance during the first half year.
Brown et al. (1996) are the first to hypothesize and document that mutual fund
managers have incentives to alter their second-half-of-the-year risk levels based on
their mid-year performance rankings. Specifically, managers who underperformed
in the first half year increase their risk levels in an attempt to improve their po-
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sitions against other managers, while managers who outperformed in the first half
year reduce risk levels to preserve their positions (Brown et al., 1996). Similarly,
Taylor (2003) mentions that poor-performing funds gamble to “catch up” and high-
performing funds moderate risk to “lock in” their leads prior to the calendar year-
end. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) finds a positive correlation between past per-
formance in excess of a benchmark during the first three quarters of the year and
increases in tracking error volatility in the subsequent quarter.
Taylor (2003) proposes an alternative model of the situation involving competing
fund managers during the calendar year. When both winning and losing managers
are active, the winning manager is more likely to gamble – especially when the mid-
year performance gap is high or when stocks offer high returns and low volatility
(Taylor, 2003).
Schwarz (2011) points out that the mixed evidence on this question is due to a
“sorting bias” from the existing methodology. The commonly applied methodology
sorts managers based on their first-half returns, and then uses managers’ first-half
return standard deviations as the baseline risk level to measure the second-half-of-
the-year risk shifting. However, return sorting will also likely sort risk levels given the
dependence of risk and return. Even without risk-shifting behavior, mean reversion
of these sorted risk levels results in the detection of tournament behavior. After
correcting for this bias, Schwarz (2011) finds evidence supporting the hypothesis that
managers who underperformed in the first half year increase portfolio risk during
the second half of the year and that this tournament behavior is not dependent on
first-half market conditions.
5.3 Methodology
The argument for why greater manager turnover risk increases the idiosyncratic risk
is as follows. Fund managers are competing within the family tournament. They
are facing greater turnover risk if fund performance is sitting at the bottom of peer
funds. What they are attempting to do when faced with a high level of replacement
risk is to increase the fund volatility to improve the performance, so as to improve
their position in the tournament.
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5.3.1 Instrumental Variables
The fundamental challenge to this study is to address that the manager replacement
risk is endogenous, which can be used to explain the realized idiosyncratic volatility.
In observational data, the causal effect can instead be identified using instrumental
variables, which significantly affect the fund manager replacement risk but are un-
related to the fund’s risk taking except through their effect on manager turnover.
We argue that the flow pressure from the fund’s peers in the tournament, provides
a valid instrumental variable for fund manager turnover in the analysis.
The manager replacement risk may influence the fund’s realized volatility. In-
stead of directly estimating the relationship using a probit model, we introduce an
instrumental variable approach to reduce omitted variable bias. The motivation for
the IV comes from the career concerns of fund managers in the tournament. We
assume that a fund manager’s primary goal is to reach a top position in the tourna-
ment by attracting significant inflow. The fund manager observes the fund’s current
position in the segment (segment rank) or family tournament (family rank) on a
continuous basis, and takes decisions in adjusting the risk using the observed flow
rank.
5.3.2 Empirical Model
Following Peters and Wagner (2014), our methodology mainly includes a two-stage
least squares approach. We present two estimation models in this section, while the
detail of each variable construction will be discussed in the next section. We use i to
denote each equity fund and t to denote time. The first stage involves the following
linear probability regression:
MRi,t = α1 + β1PeerPressurei,t + β
′
cControlsi,t + θ1i,t + ε1i,t (5.3.1)
where MRi,t is a binary variable which equals 1 if the fund manager has been
replaced since prior calendar year, and 0 otherwise; PeerPressurei,t is the instru-
mental variable which measures the flow pressure from the fund tournament in a
calendar year; Controlsi,t is a vector of control variables including ExpenseRatio,
TurnoverRatio, FundSize, FundReturn, Flow and FundAge; θ1i,t refers to the
year/family dummy applied in the regression; and ε1i,t refers to the stochastic error
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term for the first stage regression. The detail of variable construction is presented in
Section 5.4.2. We use the linear probability model instead of probit or logit models,
as the latter ones can harm consistency of the second-stage estimates and compli-
cates the computation of standard errors (Angrist and Krueger, 2001; Bennedsen
et al., 2007; Oyer, 2008).
The second stage model estimates the effect of manager replacement on fund
risk taking, and is specified as
Riski,t = α2 + γ1M̂Ri,t + β
′
cControlsi,t + θ2i,t + ε2i,t (5.3.2)
where the dependent variable Riski,t is the realized idiosyncratic volatility in each
calendar year; M̂Ri,t is the predicted value from the first stage regression; Controlsi,t
refers to a vector of control variables as described in the context of equation (5.3.1);
θ2i,t is a set of year/family dummies that we included in the regression specification;
and ε2i,t refers to the stochastic error term in the second stage regression.
The coefficient of interest is γ1, which measures the response of a portfolio’s
riskiness to fund manager replacement. Because M̂Ri,t is a dichotomous variable,
fitted values from the first stage regression are interpreted as predicted probabilities.
This means that γ1 captures the causal effect of one percentage point increase in the
probability of fund manager replacement on the riskiness of an investment portfolio.
5.4 Data
5.4.1 Sample Selection
Our analysis is mainly based on the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free U.S. Mutual Fund
database. The CRSP Survivor-Bias Free U.S. Mutual Fund database includes in-
formation on U.S. open-end mutual funds starting in 1962. It comprises the name
of the fund, monthly net returns, total net assets under management, investment
objectives, the names of the fund managers, and further fund-specific information
(Kempf et al., 2009).
First of all, we select sample funds from CRSP by excluding passively managed
annuity funds, ETFs, index funds, sector funds and international funds if their names
include relevant words. We mainly focus on actively managed domestic funds and
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managers. It seems unlikely that equity managers directly compete with the bond
or money market managers in the same family. The performance cannot be easily
compared among bond, money market and equity managers (Kempf and Ruenzi,
2008). Moreover, following Amihud and Goyenko (2013), we exclude funds if the
name is missing since we identify the fund family by the fund name. We only include
share classes which have more than 50% of the assets invested in common stocks
(CRSP variable per com) as described by Kempf et al. (2009)).
The fund segments are defined by the fund’s investment objective categories17.
We combine different investment objective classifications including Weisenberger
and Lipper, and Strategic Insight objective code from CRSP to uniform investment
objectives as described by Amihud and Goyenko (2013). If there is no investment
style code available for a fund’s test period but the fund has the style identified
for an earlier period, the fund is assigned for the missing test period the style from
the previous period. If the fund style cannot be identified, it is excluded from the
sample. There are nine segments included in the sample: (1) aggressive growth,
(2) equity income, (3) growth, (4) long-term growth, (5) growth and income, (6)
mid-cap, (7) micro-cap funds, (8) small cap, and (9) maximum capital gains.
The CRSP database lists every single share class of a fund as an individual
entry. Those share classes only differ with respect to their fee structure or to their
minimum investment requirements, but are backed by the same portfolio holdings.
According to Kempf and Ruenzi (2008), returns on share classes within the same
funds are highly correlated. Therefore, we aggregate the share class data at the
fund level, using the MFLINKS data provided by WRDS. We exclude share classes
that cannot be mapped with MFLINKS. A fund’s return, expense ratio, turnover
ratio and management fee are measured as the total of TNA-weighted information
of underlying share classes (Amihud and Goyenko, 2013). As to the manager and
management company information, we keep information of the oldest share class in
the fund until the share class is eliminated in the database. Then we will keep the
manager and management company information of the largest share class with the
greatest TNA in each year.
We are aware of the importance of team managers, as many papers have docu-
17We are aware of that SEC requires that funds report their passive benchmarks along with
fund returns from 1999. The passive self-designated benchmark of each fund can be obtained
from MorningStar from 1999. We did not use the self-designated benchmark because of database
inaccessibility.
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mented the growth in team management at mutual funds over the last decade (see
for example, Massa et al. (2010) and Qiu (2003)). Sharpe (1981) explores the moti-
vation for employment of multiple managers for a single fund. The idea is that the
danger of the overall fund performance being damaged by serious decision errors of a
single manager could be mitigated by the employment of multiple managers. Barry
and Starks (1984) propose yet another motivation for the employment of multiple
managers. They show that due to the risk sharing between managers, the optimal
risk level of the fund increases as the number of managers increases, and that in-
vestors may benefit from the higher risk taken by multiple managers. However, we
focus on individual manager turnover because of the database limitation. Following
Chevalier and Ellison (1999a), our analysis focuses on those fund-years in which
CRSP records that, as of December 31 of the previous year, a single manager is
responsible for the fund. Though the data sometimes list the names of each mem-
ber of a management team, it is often not clear whether all of the managers listed
contribute equally to the management of the fund, or whether one of the listed man-
agers is the lead manager. We thus feel that it would be problematic to generate
metrics of manager characteristics in such cases.
Similarly to Kempf et al. (2009), our conceptual framework considers the incen-
tives that a fund manager faces. However, we do our analyses using the fund as the
unit of observation. Therefore, we implicitly equate a fund manager with a fund
under their management. However, some managers manage more than one fund. In
these cases, we implicitly assume that fund managers that manage more than one
fund manage each fund independently. All the analysis are done for fund families
and segments including more than 2 funds, since fund managers are more likely to
be exposed to peer pressure from a tournament containing more competitors (Kempf
and Ruenzi, 2008). We also eliminate fund-year observations for which some of the
data are missing.
Since we only have data on fund manager names from 1992 onwards, our sample
is limited to the years 1992 to 2015. Furthermore, we limit our sample to single-
managed funds for the present study, as we cannot identify individual managers for
most teams. Overall, these decisions reduce our sample size from 15,734 to 9,923
fund-year observations.
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5.4.2 Variable Construction
5.4.2.1 Endogenous Variable: Manager Replacement
The endogenous variables MRi,t (Manager Replacement) is a binary variable, which
indicates if the fund has replaced its portfolio manager or not within the calendar
year. Specifically, variables MRi,t equals 1 if the current year-beginning manager
differs from the prior year-end manager, or there is manager replacement happening
within this calendar year, and 0 otherwise. It is rare but there are a small number
of funds that has multiple episodes of manager replacement within one year. We
treat multiple replacement in the same way as single replacement18.
The main issue of using manager information from CRSP is that it does not
report every manager’s name if the fund is managed by multiple managers. Our
method has an obvious shortcoming – it can only capture the manager replacement
if the fund switches from one individual to another individual manager, or if the
fund switches from individual to multiple managers or the opposite.
We also need fund family information since we perform the analysis from the
perspective of the family tournament. The detail of how we identify the mutual
fund family is presented in Appendix B. It is possible that a fund has multiple
families identified within a calendar year due to fund acquisition or fund company
takeover. We keep the first company reported in the calendar year.
5.4.2.2 Instrumental Variables: Peer Pressure
The main objective of this study is to estimate the casual effect of fund manager’s
replacement risk on the risk taking. In this study, we assume that the manager’s
career concern mainly comes from the flow pressure generated by peers. Therefore it
is essential to identify “peer” at the first place. Specifically, we use two classifications
– “Segment” peers identified as funds that use the same Lipper objective code and
“Family” peers identified as funds that are using the same objective code and from
the same fund family.
We use ranks based on fund flow rather than fund flow itself, since fund investors
mainly care about ranks in making their investment decisions (Patel et al., 1994;
Sirri and Tufano, 1998). Consequently, ranks seem the best measure to capture the
18Observations with multiple manager turnover make up 2.3% of the full sample. The results
remain both qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged if we drop the multiple manager turnover
observations.
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influence of fund managers’ incentives. Furthermore, using normalized ranks has the
advantage that fund observations from segments of different sizes become directly
comparable (Kempf et al., 2009).
We firstly calculate the fund annual flow which is defined as the growth rate of
the total net asset (TNAi,t) under management after adjusting for the appreciation
of the mutual fund’s assets (Ri,t) in each calendar year following Huang et al. (2011):
Flowi,t =
TNAi,t − TNAi,t−1(1 +Ri,t)
TNAi,t−1(1 +Ri,t)
(5.4.1)
Then, we use the annualized fund flow to construct two rankings of a fund i at the
beginning at year t. The factor Segment Flow Rank is determined by the fund flow
relative to the total flow of the competing funds in the same segment. The rank is
calculated by ordering the funds in a segment according to their annual flows. We
then calculate the fractional segment rank for each fund to obtain evenly-distributed
rank between 0 and 1. A higher Segment Flow Rank denotes a better position in
the flow competition within a segment. Segment ranks are calculated separately for
each segment so as to control for risk differences across various segments.
In the next step, we order all equity funds of a family according to their segment
ranks to measure the Family Flow Rank of a fund. Based on this ordering of the
segment ranks, we then assign a family rank number to each fund. This “Rank-of-
Ranks” method is adopted from Kempf and Ruenzi (2008), and it ensures that the
flow of funds from different segments can easily be compared. Also, the Family Flow
Rank is evenly distributed between 0 and 1.
5.4.2.3 Idiosyncratic Risk
There are many previous papers analyzing the fund risk taking behavior using fund
return data (e.g. Brown et al. (1996) and Elton et al. (2003)). Busse (2001) argues
that daily returns produce much more efficient estimates of fund volatility compared
to monthly data. However, CRSP only reports fund daily returns from 1999 which
would largely reduce the sample size. Therefore, we choose monthly returns in our
main volatility measurement.
The idiosyncratic risk measures the volatility that is endemic to a particular fund.
There are two types of idiosyncratic risk measures used in this study – the segment
peer-adjusted and the Carhart-adjusted idiosyncratic risk. The former measures the
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the volatility that is endemic to a particular fund and cannot be explained by the
segment benchmark, while the later captures the fund-specific risk which cannot be
explained by the Carhart factors.
The first step in getting the the segment peer-adjusted idiosyncratic risk measure
is to identify the peer benchmark return in each segment. We follow the method of
Lipper fund index construction to create our peer return in each segment, with the
purpose in providing measurements of the central tendency of similar investments
objectives19. To be specific, we determine the component funds in each segment
using the previous year-end total net asset values. Thirty component funds with
largest year-end TNA are selected in a single investment segment in each calendar
year. Finally, we calculate the average monthly return of the selected 30 funds as
the benchmark peer return. The equally weighted return of component funds is used
to prevent dominance of an index by a single fund.
Next, we perform the regression using 12 monthly returns against peer returns
for each fund and each calendar year. We keep the residuals from the regression, and
take the standard deviation of the saved residuals. Therefore, the idiosyncratic risk
is computed as the standard deviation of the residuals saved from each regression
at the fund-year level.
As a robustness check, we also use an alternative measure to describe the fund’s
yearly risk. We obtain the Carhart-adjusted idiosyncratic risk as the standard de-
viation of the residuals from regressing the fund’s monthly excess return against
Carhart four factors, following the Carhart (1997) 4 factor model:
Ri,t −Rf,t = αi + βi,m(Rm,t −Rf,t) + βi,smbSMBt + βi,hmlHMLt
+βi,momMOMt + ε
j
t (5.4.2)
5.4.2.4 Control Variables
There are many fund or fund family characteristics that are considered as potential
determinants of manager turnover, including fund size, turnover ratio, age and ex-
penses (Kempf and Ruenzi, 2008; Kempf et al., 2009). We include them as control
variables in this study as follows.
19The Lipper fund indices are used to describe the returns that an investor could reasonably
have expected to achieve in the past. The detail of creating Lipper indices of U.S. funds can be
obtained from the official descriptive document: Thomson Reuthers Lipper Index Policies
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The factor Segment Return Rank and Family Return Rank are calculated follow-
ing Kempf and Ruenzi (2008), which is similar to the instrument variable construc-
tion. Firstly, Segment Return Rank is calculated by ordering the funds in a segment
according to their annual return, and take the fractional rank for each fund to make
it an evenly distributed number between 0 and 1. Next, we order all funds from the
same family according to their segment return ranks to measure the Family Return
Rank. Also, the Family Return Rank is evenly distributed between 0 and 1.
Factors Expense Ratio (CRSP variable name exp ratio) and Turnover Ratio
(CRSP variable name turn) are already reported in the CRSP fund hdr data file.
Variable Fund Age is computed as the natural logarithm of the difference between
the current year and the fund’s inception year as reported in CRSP. Fund Size is
the natural logarithm of the fund’s total net asset in millions. Annual Return is
computed as the geometric mean of the fund’s monthly returns in each calendar
year. Fund Flow refers to the percentage change in fund’s total net asset adjusted
to the return growth within each calendar year. The Load Dummy is a binary
variable indicating the load status of a fund which takes on the value 1 if any of the
share classes of the fund charges a load in the calendar year, and 0 otherwise (Kempf
et al., 2009). Factor Multiple Share Classes is also an indicator variable equals 1 if
the fund includes more than one share class in the calendar year, and 0 otherwise.
Moreover, there are two fund family character – Family Size and Number of Funds
in Family, which is calculated as the natural logarithm of the fund family’s total
net assets and the number of funds included in each family in the calendar year,
respectively.
We also pay attention to the time period over which all control variables are mea-
sured. Studies on fund manager turnover as determinants of manager replacement
typically use fund information measured either in the current or previous years.
There are both pros and cons of using explanatory variables in contemporaneous
or previous periods. When using the current calendar year information, the mea-
surement often overlaps with the replacement date and thus includes performance
that should be attributed to the new manager, instead the manager who has been
replaced. On the other hand, when using lagged variables, there may be a signifi-
cant gap between the manager departure date and variable measurement date. For
instance, if the manager replacement happens in November, lagged control variables
would neglect the most recent performance realized under the departing manager.
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Table 5.1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Frequency of Manager Replacement
# Fund Years # Manager Replace % Manager Replace
Sample Size and # of Replace 9,923 2029 20.45
Panel B: Fund Characteristics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Idiosyncratic Risk 9,832 0.018 0.014 0.000 0.170
Carhart-adj. Idiosyncratic Risk 9,832 0.013 0.011 0.000 0.158
Manager Replacement 9,923 0.204 0.403 0 1
Segment Flow Rank 9,781 0.489 0.278 0 1
Family Flow Rank 9,781 0.492 0.331 0 1
Segment Return Rank 9,865 0.506 0.284 0 1
Family Return Rank 9,865 0.497 0.331 0 1
Expense Ratio 9,730 0.012 0.005 -0.005 0.135
Fund Age (year) 9,923 14.747 11.259 1 55
Turnover Ratio 9,730 0.898 1.442 0 91.5
Fund Total Net Asset (million) 9,781 1511 4918 10 111095
Fund Size (log TNA) 9,781 5.714 1.746 2.398 11.618
Fund Return (annual) 9,865 0.075 0.220 -1.998 1.085
Fund Flow 9,781 0.210 1.064 -11.981 38.591
Load Dummy 9,923 0.647 0.478 0 1
Multiple Share Classes 9,923 0.517 0.500 0 1
# Funds 1,642
Panel C: Fund Family Characteristics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Fund Family TNA (million) 9,894 53,523 116,924 10 440,208
Fund Family Size (log TNA) 9,894 8.215 2.515 2.303 12.995
Number of Funds in Family 9,923 21.331 26.283 3 91
# Fund Families 343
This table summarizes the descriptive statistics of relevant variables used in the study. Panel A
presents the number of observations and the frequency of manager replacement in the sample.
Panel B demonstrates the descriptive statistics including mean, standard deviation, minimum and
maximum of fund characteristics which are applied in the analysis. Panel C shows the statistics of
fund family characteristics.
To address these timing convention issues, we perform our analysis using both con-
temporaneous and lagged explanatory variables.
5.4.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 5.1 reports the summary statistics for the sample, including fund characteris-
tics of the fund-year sample. All variables definitions can be found in Appendix C.
The final sample used in the main analysis contains 9,923 fund-year observations,
spanning from year 1992 to 2015. In total, there are 1,642 domestic equity funds,
343 fund families and 9 Lipper Objective Codes (investment styles). Panel A reports
the basic manager replacement statistics. There are 2,029 fund-year observations
that have manager replacement representing 20.45% of the 9,923 final sample obser-
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vations. Panel B summarizes fund characteristics while Panel C summarizes fund
family characteristics.
We use two types of fund realized volatility in this chapter, namely Lipper peer
returns adjusted idiosyncratic volatility (Idiosyncratic Volatility) and the Carhart
(1997) 4 factor model idiosyncratic risk (Carhart-adj. Idiosyncratic Volatility). We
apply the former one as the main risk measure and the latter in the robustness
check. The mean of Idiosyncratic Volatility is 1.8%, which is slightly greater than the
Carhart-adj. Idiosyncratic Volatility 1.3%. The correlation coefficient between these
two idiosyncratic volatility measure is over 80%. The main instrumental variable
Family Flow Rank is also highly-correlated to the alternative instrumental variable
Segment Flow Rank, with the mean of both being around 0.49.
The average annual expense ratio of our sample is 1.2%, ranging from -0.5%
to 13.5%20. The average fund age in our sample is around 14.7 years. The average
turnover ratio is 89.8% which indicates the funds are actively managed equity funds.
The fund size measure is volatile and ranges from $10 million to $111 billion in terms
of total net assets under management. Therefore we take the natural logarithm of
it to reduce the outlier effect. The mean annualized fund return is 7.5% and the
mean annualized flow is around 21%. Finally, 64.7% of the sample observations
charge fund loads, and 51.7% fund-year observations are from multi-share class
funds. There are averagely 21 funds managed by each family, which indicates that
we select relatively large families for the analysis. Consistently, the mean of fund
family TNA is $53.5 million.
5.5 Empirical Result
We present and discuss our empirical results in this section, including the main esti-
mation result as well as the robustness check output. The robustness checks explore
the use of alternative measures of the fund’s realized risk, and also the use of alterna-
tive instrumental variables. We also test for lagged effects of instrumental variables
by using one period lagged explanatory variables in estimation specifications.
20The expense ratio refers to the ratio of total investment that shareholders pay for the fund’s
operating expenses, which include 12b-1 fees. It may include waivers and reimbursements, which
can lead to negative expense ratio.
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Table 5.2: First Stage Regression of Manager Replacement (Instrument Vari-
able: Family Flow Rank)
Dependent Variable Manager Replacement Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Family Flow Rank -0.0788 *** -0.0769 *** -0.0764 *** -0.084 ***
(-5.53) (-5.42) (-5.34) (-5.38)
Segment Return Rank 0.0032 -0.0204 -0.0068 0.056
(0.11) (-0.7) (-0.23) (1.33)
Family Return Rank 0.0210 0.0350 * 0.0218 -0.006
(1.1) (1.83) (1.12) (-0.22)
Expense Ratio -1.2585 -0.4736 4.1179 *** 3.432 **
(-1.29) (-0.49) (-3.49) (2.56)
Fund Age 0.0232 *** 0.0250 *** 0.0400 *** 0.044 ***
(3.32) (3.59) (-4.82) (5.12)
Turnover Ratio 0.0317 *** 0.0228 *** 0.0089 0.009
(6.38) (4.54) (-1.58) (1.39)
Fund Size -0.0096 *** -0.0197 *** -0.0218 *** -0.024 ***
(-3.42) (-5.91) (-6.11) (-6.72)
Fund Return -0.1072 * -0.0997 * -0.1007 * -0.187 ***
(-1.83) (-1.71) (-1.73) (-2.87)
Fund Flow 0.0170 ** 0.0108 0.0071 0.013
(2.19) (1.39) (-0.89) (1.42)
Load Dummy 0.0443 *** 0.0299 *** 0.0209 * 0.031 **
(4.63) (3.09) (-1.67) (2.24)
Multiple Share Classes -0.0042 0.0117 -0.0151 -0.028 **
(-0.46) (1.27) (-1.3) (-2.16)
Fund Family Size 0.0044 0.0122 **
(1.36) (-2.26)
Number of Funds in Family 0.0352 *** 0.025
(4.52) (1.21)
Constant 0.006 -0.0478 -0.113 0.207 ***
(0.19) (-0.16) (-0.8) (6.14)
Observations 9,729 9,729 9,729 9,729
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No
Family Fixed Effects No No Yes No
Family×Year Fixed Effects No No No Yes
Statistics on Predicted Manager Replacement Probability
25th 0.112 0.110 0.086 0.000
75th 0.303 0.305 0.315 0.341
Standard Deviation 0.127 0.132 0.172 0.274
This table presents estimations of the first stage regression following equation 5.3.1, using the
Family Flow Rank as the instrument variable. The upper part of the table shows the first-
stage least-squares regressions of a dummy variable “Manager Replacement” indicating the fund
manager turnover on controls. The lower section of the table presents the summary statistics
for the predicted manager replacement probability. The idiosyncratic risk on peer returns are
winsorised at 1% level in model specifications (1), (2) and (3), and 5% level in model (4) as the
outcome is largely affected by outliers. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and ***
denotes the significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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5.5.1 Determinants of Fund Manager Replacement
Table 5.2 presents the main results from the first stage regression which models the
probability of fund manager replacement. We use the term “specification” to refer
to the column reported in each table. In specification (1), we include controls at the
fund level, including the fund’s return rank in the Lipper segment, expense ratio,
fund age, fund size, turnover ratio, annualized return, yearly flow, load dummy
and multiple share-class dummy. As analysis proceeds, we add fund family control
variables such as Family Size and Number of Funds in Family in specification (2).
In specification (3), we apply the same set of control variables as in specification
(2) but with additional fund family fixed effects. Finally, we consider the interacted
fund family×year fixed effects in specification (4).
Concerning the control variables, we find that unsurprisingly funds with worse
annual returns are more likely to be replaced, given that variable Fund Return
is negatively associated with the manager replacement dummy across all model
specifications. We also find that younger funds, smaller funds, funds which charge
loads are more likely to replace the portfolio manager. Replacement risk for larger
families are greater than their smaller counterparts, though the significance level
differs under different types of fixed effects.
Our main interest is the explanatory power of the instrument variable shown at
the top of the table. The main instrumental variable – Family Flow Rank – is highly
statistically significant and correlated with manager replacement in the predicted
direction. Funds with lower ranking within segment and family are facing higher
replacement risk.
Most of the existing work on the determinants of fund manager turnover risk does
not control for both flow and return ranks in peer groups. It is also noteworthy that
the effects of the instrumental variable is economically significant. For instance, a
0.08 change in the family flow rank (which corresponds to about 0.08
0.33
= 0.24 standard
deviation) is associated with a decrease in the probability of dismissal of 1%. The
negative impact of flow rank is consistent across 4 model specifications using different
sets of control variable and different types of fixed effects.
The bottom part of the Table 5.2 reports the interquartile range of predicted
manager replacement rates in the base model (5.3.1), which is between 0.195 to
0.345. The linear probability model which is used to ensure consistency of the
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second-stage estimates sometimes predict negative probabilities. For example, in
model (1), 7% of the sample has negative predicted probabilities. The economic
effects of the instrumental variable and other controls remain the same in terms of
magnitude and statistical significance.
In sum, we find that funds with worse flow ranking within segment and family
are exposed to higher risk in manager replacement. The strong correlation between
the ranking and manager turnover establishes the relevance of the instruments and
alleviates concerns over weak instruments.
5.5.2 Manager Turnover Pressure and Risk Taking
A first set of second-stage regressions is presented in Table 5.3. We begin by pre-
senting the regressions of realized idiosyncratic risk on predicted manager turnover
probabilities from Table 5.2 and a range of control variables and fixed effects. As
mentioned in Focke et al. (2017), including a range of fixed effects in addition to
a large set of control variables allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity.
Apart from estimated coefficients, the F-statistics for instrument relevance are re-
ported in the bottom part of the table.The F-statistics are well above the threshold
of 10 suggested by Stock et al. (2002), which indicates that the instrumental vari-
able is highly relevant to the first stage model. Generally, we find that manager
turnover has a significantly positive association with fund idiosyncratic risk in all 4
regressions.
Column (1) presents the baseline specification and suggests that on average, the
annual realized idiosyncratic risk is 1.25% greater for a fund which has the manager
replaced than a fund which does not. As expected, fund age measured as the natural
logarithm of the age in years is significantly positively related to the fund volatility.
Similarly, expense ratio also shows a positive coefficient of 0.4, which probably picks
up higher-order effects and is difficult to interpret on its own given the range of other
fund fee controls we include. Fund size measured as the natural logarithm of year-
beginning TNA is significantly negatively related to fund volatility. We add fund
family control variables in specification (2), because families with more employed
managers are more flexible to change fund managers. The Fund Family Size presents
a positive coefficient, which indicates that larger families are associated with greater
realized risk. In specification (3) we raise the hurdle by adding family fixed effects
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Table 5.3: Second Stage Regression of Fund Risk Taking (Dependent Variable:
Idiosyncratic Risk on Peer Return)
Dependent Variable Idiosyncratic Risk on Peer Return
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Manager Replacement Prob. 0.0125 ** 0.0132 *** 0.0107 ** 0.0072 *
(2.56) (2.6) (2.3) (1.74)
Segment Return Rank 0.0010 0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0004
(1.28) (0.73) (-0.25) (-0.41)
Family Return Rank -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0001
(-1.42) (-0.94) (-0.58) (-0.1)
Expense Ratio 0.4015 *** 0.4116 *** 0.3118 *** 0.3372 ***
(14.78) (15.33) (8.9) (10.14)
Fund Age 0.0005 ** 0.0005 ** 0.0010 *** 0.0010 ***
(2.18) (2.13) (3.44) (3.43)
Turnover Ratio 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.5) (-0.29) (1.01) (0.9)
Fund Size -0.0003 *** -0.0007 *** -0.0008 *** -0.0007 ***
(-3.33) (-4.89) (-6.09) (-5.44)
Fund Return -0.0012 -0.0010 0.0009 0.0009
(-0.72) (-0.63) (0.57) (0.53)
Fund Flow 0.0007 *** 0.0006 *** 0.0004 ** 0.0002
(4.02) (3.07) (2.11) (1.2)
Load Dummy 0.0020 *** 0.0018 *** 0.0037 *** 0.0045 ***
(6.06) (5.81) (11.36) (13.32)
Multiple Share Classes -0.0063 *** -0.0060 *** -0.0049 *** -0.0054 ***
(-25.55) (-23.13) (-16.48) (-17.19)
Fund Family Size 0.0005 *** 0.0000
(5.55) (0.01)
Number of Funds in Family -0.0003 0.0003
(-1.14) (0.57)
Constant 0.0127 *** 0.0117 *** 0.0057 * 0.0129 ***
(14.18) (11.87) (1.69) (12.62)
Observations 9,729 9,729 9,729 9,729
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No
Family Fixed Effects No No Yes No
Family×Year Fixed Effects No No No Yes
F-stat of Excluded Instrument 30.58 29.38 28.52 28.94
Endogenous Variable Manager Replacement
Instrument Variable Family Flow Rank
This table presents the result of the second stage least-square regressions of fund’s idiosyncratic
risk on the fund manager replacement probability and control variables. The dependent variable
Risk is calculated as the standard deviation of the residual from regressing fund return against
peer Lipper objective returns. The idiosyncratic risk on peer returns are winsorised at 1% level
in specifications (1), (2) and (3), and 5% level in model (4) as the outcome is largely affected by
outliers. Manager replacement probability is the predicted value from the first-stage least-squares
regressions presented in Table 5.2. t-statistics calculated from robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. *, ** and *** denotes the significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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in addition to specification (2). This controls for the variation across different years
as well as across families. The key estimate decreases slightly to 1.07%. Finally,
the specification (4) helps us to better control for unobserved time-varying family
characteristics by applying an interaction of family and year fixed effects. We expect
to see weaker results in the ladder as the pressure is likely to be dependent on time
within family. The point estimate declines numerically to 0.72%, but it still remains
significant at the 10% level. This is because that the family and year interacted fixed
effects absorb a significant portion of variation in the fund risk. Though the estimate
of the effect is numerically smaller than what we saw in the baseline specifications, it
is more precisely estimated. The family control variables are omitted in specification
(4) because those factors are largely correlated with the year×family ID.
Consistently with our main hypothesis, the probability of manager replacement
is positively associated with the fund’s realized idiosyncratic risk in four regression
specifications, with different sets of control variables and fixed effects applied. In
other words, the fund is expected to show higher idiosyncratic volatility when the
manager is exposed to greater replacement risk. The estimation results on control
variables remain very similar across different specifications. For instance, we find
that fund age is positively associated with the fund risk. Similarly, funds that charge
front or end loads, as well as higher expenses are expected to show higher risk. Single
share funds are more likely to present higher idiosyncratic risk, given the control
variable Multiple Share Class has a coefficient estimate of around -0.006. The fund
size factor also has a negative coefficient estimate, indicating that smaller funds tend
to exhibit higher risk. The flow is positively associated with fund volatility.
5.5.3 Robustness Check
In this section, we provide empirical results of robustness analysis, including the use
of alternative idiosyncratic risk measurement, alternative instrumental variable and
lagged explanatory factors.
5.5.3.1 Alternative Idiosyncratic Volatility Measure
It is possible that part of the result shown in Table 5.3 is due to the classification
of segments (peers), since the realized idiosyncratic volatility relies on peer returns.
To alleviate this concern, we use an alternative dependent variable. Instead of using
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Table 5.4: Second Stage Regression of Fund Risk Taking (Dependent Variable:
Carhart-Adjusted Idiosyncratic Volatility)
Dependent Variable Carhart-Adjusted Idiosyncratic Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Manager Replacement Prob. 0.0085 ** 0.0092 ** 0.0082 ** 0.0078 **
(2.33) (2.43) (2.29) (2.36)
Segment Return Rank -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0012 ** -0.0017 **
(-0.95) (-1.3) (-2.11) (-2.26)
Family Return Rank -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0002
(-0.77) (-0.46) (-0.26) (0.48)
Expense Ratio 0.3295 *** 0.3336 *** 0.2822 *** 0.2793 ***
(16.3) (16.64) (10.45) (10.53)
Fund Age 0.0004 ** 0.0004 ** 0.0005 ** 0.0004 *
(2.33) (2.2) (2.2) (1.77)
Turnover Ratio 0.0005 *** 0.0004 *** 0.0006 *** 0.0006 ***
(3.44) (3.29) (5.02) (5.19)
Fund Size 0.0000 -0.0003 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0002 **
(-0.74) (-3) (-3.35) (-2.37)
Fund Return -0.0007 -0.0006 0.0006 0.0017
(-0.55) (-0.46) (0.48) (1.3)
Fund Flow 0.0008 *** 0.0007 *** 0.0006 *** 0.0004 ***
(5.52) (4.6) (4.08) (2.93)
Load Dummy 0.0018 *** 0.0017 *** 0.0029 *** 0.0032 ***
(7.36) (7.44) (11.56) (11.94)
Multiple Share Classes -0.0045 *** -0.0044 *** -0.0036 *** -0.0038 ***
(-24.59) (-22.42) (-15.66) (-15.02)
Fund Family Size 0.0004 *** 0.0000
(6.13) (0.17)
Number of Funds in Family -0.0005 ** -0.0004
(-2.39) (-1.07)
Constant 0.0067 *** 0.0062 *** 0.0018 0.0072 ***
(10.12) (8.41) (0.7) (8.82)
Observations 9,729 9,729 9,729 9,729
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No
Family Fixed Effects No No Yes No
Family×Year Fixed Effects No No No Yes
F-stat of Excluded Instrument 30.58 29.38 28.52 28.94
Endogenous Variable Manager Replacement
Instrument Variable Family Flow Rank
This table presents the result of the second stage least-square regressions of fund’s idiosyncratic
risk on the fund manager replacement probability and control variables. The dependent variable
Risk is calculated as the standard deviation of the residual from regressing fund return on Carhart
4-factor model. The idiosyncratic risk on Carhart model is winsorised at 1% level in model speci-
fications (1), (2) and (3), and 5% level in model (4) as the outcome is largely affected by outliers.
Manager replacement probability is the predicted value from the first-stage least-squares regres-
sions presented in Table 5.2. t-statistics calculated from robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. *, ** and *** denotes the significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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the fund realized idiosyncratic volatility that are net from the segment benchmark,
we use the Carhart 4 factor model adjusted idiosyncratic risk. This alternative
dependent variable captures the realized fund risk without relying on the segment
classification.
In Table 5.4, we only report the second stage estimation results using the alterna-
tive idiosyncratic risk measure, since the first stage results are identical to Table 5.2.
Though the coefficients on the manager replacement probability (0.008) decrease
slightly compared to the previous analysis (0.01), they still remain statistically and
economically significant – the likelihood of manager turnover is a determinant of the
fund’s realized Carhart-adjusted volatility.
The four model specifications in Table 5.4 still use the predicted manager re-
placement probabilities from Table 5.2 as the key explanatory variable for Carhart-
adjusted idiosyncratic risk. Similarly, the F-statistics reported in the bottom part
are also above the threshold of 10. Most of the empirical findings remain qualita-
tively unchanged when using the Carhart-adjusted risk as the dependent variable.
However, one thing that is worth noticing is that variable Turnover Ratio becomes
significantly positive in this analysis. Therefore, the turnover ratio of fund holdings
is yet another effective determinant in fund volatility adjusted using the Carhart
model.
Taken together, we find that the empirical findings remains unchanged when
we use the Carhart-adjusted idiosyncratic risk measure, that does not depend on
segment classifications, as the dependent variable in the second stage regression.
5.5.3.2 Alternative Instrument Variable
As a robustness check, we examine the peer pressure from the more generalized
segment tournament instead of the family tournament. The segment flow rank
measures the fund’s current position in the segment tournament. A fund with a
higher rank is considered to have less peer pressure whereas a lower ranking fund is
considered to face greater tournament pressure and career risk.
We present the first- and second-stage estimation results using the alternative
instrumental variable in Table 5.5 and 5.6 separately. As before, we report estima-
tion results under 4 different specifications using different sets of control variables
and fixed effects. Generally, we find the result remains very similar comparing the
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Table 5.5: First Stage Regression of Manager Replacement (Instrument Vari-
able: Segment Flow Rank)
Dependent Variable Manager Replacement Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Segment Flow Rank -0.1461 *** -0.1452 *** -0.1396 *** -0.1529 ***
(-7.08) (-7.07) (-6.61) (-6.54)
Segment Return Rank 0.0235 -0.0004 0.0100 0.0695 *
(0.81 (-0.01) (0.33) (1.66)
Family Return Rank 0.0088 0.0232 0.0125 -0.0119
(0.46 (1.22) (0.64) (-0.43)
Expense Ratio -1.2698 -0.4815 4.1356 *** 3.4300 **
(-1.3) (-0.49) (3.51) (2.57)
Fund Age 0.0201 *** 0.0219 *** 0.0386 *** 0.0428 ***
(2.86) (3.12) (4.65) (4.92)
Turnover Ratio 0.0299 *** 0.0210 *** 0.0086 0.0087
(6.03) (4.18) (1.53) (1.42)
Fund Size -0.0081 *** -0.0182 *** -0.0207 *** -0.0234 ***
(-2.88) (-5.48) (-5.8) (-6.51)
Fund Return -0.1125 * -0.1051 * -0.1069 * -0.1893 ***
(-1.92) (-1.81) (-1.84) (-2.9)
Fund Flow 0.0403 *** 0.0342 *** 0.0278 *** 0.0298 ***
(4.36) (3.72) (2.97) (2.85)
Load Dummy 0.0444 *** 0.0299 *** 0.0200 0.0313 **
(4.63) (3.1) (1.61) (2.24)
Multiple Share Classes -0.0043 0.0117 -0.0141 -0.0283 **
(-0.47) (1.27) (-1.21) (-2.17)
Fund Family Size 0.0045 0.0123 **
(1.39) (2.29)
Number of Funds in Family 0.0353 *** 0.0237
(4.53) (1.17)
Constant 0.0233 -0.0307 -0.1031 0.2333 ***
(0.7) (-0.91) (-0.77) (6.79)
Observations 9,729 9,729 9,729 9,729
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No
Family Fixed Effects No No Yes No
Family×Year Fixed Effects No No No Yes
Statistics on Predicted Manager Replacement Probability
25th 0.111 0.109 0.086 0.000
75th 0.304 0.304 0.316 0.341
Standard Deviation 0.128 0.133 0.172 0.274
This table presents estimations of the first stage regression following equation 5.3.1, using the
Segment Flow Rank as the instrument variable. The upper part of the table shows the first-
stage least-squares regressions of a dummy variable “Manager Replacement” indicating the fund
manager turnover on controls. The lower section of the table presents the summary statistics for
the predicted manager replacement probability. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and
*** denotes the significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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previous analysis which uses the Segment Flow Rank as the instrumental variable.
In Table 5.5, we report the first stage estimation results using the Segment Flow
Rank as the instrumental variable. Firstly, the main factor of interest Segment
Flow Rank is highly statistically significant and negatively correlated with manager
replace, with the coefficient standing around -0.14. In terms of magnitude, the esti-
mate is greater than what we found earlier in Table 5.2. But the results still agree
with our hypothesis that funds with greater pressure from the segment tournament
are facing greater replacement risk. Unsurprisingly, fund performance is negatively
associated with the manager replacement across all model specifications, consistent
with other literature. Smaller funds are more likely to replace the portfolio manager
as the negative coefficient on Fund Size suggests. Fund Age is positively associated
with manager turnover. Therefore, we conclude that in the segment tournament,
managers who manage older funds are facing larger replacement risk. The bottom
part of Table 5.5 presents the interquartile range of predicted probabilities of man-
ager replacement, using the base model specification 5.3.1, which is between 0.11
to 0.34. The linear probability model, which is used to ensure consistency of the
second-stage estimates, sometimes predicts negative probabilities. For example, in
specification (1), 7% of the sample has negative predicted probabilities. The eco-
nomic effects of the instrumental variable and other controls remain the same in
terms of magnitude and statistical significance.
Table 5.6 reports the estimation results for the second stage regression, which
includes 4 specifications with a range of control variables and fixed effects. Also,
F-statistics reported in the bottom part of the table indicates that the instrumental
variable is highly relevant. We find very similar results using Segment Flow Rank as
the alternative instrumental variable. Specifically, the coefficients on the predicted
probability of manager replacement improve slightly using a different IV, both nu-
merically and statistically. We mainly focus on the discussion of specification (4) as
it provides the most robust and precise estimation results, with the family and year
interacted fixed effects. On average, the annual realized idiosyncratic risk is 0.82%
greater for a fund which has replaced the portfolio manager within the calendar
year.
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Table 5.6: Second Stage Regression of Fund Risk Taking (Dependent Variable:
Idiosyncratic Risk on Peer Return)
Dependent Variable Idiosyncratic Risk on Peer Return
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Manager Replacement Prob. 0.0138 *** 0.0143 *** 0.0075 ** 0.0082 **
(3.52) (3.61) (2.08) (2.36)
Segment Return Rank 0.0010 0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0004
(1.26) (0.75) (-0.31) (-0.45)
Family Return Rank -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0001
(-1.42) (-0.98) (-0.52) (-0.09)
Expense Ratio 0.4030 *** 0.4121 *** 0.3251 *** 0.3340 ***
(14.69) (15.07) (10.26) (10.24)
Fund Age 0.0005 ** 0.0005 ** 0.0011 *** 0.0009 ***
(2.13) (2.11) (4.51) (3.54)
Turnover Ratio 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
(0.34) (-0.47) (1.29) (0.83)
Fund Size -0.0003 *** -0.0006 *** -0.0009 *** -0.0007 ***
(-3.33) (-5.26) (-7.74) (-5.82)
Fund Return -0.0011 -0.0009 0.0006 0.0010
(-0.65) (-0.56) (0.39) (0.64)
Fund Flow 0.0007 *** 0.0006 *** 0.0003 ** 0.0002
(3.98) (3.11) (1.99) (1.28)
Load Dummy 0.0020 *** 0.0017 *** 0.0037 *** 0.0044 ***
(6.29) (5.88) (12.27) (13.37)
Multiple Share Classes -0.0063 *** -0.0060 *** -0.0049 *** -0.0054 ***
(-25.05) (-22.98) (-17.56) (-17.26)
Fund Family Size 0.0005 *** 0.0000
(5.44) (0.25)
Number of Funds in Family -0.0004 0.0004
(-1.39) (0.78)
Constant 0.0127 *** 0.0118 *** 0.0053 * 0.0128 ***
(13.95) (12.08) (1.64) (13.38)
Observations 9,729 9,729 9,729 9,729
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No
Family Fixed Effects No No Yes No
Family×Year Fixed Effects No No No Yes
F-stat of Excluded Instrument 50.13 49.98 43.69 42.77
Endogenous Variable Manager Replacement
Instrument Variable Segment Flow Rank
This table presents the result of the second stage least-square regressions of fund’s idiosyncratic
risk on the fund manager replacement probability and control variables. The dependent variable
Risk is calculated as the standard deviation of the residual from regressing fund return against
peer Lipper objective returns. The idiosyncratic risk on peer returns are winsorised at 1% level in
model specifications (1), (2) and (3), and 5% level in model (4) as the outcome is largely affected by
outliers. Manager replacement probability is the predicted value from the first-stage least-squares
regressions presented in Table 5.5. t-statistics calculated from robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. *, ** and *** denotes the significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 5.7: First Stage Regression of Manager Replacement (Lagged Effect)
Dependent Variable Manager Replacement Dummy
(1) (2) (3)
Family Flow Rank in t-1 -0.0463 *** -0.0422 *** -0.0598 ***
(-3.47) (-3.28) (-4.41)
Segment Return Rank in t-1 -0.0426 * -0.0894 *** -0.0991 **
(-1.67) (-3.03) (-2.36)
Family Return Rank in t-1 0.0080 0.0162 0.0162
(0.4) (0.84) (0.58)
Expense Ratio in t-1 3.2483 *** 3.1353 *** 2.0324
(2.91) (2.89) (1.64)
Fund Age in t-1 0.0003 0.0011 ** 0.0015 ***
(0.64) (2.08) (2.89)
Turnover Ratio in t-1 -0.0008 -0.0027 -0.0014
(-0.26) (-0.94) (-0.45)
Fund Size in t-1 -0.0155 *** -0.0180 *** -0.0218 ***
(-4.65) (-5.39) (-6.43)
Fund Return in t-1 -0.0379 * 0.0740 0.0908
(-1.72) (1.38) (1.49)
Fund Flow in t-1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.97) (1.24) (0.72)
Load Dummy in t-1 0.0207 0.0194 0.0210
(1.54) (1.5) (1.42)
Multiple Share Classes in t-1 -0.0515 *** -0.0369 *** -0.0463 ***
(-4.37) (-3.02) (-3.33)
Fund Family Size in t-1 0.0111 **
(2.09)
Number of Funds in Family at in t-1 0.0081
(0.49)
Constant 0.3643 ** 0.5151 0.3685 ***
(2.23) (1.64) (12.16)
Observations 8,994 8,994 8,994
Family Fixed Effects Yes Yes No
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No
Family×Year Fixed Effects No No Yes
Statistics on Predicted Manager Replacement Probability
25th 0.123 0.091 0.000
75th 0.293 0.319 0.350
Standard Deviation 0.136 0.175 0.276
This table presents estimations of the first stage regression following equation 5.3.1,
using the one period lagged family flow rank as the instrument variable and one period
lagged control variables. The upper part of the table shows the first-stage least-squares
regressions of a dummy variable “Manager Replacement” indicating the fund manager
turnover on controls. The lower section of the table presents the summary statistics for
the predicted manager replacement probability. The idiosyncratic risk on peer returns
are winsorised at 1% level in model specifications (1), (2) and (3), and 5% level in model
(4) as the outcome is largely affected by outliers. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
*, ** and *** denotes the significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 5.8: Second Stage Regression of Fund Risk Taking (Lagged Effect)
Dependent Variable Idiosyncratic Risk on Peer Return
(1) (2) (3)
Manager Replacement Prob. 0.0195 ** 0.0150 * 0.0093 *
(2.16) (1.86) (1.83)
Segment Return Rank in t-1 -0.0011 0.0004 0.0003
(-1.17) (0.36) (0.28)
Family Return Rank in t-1 0.0008 0.0006 0.0007
(1.25) (1.13) (1.05)
Expense Ratio in t-1 0.2760 *** 0.3220 *** 0.3281 ***
(5.87) (8.18) (10.82)
Fund Age in t-1 0.0000 ** 0.0000 ** 0.0000 **
(-2.27) (2.33) (2.06)
Turnover Ratio in t-1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.46) (0.27) (-0.46)
Fund Size in t-1 -0.0003 * -0.0007 *** -0.0006 ***
(-1.9) (-4.22) (-4.86)
Fund Return in t-1 -0.0001 -0.0041 *** -0.0039 ***
(-0.14) (-2.63) (-2.73)
Fund Flow in t-1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 *
(-0.61) (-1.04) (-1.73)
Load Dummy in t-1 0.0028 *** 0.0036 *** 0.0046 ***
(6.11) (9.56) (12.99)
Multiple Share Classes in t-1 -0.0051 *** -0.0048 *** -0.0053 ***
(-8.39) (-10.75) (-13.4)
Fund Family Size in t-1 0.0000
(0.26)
Number of Funds in Family at in t-1 0.0008 *
(1.84)
Constant 0.0070 -0.0008 0.0135 ***
(1.18) (-0.09) (7.51)
Observations 8,994 8,994 8,994
Family Fixed Effects Yes Yes No
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No
Family×Year Fixed Effects No No Yes
F-stat of Excluded Instrument 12.04 10.76 19.45
Endogenous Variable Manager Replacement
Instrument Variable Family Flow Rank
This table presents the result of the second stage least-square regressions of fund’s id-
iosyncratic risk on the fund manager replacement probability and control variables. The
dependent variable Risk is calculated as the standard deviation of the residual from re-
gressing fund return against peer Lipper objective returns. All explanatory variables are
one period lagged. The idiosyncratic risk on peer returns are winsorised at 1% level in
model specifications (1), (2) and (3), and 5% level in model (4) as the outcome is largely
affected by outliers. Manager replacement probability is the predicted value from the
first-stage least-squares regressions presented in Table 5.7. t-statistics calculated from
robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denotes the significance
at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
103
5.5.3.3 Lagged Effect
The previous results are done within the contemporaneous time. In this robustness
test, we lag the main instrumental variable Family Flow Rank and control variables
by one fiscal year to reduce potential simultaneity concerns. As before, estimation
results from first- and second-stage regressions are presented separately in Table 5.7
and 5.8. Overall, the Family Flow Rank remains a significantly negative predictor
for the manager replacement in the next year, as shown across 3 model specifications
in Table 5.7. In the second stage regression, funds with manager changed in the prior
calendar year is more likely to be associated with greater idiosyncratic risk.
We also report the estimates for 3 model specifications, and the results are similar
to what we obtained using the contemporaneous specification. Specifically, column
(1) in both tables presents the estimation results using lagged fund-level control
variables and family fixed effects. In this specification, differences in the family
characteristics are accounted for. Specification (2) adds lagged family control vari-
ables and year fixed effects in addition to specification (1). The fixed effects in
specification (2) control for the variation across different years as well as across fam-
ilies. Interestingly, we find a negative relation between manager turnover and prior
fund performance, as in previous studies (e.g. (Kostovetsky and Warner, 2015)).
But the negative effect from past year return becomes insignificant when the year
fixed effect is considered. Finally, column (3) considers the family and year inter-
acted fixed effects. Consistently, we expect the analysis in the last column is the
weakest since the family×year fixed effects absorb a significant amount of variation
in the fund volatility. A half of the coefficient estimates for the control variables are
significant, showing that there are some time series variation exists in these variables
to have an effect in a regression with a large array of fixed effects.
5.6 Summary
This chapter makes the simple point that mutual fund manager replacement explains
an important part of the fund’s realized volatility of domestic equity funds in U.S..
The empirical magnitude of the manager turnover risk premium – about 1% greater
realized volatility for a one percentage point increase in manager replacement risk
– is in line with calibrated theoretical predictions. The manager replacement risk
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driven by the peer pressure is likely to be reflected in the fund’s idiosyncratic risk.
We use an instrumental variable (IV) approach to study whether fund managers
would take into account turnover risk that they face when adjusting the volatility
of portfolios. The instrumental variable measures the peer flow pressure that a fund
manager is facing in the tournament, by following the “Rank-of-Ranks” approach of
Kempf and Ruenzi (2008). This method allows the performance of funds from dif-
ferent segments to be compared easily, and signals different but related employment
risk fund managers are facing in the tournament. In the IV analysis using different
sets of control variables and fixed effects, we find that Family Flow Rank is a highly
statistically significant determinant of manager replacement, which means that funds
with a lower flow ranking in the family tournament are facing higher replacement
risk. Such peer pressure would lead the fund to increase the idiosyncratic volatility.
The finding is robust to the use of an alternative instrumental variable Segment
Flow Rank, an alternative measure of realized risk Carhart-adjusted Idiosyncratic
Risk and one-period lags of explanatory factors in both first- and second-stage re-
gressions.
Both mutual fund families and relevant regulatory authorities could potentially
benefit from the findings of this study. Specifically, fund families should pay atten-
tion to the rebalancing costs caused by the risk adjustment behavior in the fund
tournament. In addition, fund families suffer from the in-family tournament neg-
atively because fund managers compete with others in the same family for inflows
according to Kempf and Ruenzi (2008). Finally, regulatory authorities may take an
interest in the fund tournament since, as James and Isaac (2000) find, tournament
behavior may lead to irrational price formation in asset markets.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This chapter concludes the thesis, with main empirical finding and contributions
to the literature. This thesis comprises three empirical studies on mutual funds,
ranging from fund manager career concerns to fund creation and asset allocation.
The main conclusions and implications of each study may be summarized as follows.
The first essay examines the relationship between the mutual fund manager’s
past experience and mutual fund performance. The skills and knowledge acquired
from prior working experience may be transferred to the current working context,
thereby influencing the current job performance (Schmidt et al., 1986). Researchers
have explored this topic from the perspectives of both applied psychology and em-
pirical finance, where the latter particularly pertains to the CEO behavior analysis
(Custo´dio et al., 2013). Building on this literature, we investigate the relationship
between the mutual fund manager’s past experience and mutual fund performance.
Using U.S. mutual fund data of fund managers’ work experience ranging from 1993
to 2012, the first essay introduces a new method to evaluate mutual fund perfor-
mance from the perspective of the manager’s lifetime working experience. Specif-
ically we use the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to construct a Managerial
Experience Index (MEI) based on 3 professional experience factors from the past
career history of each manager: (i) investment objectives of the funds that s/he
has managed (Zambrana and Zapatero, 2017), (ii) fund companies that s/he has
worked for and (iii) industries of stocks in which s/he has invested (Kacperczyk
et al., 2005). The MEI would increase along with the experience accumulation for
each mutual fund manager. We group the sample based on the MEI into 5 quintiles
from the lowest MEI score (most concentrated experience) to the highest MEI score
(most diversified experience). Therefore, the “Specialist” refers to portfolio man-
agers with a more concentrated professional history while the “Generalist” refers
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to those with more diversified experience in mutual fund management. Both the
univariate and multivariate estimation findings suggest that “Specialist” managers
outperform “Generalist” managers. In addition, the “Specialist” tends to exhibit
stock-picking ability while the “Generalist” tends to exhibit market-timing ability.
This essay considers an individual’s past working experience as an essential deter-
minant of their current career performance and provides a new method to evaluate
the mutual fund performance from the perspective of the manager’s lifetime working
experience. The findings of this study are expected to be particularly useful for in-
dividual investors, since an observable managerial characteristic such as managerial
past experience would allow them to more appropriately choose where to allocate
their money for investment purposes.
This essay can be further improved in several aspects. Firstly, we only include
individual fund managers due to the database limitation. The effort can be made in
the future to construct a more comprehensive managerial bibliography dataset. Sec-
ondly, we currently analyze the manager’s stock selection and market timing ability
based on the assumption that only one type of skill exists. However, according to
Ferson and Mo (2016), it would be difficult to distinguish one skill from the other
if a fund manager attempts to adopt both skills. Moreover, Ferson and Mo (2016)
mention that it is necessary to consider both market level and volatility timing
behavior, as well as security selection ability, when measuring the portfolio perfor-
mance. Therefore, further improvement can be made by applying the methodology
which accommodate all three components as discussed in Ferson and Mo (2016).
The second essay analyzes the performance patterns of new funds during the
early stage after their creation, and provides potential explanations for their short-
lived outperformance. Instead of investigating the overall fund performance, this
chapter concentrates on the emerging period of mutual funds (the first 6 months
after creation of new funds) using an event time approach, where the event is the
date when the fund is initiated. Using a sample of incubation-free mutual fund
data from 1996 to 2015, we address the questions of (i) whether new mutual funds
outperform the market and (ii) if they do what may explain their superior perfor-
mance. We find evidence of outperformance for the new funds during their emerging
period defined here as the first 6 months of their existence, both before and after
fund expenses are taken into account. This finding is consistent with prior literature
which provides evidence that new US equity mutual funds outperform their peers
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by 0.15% per month over the first 3 years (Karoui and Meier, 2009). This outperfor-
mance, however, only lasts for a short term and disappears soon after the emerging
period. The short-term outperformance during the emerging period is negatively
related with the fund size, which is consistent with the finding in Karoui and Meier
(2009) that funds start by investing more actively in small-cap stocks and gradually
increase their exposure to market risk. We also find that IPO access is a significant
explanation for the short-term outperformance, which indicates that newly created
funds with IPO allocations provide an attractive investment opportunity, especially
during the first 6 months of their lives. However, we do not find significant het-
erogeneity in the outperformance with respect to managerial characteristics such as
team managers and prior experience in equity fund management. We also provide
evidence on the flow-performance relationship.
The evidence of outperformance for the new funds during their emerging period is
particularly useful for mutual fund investors. Our conclusions also have implications
for portfolio managers and fund companies, as we show that IPO allocation is an
effective strategy in enhancing investment flows during the emerging period of a new
fund. In addition, we find that funds created by team managers attract more flows
than funds created by individual managers.
However, this chapter can be enhanced in the future. The first direction to look
at is the expense analysis of IPO, which can be seen as the reward of IPO allocation.
Malhotra and McLeod (1997) already conclude that that expenseconscious investors
should pay attention to some fund characteristics such as the fund size, age, turnover
ratio and cash holding as key determinants of expenses. We can further examine
if IPO allocation dummy is the additional determinant for fund expenses in the
emerging period. The next further analysis we can do is to perform a multinominal
probit model to investigate the fund family’s decision in opening an IPO new fund
following Khorana and Servaes (1999).
The third chapter investigates the idea that fund managers would take into ac-
count turnover risk that they face when adjusting the volatility of portfolios under
their management. We use an instrumental variable (IV) approach to avoid omitted
variable bias from the usual probit regression. We assume that a fund manager’s
primary goal is to reach a top position in the tournament to secure or improve the
career status. Specifically, each fund manager observes the position of her funds
relative to other funds in the same family (family rank) on a continuous basis which
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is reflected in the turnover probability. Therefore, fund managers decide on the
amount of risk to take based on the career risk resulting from the tournament. The
empirical magnitude of the manager turnover risk premium – about 1% greater re-
alized volatility for a one percentage point increase in manager replacement risk –
is in line with calibrated theoretical predictions. Across various regression specifi-
cations, the results indicate that funds which change portfolio managers during the
calendar year are subject to about 1% greater idiosyncratic volatility than funds
which do not change managers. The result is in line with the manager employment
concern literature. This study provides an innovative explanation for the linkage of
fund risk taking and the family tournament. Fund managers who perform badly in
the tournament face greater career risks since they are more likely to be replaced.
Under the resulting pressure, those managers tend to hold more volatile portfolios to
improve their positions within the family tournament. In other words, the manager
replacement risk driven by the peer pressure from the tournament is likely to be
incorporated into the fund’s idiosyncratic risk.
The central finding of third empirical study has several implications for mutual
fund investors, fund families as well as relevant regulatory authorities. According
to Kempf and Ruenzi (2008), the purpose of risk adjustment in the tournament is
not about optimizing an optimal portfolio for investors. Fund families should pay
attention to the rebalancing costs caused by the risk adjustment behavior in the
fund tournament. Secondly, a fund family also suffers from the in-family tourna-
ment negatively because fund managers compete with others in the same family
for inflows. Such uncoordinated behavior of individual fund managers will lead to
considerable agency costs (Ba¨r et al., 2011; Massa et al., 2010). Finally, regulatory
authorities may take an interest in the fund tournament since, as James and Isaac
(2000) find, tournament behavior may lead to irrational price formation in asset
markets.
We are aware that this chapter can be further improved in the following aspects.
First, we can focus on the question of why the fund manager departs from the current
fund – forced or voluntary departures. One possible solution is applied in Kostovet-
sky and Warner (2015) by identifying portfolio managers as in-house employees or
subadvisors. Manager departures by in-house managers are more likely to be volun-
tary, because good performance gives in-house managers better opportunities, such
as joining hedge funds (see (Kostovetsky and Warner, 2015)), causing them to leave.
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In contrast, outperforming subadvisors can take advantage of expanded opportuni-
ties by simply adding clients. Thus, subadvisor data may help reduce classification
error in distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary turnover.
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Appendix
A Mutual Fund Manager Identification
The manager information is not fully disclosed in the CRSP since the manager
information is not required to disclose by the SEC prior to 1988. Even after 1988,
funds are not required to disclose detailed information of each manager in the team
by the SEC. Until February 2006, funds are required to disclose information about
each manager in a team (up to at least four of the members) by the SEC.
CRSP rarely reports more than three manager names; during the majority of that
time, for most of the funds for which Morningstar lists four or more manager names,
CRSP simply reports “Team Managed”. This suggests that the CRSP manager
name variable does not allow researchers reliably to distinguish co-managed funds
with more than three managers from anonymously managed funds
We capture the variable mgr name which refers to the portfolio manager name
from the fund hdr data file. CRSP documents the fund managed by individual
manager directly as the manager name such as “John Smith”. However, if the fund is
managed by more than one manager, CRSP might report the manager information in
different ways “John Smith and Jane White”, “John Smith and Team Managers” or
“Team Managed”. Most of them are impossible to identify each manager’s identity.
Therefore, we keep only the individual fund managers and manually correct typos
or abbreviations. Next, we assign each individual manager a unique ID number
(integer starting from 1); we assign multiple managers with the ID equals 0.
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B Mutual Fund Family Identification
CRSP provides two unique identifiers, crsp fundno and crsp portno. Neither iden-
tifier is unique to “families” of funds, or groups of fund share classes with the same
holdings portfolio and management company. CRSP provides an imperfect way to
identify fund family – to parse common syntax used in the fund name field. It is
based on the convention of using semicolon (;) to distinguish fund class from fund
family. However, it fails for many funds who do not have a semicolon (;) in their
names. Alternatively, we use the CRSP reported management company information
(variable name mgmt name) if we cannot identify the fund family based on fund
name.
We manually correct typos and possible duplicates in the company names and
assign each management company with a unique ID as we did for portfolio man-
agers in Appendix A. We notice that many funds change the management company
because of fund merge or acquisition throughout the whole reporting period. We
attempt to manually merge it to the parent corporation. However, it is still not
perfectly accurate.
C Variable Description for Chapter 5
We present description and usage of factors from Chapter 5 in the following tables.
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